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ABSTRACT
The primary objective of this thesis is to show the significant 
role which statistics and probability theory can play in the design 
of various aspects of a building (i.e. the lifts, the structure, the 
water supply, the thermal environment, the fire protection etc.).
It is shown that the operational performance of the majority of these 
building subsystems is dependent upon one or more factors which are 
probabilistic in nature, and consequently should not be considered 
deterministically as is commonly the practice in present design codes. 
These so called probabilistic approaches to design allow the performance 
of any design solution to be quantified as the frequency, or probability 
of inadequacy.
The second objective of this thesis is to consider the use of two 
rational design procedures to aid the designer in choosing the desired 
probabilities of inadequacy or failure for each subsystem of the 
building. The first method, which was developed during the course of 
this research project, balances the operational performance of all the 
various subsystems of the building using the criterion that the frequency 
of inadequacy of each subsystem should be inversely proportional to the 
consequences of inadequacy. This design criterion produces a building 
which has a satisfactory overall performance from the users view point.
The second rational method considered in this thesis is the use 
of classical cost benefit techniques to determine the optimal economic 
level of performance for each of the probabilistic subsystems. This 
design method requires that capital and running costs must be considered 
in addition to the expected losses should inadequacy of the subsystem 
occur.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Engineering design is essentially the art of using mathematical 
or scientific laws as aids in making decisions on the basis of the 
information available. Comprehensive information is.rarely available, 
consequently many design procedures contain an element based largely, 
if not entirely on engineering experience. As a result, the potential 
Benefits of a rigorous analysis may be severely reduced if the results 
are subsequently amended by the employment of empirical multipliers. 
These are often called safety factors and are included partly to 
compensate for the designer's imperfect knowledge, and partly to 
allow for the uncertainty of: future events. The basis for selecting 
safety factors is not always known and it is likely that the choice 
in some instances may have been made arbitrarily on the basis of 
considerations not always rational or relevant. As a result, the 
adequacy or safety of a design is not always clearly defined and, 
furthermore, thefe may be inconsistencies associated with the perform­
ance of various aspects of the building.
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The use of safety factors often results in over conservative 
design in terms of non-utilized capacity or over provision ,of 
facilities. However this seldom comes to light since it is human ! 
nature to complain only when something is inadequate or fails, 
consequently the designer will tend to err on the side of safety in’ 
order to ensure satisfaction, riowever the initial cost will increase 
with the degree of conservation, consequently, there is a growing aware­
ness of the need for greater precision in design.
The use of probabilistic methods and of statistics is therefore 
of interest since it is possible, using such techniques, to estimate 
the expected safety or satisfaction associated with a particular 
design. The use of probabilistic techniques is becoming increasingly 
common since, in recent years the engineering professions have 
become more concerned with performance. This is the inevitable result 
of the recognition that random phenomena, which affect the performance 
of a system, can be explicitly analysed. In the field of building 
design seismic effects, wind loading design, water demand and acoustic 
problems have all been tackled using probabilistic techniques. There 
are, however, many others aspects of a building which would be more 
realistically modelled using a probabilistic approach rather than the 
present deterministic approach. However the first hurdle which must 
be overcome if probabilistic methods are to be more generally accepted 
by engineers is one of education. In particular the simple concept 
that there is a finite probability of failure associated with any 
design solution must be accepted. In most cases, the major design task 
is to ensure this probability is at an acceptably low value but, never­
theless it is real and non-zero. The determination of the probability 
of failure or inadequacy, referred to subsequently in this thesis as 
the failure rating, associated with a design solution depends upon 
the probabilistic factors being identified and then upon sufficient 
data being available to enable the variability of these factors to-be 
algebraically or graphically modelled.
It is convenient at this point to consider in greater detail the 
implications of probability theory in relation to building design.
The success or otherwise of a building depends upon how well the 
building functions which in turn depends upon the performance of 
the various subsystems of the building. These include special, 
environmental, structural and service subsystems, furthermore the 
performance of many of these building subsystems depends upon at least 
one probabilistic factor. Table 1.1 lists the various probabilistic 
subsystems of a building and indicates the probabilistic variable(s) 
in each case.
Considerable progress has been made in the past two decades in the 
development of analytical techniques used as a basis for building sub­
system design. However the benefits of these refined analytical methods
Category Subsystem Cause of design uncertainty
Environment
Heating
Variability of
External climatic conditions
Cooling ft•
Acoustics External and internal generated 
noise.
Services Sanitary appliance 
allocation
User demand
Storage tank sizing 
(Hot & Cold)
Water consumption
Pipe sizing Flow rate demand
Number of electric 
sockets
User demand
Fire prevention 
& protection
Likelihood of fire & severity
Electrical supply Electricity consumption
Circulation Lift installations Passenger demand
Corridor sizing & 
stair sizing
Expected usage
Structural Super structure Expected loading, i.e. imposed, 
wind, snow, earthquake
Foundations ft
Table 1.1 Examples of Probabilistic Building Subsystems
are severely reduced if a deterministic value of a probabilistic 
factor such as the demand or climatic conditions is assumed for design 
purposes. In the few building subsystems where the current design 
procedure uses a probabilistic technique, the design failure rate is 
usually a fixed value specified by the committee which draws up the 
Code of Practice since, in the past, it has been argued that it is not 
practical to leave this decision to the designers. However it would 
be preferable to have more flexible design procedures which recommend 
failure ratings, but essentially allow the designer to choose a.failure 
rating which would take account of the specific requirements of any 
particular building. With this objective in mind design procedures 
incorporating a probabilistic approach should be developed for the 
various subsystems of the building. These must be readily understood 
by designers but they must nevertheless realistically model the real 
situation with the minimum of complications or assumptions. Once the 
operational performance of a building subsystem can be quantified usipg 
probabilistic statements, there is merit in adopting optimization methods 
or any other rational decision criterion, to determine the desirable 
level of subsystems performance^^
During the early stages of this research project it was necessary 
for the candidate to study current design procedures, and to note 
development trends for a wide range of building subsystems. Inevit­
ably, this led to an interest in the overall philosophy of building 
design;and current trends in the building design process are briefly 
reviewed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF BUILDING DESIGN
2.1 The Basic Purposes of, and Requirements for a Building
2.1.1 The purposes. A building has a twofold basic purpose; first 
to protect the occupants from adverse climatic and social conditions, 
and second to enable the occupants to undertake their tasks in the most 
convenient and efficient way.
2.1.2 The requirements. With the above purposes in mind the basic 
requirements for a building are:-
a) A structural frame which safely resists the climatic 
conditions and dead loads to which the building will be 
exposed.
b) An external skin to prevent climatic and environmental 
intrusion.
c) The inclusion of life support systems to ensure comfortable 
internal environmental conditions.
d) The installation of various services to assist the occupants 
in their activities.
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2.2 The Building Design Process
The satisfactory design of buildings requires that many specialists 
and engineering professions must be consulted. The traditional approach 
to design with the continual revision of drawings due to the contrary 
objectives of the architect, structural engineers, services engineers 
and quantity surveyor is irrational. As a consequence a more fully 
integrated design team approach is receiving increasing popularity at 
the present time. This trend towards a more rational approach to design 
has meant that operational research methods, such as network theory and
critical path analysis are now being considered as design aids to 
identify the inter-relationship between the various decisions which 
must be made when designing a building. The objective of such methods 
is a correct sequential ordering for design decision making. Other 
mathematical and economic criteria are also being used to analyse 
the design process, and hence develop more efficient approaches to
(3)
design . A common conclusion of these studies is the interdependence 
of all subsystems within a building, any decision made with regard to 
say the thermal properties of the building will affect many other 
aspects of the building*s performance. To ensure that the full 
implications of any decision are realised it is important that the . 
Architect, mechanical engineer, the electrical engineer, the heating 
engineer, the structural engineer and the quantity surveyor are all 
consulted at every stage of the design process. This multi-disciplinary 
design approach is in common use, and is proving absolutely essential 
for the tall buildings which are increasingly commonplace in modem cities 
The importance of the services in tall buildings cannot be over emphasised 
as frequently it is the technological problems associated with the 
services and internal environment, rather than structural or social 
problems which limit the size of modem buildings. Consequently it is 
essential that all the various service specialists are consulted at 
the outset of design.
Many multi-disciplinary consultants now exist, and although it is 
recognised that the whole design process can take longer than the 
traditional design process, the improvements in terms of economic 
efficiency and user satisfaction can more than compensate for the 1 
extended design period.
The main drawback to the implementation of the design team approach 
in practice is gaining inter-disciplinary cooperation. The various 
professions involved have been accused of being over concerned with 
their own status or position in the building design team.
2.3 Building Appraisal and Performance
. In the lase decade psychologists have entered the field of building
design. It is argued by architectural and environmental psychologists
that the degree of satisfaction offered by a building depends on human
reaction, consequently the determination of spacial layout requirements,
environmental comfort criterion, lighting levels, internal colouring
etc. should be left to the psychologist who is experienced in assessing
human reaction. Improving the performance of buildings by using more
scientifically defined user design criteria means that existing
buildings must be appraised since it is impossible to improve the level
of satisfaction provided by buildings until people's reaction to existing
(A)standards have been assessed. Markus suggests that the feed back of 
information concerning the mechanical performance and human reaction to 
a building should be the last stage of the design process, as shown in
Figure 2.1. This information is then available to improve the perform 
ance of future buildings.
SYNTHESIS
Determine a design solution which best meets the needs
CONSTRUCTION 
Construction of the building
FEED-BACK
Appraisal of the building's performance when in use
ANALYSIS
Determine the needs and requirements for the building being designed
Figure 2.1 A Simplified Design Model
As shall be seen in subsequent chapters the defining of satisfactory 
standards of performance is an explicit requirement of design decision 
methods based on the probabilistic evaluation of subsystem performance.
Many techniques for design evaluation have been d e v e l o p e d , ^  
however scientifically rigorous appraisal of existing buildings is 
inevitably time consuming. Unfortunately the results of building
appraisal is beneficial to future buildings rather than to the owner 
or users of the building appraisal. Consequently the client is 
unwilling to finance post construction evaluations, and as a result
this is only very gradually being accepted as the final stage of the
. (4)
design process as recommended by Markus . The most serious attempt
at building appraisal was undertaken by the Building Performance
Research Unit at Strathclyde University. Specialists from many fields
combined in an attempt to rigorously appraise the performance of
schools, and hence propose design criteria for future schools. A more
thorough description of the work of this research unit can be found
in "Building Performance"^.
The aim of a performance analysis is not just to provide a building, 
but to provide one which will best satisfy the occupants or clients' 
needs. The objective is basically that of optimising the allocation 
of the resources available.
2.4 The Building Economist
From the community's or occupants' point of view a building should 
provide a comfortable and convenient environment to undertake certain 
tasks. As already discussed, the architectural psychologist is best 
equipped to quantify user requirements and convert them to design 
performance criteria. The owner or developer is equally concerned 
with the financial implications of any decision and consequently he uses 
a building economist, in practice a quantity surveyor, to ensure that 
the financial resources are efficiently allocated. The aim of the 
building economist is to optimise the financial performance of the 
building over its expected life. During the last decade the economist 
has shown the relevance of the running costs to the total life cycle 
cost of 3 building. It is now being realised that the running costs 
in the form of maintenance, repairs and fuel can, over the life of a 
building, be many times greater than the capital cost of the building. 
Consequently using conventional capital cost design and tendering methods 
does not necessarily produce the most efficient building. It is 
essential that the cost implications of decisions should be more 
thoroughly examined in the design of modern buildings. In subsequent
chapters the application of cost orientated design decision aids to 
building design problems will be considered in greater detail.
2.5 Integrated Environmental Design
The difficulties of using the traditional building design process 
when the expertise of so many disciplines is involved prompted Hardy 
& 0 fSullivan to investigate a new design process which they called 
Integrated Environmental Design (I.E.D.)^. As this title suggests 
they were primarily concerned with the climatic modifying effects of 
a building, and the rational integration of the environmental services 
in a building. However the basic aims of I.E.D. has wider implications 
for the total design process of the building. The basic principles 
upon which Integrated Environmental Design is based are as follows;
a) Joint team working between architects, structural engineers, 
quantity surveyors, service engineers, and any other special­
ists from the outset of design.
b) The adoption of the cost-in-use approach, evaluating costs and 
benefits on a long term basis, rather than the conventional 
capital cost approach.
c) The application of the principle of the conservation of energy 
by using thermal insulating material, systems to redistribute 
energy and the storing of excess energy rather than expelling 
it from the building.
d) The use of energy rejection or storage at the outside walls of 
the building to minimize the amount of excess energy within 
the building.
e) The use of the principles of integrated internal environment 
design to produce a balanced environment at all times.
f) The feedback of information from completed buildings, using 
scientific appraisal techniques, to produce improvements in 
subsequent designs.
The Electricity Council are promoting the use of Integrated 
Environmental Design. Although the advantages and actual financial
savings associated with the use of I.E.D. have been questioned, the 
method incorporates many logically desirable principles. For example 
the multi-disciplinary approach to design, the use of total life Cycle 
cost considerationsand economic optimising techniques, and finally 
the inclusion of appraisal methods which can only be of benefit to 
the future built environment.
2.6 Computer Aided Design
' *
Computer methods can make use of probabilistic information, con­
sequently it is thought beneficial to outline the advances in the 
application of computers to building design which have occurred in 
recent years.
The basic advantage of computers is the ease with which they can 
quickly examine the consequences of various design possibilities. 
Computer techniques have now been developed to compare and evaluate 
in detail various spacial lay-out alternatives, and in fact spacial
•. /g\
optimisation procedures have been developed . The complexity of the 
problem in terms of design constraints and the number of variables 
involved makes the task of quantitative optimisation impossible without 
the use of computers. An additional development in this field has 
been computer graphics, where the results of an analysis or optimising 
procedure are presented graphically either on a screen or as a paper 
print-out.
In the building services field complex and laborious mathematical
analyses have been found to be amenable to computerised solutions. In
the thermal environment field programmes have been developed to therm-
(9)ally analyse a building . Such programmes enable the thermal con­
sequences of various design alternatives to be rapidly and easily 
assessed using random climatic data generated from representative 
probability distribution functions for each of the climatic factors.
It is difficult to theoretically model the use of lifts in 
buildings. However using computer simulation techniques Barney has 
developed a suite of programmes to investigate lift performance in 
buildings The output of a simulation run is the expected perform­
ance of a particular lift system in the form of a probability distribu-
tion function. Lift system parameters can be changed and the effects 
on performance investigated using the simulation programme.
Simulation techniques are being developed for a number of other 
building service subsystems. The shortcoming of such simulation 
techniques is that although the programme might accurately model the 
use of the system, the accuracy of the resulting performance distribu­
tion depends upon the accuracy of the demand or load distribution 
function used as an input to the simulation model.
2.7 Design Codes and Guides
Throughout this thesis continual reference will be made to 
design guides and various Codes of Practice. A brief introduction to 
such documents would seem beneficial.
Throughout this century the primary objective in building design 
has always been to use every tool available to improve the standards 
of comfort, safety, economic efficiency, convenience and aesthetics.
To fulfil this objective many specialists from other fields become 
involved in building design. The results of all the research and 
development activities undertaken in the various building design 
fields is summarised in the ever increasing number of design guides, 
Codes of Practice, British Standards, and statutory laws and regula­
tions which have been written to ensure safe and desirable buildings.
It has often been remarked that with so many statutory regulations 
and advisory codes there seems no room left for an engineer to make 
positive decisions. In defence of design and planning regulations 
it can be said that the built environment has such a profound effect 
on the quality of life of the community that it is of utmost importance 
to see that the community^ needs are a primary design consideration.
British Standards are a method of summarising information which 
it is thought will be of use to industry as a whole. Many British 
Standards relate to building design. These are generally the standards 
concerning material or component properties, or methods of testing. 
British Standards are not mandatory regulations although on many issues
the Building Regulations,^  ^  which are again very loosely written 
and non-mandatory, use "deem to satisfy British Standards" as design 
requirements. Compliance with the Building Regulations is frequently 
a prerequisite for planning permission and the fire officers1 certificate 
of safety, consequently it is frequently essential to adhere to the 
recommendations of British Standards.
Codes of Practice have the much more definite aim of assisting the
engineer in the design of a particular aspect of the building. Codes
of Practice combine all the information of relevant British Standards
to produce in a logical fashion a guide for designing that particular
subsystem of the building. Codes of Practice exist for the design of
the artificial lighting, ventilation rates, sound insulation, precautions
against fire, dead and superimposed loading, wind loading, sanitary
appliance allocation and many other aspects of the building. A full
(12 Vlist of current Codes of Practice appears in the BSI Yearbook .
The complexity of each Code of Practice obviously depends upon the 
complexity of that particular subsystem and the complexity of the 
approach to its design, however they all have a similar format. The 
general introduction indicates the scope of the Code, defines the various 
purposes of that subsystem within the building and hence indicates the 
factors which may affect the actual desired standard of design. The 
philosophy of the design procedure is usually described and then inform­
ation is given which will allow the procedure to be used. It is usual 
in Codes of Practice to recommend-desired levels of performance under 
various conditions, or in various types of buildings, these might be 
called the design criteria. For example the Code of Practice relating 
to artificial lighting recommends illuminance levels for various tasks.
In defining the design criteria the Code of Practice will take into 
consideration any relevant statutory regulations and also indicate by­
laws which, under certain circumstances, mpst be consulted in addition 
to the Code of Practice. The problem of integrating mandatory require­
ments with Codes of Practice recommendations is not as difficult as it 
may appear; by-laws usually state minimum levels of service from the 
health or safety view point, whereas Codes of Practice are more con­
cerned with acceptable rather than minimum standards.
For many aspects of a building the fire safety criterion will 
be of paramount importance and this, rather than any other design 
requirement, will dictate the hardware design. Examples of this 
are corridor widths, partition and door design, and stairway design.
Historically the design of the structure has been given a higher 
priority in buildings than the services. As a consequence the current 
structural codes are in general more sophisticated than the codes 
relating to the services. One of the fundamental differences concerns 
the assessment of the design load or demand assumed for subsystem 
design. For both structural and services design the degree of satis­
faction associated with a hardware design depends on the accuracy of 
the predicted subsystem demand or loading values. Considerable 
research has been undertaken to satisfactorily model the variability of 
structural loads; this has resulted in detailed design codes for the 
wind, snow, earthquake and superimposed loadings. However the varia­
bility of service subsystem loads or demands has not been considered 
in such a detailed manner. Semi-probabilistic and probabilistic formats 
are being increasingly used in structural codes at the present time, 
logically the next step should be to modify service and environmental 
building design codes to ensure the probabilistic implications are 
more realistically modelled.
Although Codes of Practice exist for the majority of service
. (13) .
subsystems,the IHVE design guide is more commonly used by 
practising building services engineers. This guide provides design 
information for heating, air conditioning, water supply, fire pre­
cautions, vertical transportation, electrical supply, waste disposal 
and lighting. Much of the information is duplicated from the relevant 
Codes of Practice, however the requirements of other relevant documents 
are incorporated to provide a comprehensive reference manual. At times 
contradictory recommendations do arise between the IHVE Guide and the relevant 
Codes of Practice, however this is inevitable when considering the 
breadth of information contained within the IHVE Guide.
2.8 Conclusions
Following this brief study of the building design process a 
number of conclusions were reachdd by the author;
1) Semi-probabilistic or probabilistic design, procedures 
should be developed whenever possible for the service and 
environmental subsystems of a building.
2) Total life cycle cost techniques should be more commonly 
used as a basis for decision making in building design*
As will be seen in subsequent chapters cost benefit methods 
require that it be possible to explicitly quantify a subsystem 
in probabilistic terms. Consequently the development of such 
techniques relies on the implementation of the first 
conclusion.
3) The building planner will evolve as an important member of 
the design team. The planner will understand the counter­
objectives of the various members of the design team, and
will be able to coordinate the design effort taking due account 
of the financial implications of design decisions.
The primary problem preventing the development of probabilistically 
orientated service and environmental building design procedures is one 
of education. Only when the benefits of such procedures have been 
recognised and accepted by the building industry can any positive 
changes be expected. The objective of this thesis will be to show how 
probabilistic design procedures can be devised for various building 
subsystems, and to illustrate the possible benefits in terms of 
cost orientated design decision aids.
CHAPTER THREE
STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES RELEVANT TO BUILDING 
DESIGN
3.1 Introduction
Statistical techniques are relevant to design decision making 
in the degree to which they allow the designer to deal with the 
variability in
a) Human behaviour - anatomical, physiological, psychological
and sociological.
b) Material behaviour - strength, life, magnitude, density
weight etc.
c) Climatic behaviour - wind speed, rainfall, temperature,
humidity etc.
In this chapter the basic principles of the statistical methods 
applicable to various building design problems will be described.
3.2 Elementary Probability Theory
Statisticians have defined a measure of relative likelihood of an 
event, which they call probability, as follows: "the probability of 
un event occurring is given by the ratio of the number of observed 
occurrences of the event to the total number of possible outcomes of 
the experiment." Probability levels must always be interpreted carefully. 
For many building services the "outcomes-'of the experiment" are in units 
of time, in which case the probability of demand is given by the ratio 
of the duration of the demand to the total study period. For example 
consider the case of a water outlet which is in use on average for five, 
two minute periods during the peak sixty minute usage period of the day.
The probability of the outlet being in use during this period is 
5 x 2■ - - or 0.166. Probability values always lie between zero and unity,
with unity representing complete certainty.
The probability of event A or event B occurring is the sum of the 
individual probabilities of event A and B. That is
P. yj 55 P. + PB - 3.1A or B A B
The probability of events A and B occurring is given by
PA , u = PA x PB - 3.2A and B A B
Equations 3.1 and 3.2 are the Additive and Multiplicative Laws of 
Probability respectively. These two laws are the basis of many of the 
probabilistic analyses which will be proposed in this thesis.
To illustrate the use of the Multiplicative Law imagine a house
with ten electrical sockets, each of which has a probability of use,
p, of 0.2. The probability of all ten sockets being in use simultan­
eously is p or 10 It is possible to determine the probability 
of any number of the ten sockets being in simultaneous use. In general 
the probability of r out of n sockets being in use is given by
n_, nn r  v r i - r  _  *
P = C x p x (1-p) - 3.3
r r v
where is the number of combinations of n taken r at a time and 
is given by
nC n!
r r!(n-r) 1
where n! is the factorial of n and is equal to 
n! = n x (n-1) x (n-2) x . . . 2 x 1
Equation 3.3 is called the Bernoulli or Binomial expression.
Returning to the electrical socket problem, using Equation 3.3 
the probability of any number of sockets being in simultaneous use can
be determined. By summing these probability figures it is possible to 
determine the probability of any particular number of sockets being 
inadequate, or conversely the number of sockets associated with any 
“predefined failure rating value (probability of inadequacy).
3.3 Probability Frequency Distributions
Using the basic laws of probability it is possible to construct 
probability frequency distributions, and hence make clear quantifiable 
statements concerning future events. Frequency distributions can be 
beneficial in building services design because they give a graphical 
indication of the actual variability of the expected demand or load.
3.3.1 The binomial frequency distribution. In the previous 
sections the binomial distribution function was shown to theoretically 
model the use of electrical sockets. Figure 3.1 is the characteristic 
shape of a binomial frequency distribution. The area under the graph 
is equal to unity and the area under that part of it from zero outlets 
up to x outlets (shaded section) gives the probability of x or fewer 
outlets being in simultaneous use. In general terms the binomial 
distribution enables one to predict the likelihood of coincidence of 
any given number of independent events, if the likely occurrence of 
each event is known. The binomial frequency distribution has the 
following two characteristics: the variable under examination, i.e. the 
number of outlets in simultaneous use, varies discretely, that is it 
increases by one whole number at a time; and secondly the variable 
can only take values between zero and 'n', where fn f is the finite 
possible number of users. The binomial expression is only symmetrical 
when p is 0,5, at other times the frequency distribution will have a 
skewed shape. A binomial frequency distribution is described by the 
meap and standard deviations, [see next section for definitions^ 9 which 
are given by
Mean, (y) = n * p
Standard deviation, (a) = (n x p x q)^
where ?n f is ^ the total number of possible simultaneous events and
''p' is the probability of occurrence of each event.
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The degree of skewness can also be quantified, however, it is 
not considered necessary to describe skewness in detail here.
3.3.2 The normal frequency distribution. The. frequency distributions 
of many events in nature where the variable is continuous^ that is the 
variable can take any numerical value a r e  found to approximate to a 
bell shaped type of curve known as the normal curve (Figure 3.2) .
Consequently this curve can be used as a model when dealing with these
"normal" random variables. The normal frequency distribution is 
described by two parameters; the mean, which is a measure of the central 
tendency of the data, and the standard deviation, which is a measure of 
the spread of the data. For any set of empirical data the mean and 
standard deviation are calculated using the following formulae;
3.4
3.5
where 'x* is the value of the variable (or the mid-point of a
particular range of fx f values),and *f* is the frequency of occurrence
of fx f.
Alternative but less Useful measures of central tendency are:
a) The mode, which is the most frequently occurring variable value
b) The median, which is the variable value such that half the 
observations fall below it and half are above it.
An alternative measure of the spread of the distribution is the 
variance which is qqual to the square of the standard deviation.
If the empirical frequency distribution derived from the raw data 
can be approsimated by a theoretical normal distribution function then 
it is possible to use tables to determine the probability of a parti­
cular event occurring, or conversely to find the variable value assoc­
iated with a particular probability of being exceeded. This probabilistic 
information can be extremely useful when making design decisions. The 
equation of the normal frequency distribution function is rather complex*,
mean (y) IfiL
If
standard deviation (a) = I f £  - vz
J
Y = e-(X-u)z/2<J2 _ 3>6
C V H
where Y is the height of the curve for the particular value of *Xf and 
y and o are the mean and standard deviation of the distribution 
of fX f,respectively.
The probability of *X* being greater than fb', which is equivalent 
to the area under the normal curve between X = b and X =a [^Figure 3.2], 
is given by
00
1 -(X-y)2/2a2
P(X > b) = dX - 3.7
This is not an elementary function and hence its integral cannot 
be written down in simple form. If this function were tabulated in 
the above form then a separate table would be required for each pair 
of y and a values. However a simple transformation can reduce the 
problem to the computation of a single table. Let
V = L — E  and dX = adV
a
The probability that 'X* is greater than fb f can then be written as 
P(X > b) =
. y/lva 
b-y
- y2/2
e a dV —  3.8
a
ci
■ i
f(V) dV.
b-y
a
f(V> has the form of a normal density function with zero mean 
and unity standard deviation. This is called the standard score normal 
distribution function. This function has been solved for various 
values of and the results tabulated (Appendix 1, Table A.I.)
To find the failure rate associated with any variable value *bf, the 
equivalent value of V is calculated using the mean and standard devia­
tion of the empirical data, and then Table A.1 is used.
In theory a variable only conforms to a normal frequency dis­
tribution if it is continuous and has infinite upper and lower limits.
However providing the upper and lower limits are sufficiently far 
from the mean value then a normal distribution can be assumed.
Before leaving the theory of the normal distribution one 
further point must be developed. If it can be assumed that the mean, 
y, and standard deviation, a, apply to each of N identical frequency 
distributions, then the mean of the total distribution is Nxy and the 
standard deviation is, v'Wxo. To illustrate the consequences of this 
consider two identical water outlets served by the same pipe. If the 
mean flow rate demand of each outlet is ten litres per second and the 
standard deviation is two litres per second then for a 0.05 failure 
rating the pipe must be sized for a demand given by;
demand = N*y + x Vn nc x aU.Uo
Now using Table A.1 05 **^45 hence
demand = 2 x 10 + 72 x 1.645 x 2
= 24.652 litres per second.
If separate pipes serve each outlet then the design demand value 
for each pipe associated with a 0.05 failure rating is given by
demand = 10 + 1.645 x 2
= 13.3 litres per second.
A greater supply flow rate is required when the outlets are served 
separately because extreme demands at both outlets are unlikely to occur 
simultaneously. This is an example of the concept of diversity of 
demand which is extremely relevant in building services design.
3.3.3 Gumbels extreme value distribution. When making decisions 
concerning the 'size' of building service systems the designer is 
concerned with the extreme demands or loads which are likely to occur.
If a normal distribution function is used to represent the variable 
demand then the designer is only concerned with the extreme ’tails* 
of the distribution. Unfortunately the use of an assumed theoretical 
function to represent empirical data can lead to erroneous predictions, 
especially in the ’extreme* regions of the distribution. The aim of
a statistical theory of extreme values is to explain observed extremes 
arising in samples of given size, or valid for a given period or length, 
area or volume, and to forecast extremes that may be expected to occur 
within a certain sample size, time, area etc. The essential conditions 
for the use of extremal theory are first, that statistical variates 
are being dealt with, and second that the initial distribution from 
which the extremes have been drawn and its parameters remain constant 
from one sample to the next. It is also necessary that the observed 
extremes should be extremes of samples of independent data, however 
independence can be legitimately assumed provided the extremes are taken 
from large samples.
The basic fundamental of extreme value theory is that the extreme 
values, namely the first, second, third etc, or, the last, penultimate, 
and preceding values are not fixed. They are themselves statistical 
variates depending upon the initial distribution from which the samples 
have been drawn and upon the sample size. Modem extreme value theory 
is based on the work of Fisher and T i p p e t t H o w e v e r  Emil Gumbel 
developed the theory of extreme values and it is his work which is 
extensively referred to whenever extreme value methods are used. Gumbel 
summarised the theory of extreme values and its application in a series 
of lectures given at the National Bureau of Standards in the 1950fs ^ ^ \  
The reader is referred to this document for a comprehensive description 
of the mathematical basis of the extreme value function. Gumbel and 
others concluded that extreme value observations are exponentially 
related to their associated failure ratings or return periods. Equation 
3.9 is the exact algebraic form of this exponential relationship for 
extreme observations.
X = - a.logj^- logp-Pf)] + b - 3.9
where X is the extreme observation value, and
P^ is the failure rating associated with X being exceeded.
Probability paper is frequently used to simplify a statistical 
distribution function for use by engineers, scientists, etc. Referring 
to Equation 3.9, if fX ? is plotted against (1-P^) on graph paper with 
a double logarithmic transformed y scale then a straight line will 
result if the data has extreme value characteristics. Algebraic or 
graphical methods can then be used to predict future events. It is
not possible using an extreme value distribution to forecast 
precisely the largest (smallest) value expected during a certain time 
period, rather it is possible to forecast the most probable largest 
(smallest) value expected during the given time period, and give limits 
within which this largest (smallest) value may be expected to fall for 
a particular degree of confidence. The theory of extremes leads to the 
knowledge of the risk associated with a particular design solution 
and thus makes possible the introduction of rational 'safety statements*
Gumbel proposed a method for fitting a theoretical straight line 
to, the *n* observations plotted on the extreme value probability paper. 
This method, which is illustrated using an example in Appendix II, is 
based on the least sum of squares criterion which is explained in more 
detail in the next section. A method is also required to graphically 
illustrate the'goodness of fit*between the theoretical line and the 
observations. Control curves are used for thispurpose and the procedure 
proposed by Gumbel to construct the control curves is again illustrated 
in Appendix II. The control curves allow one to make statements of the 
forau "there is ninety-five percent confidence that the maximum 
(minimum) variable value expected during X years will be in the range 
X - Z. "
\
Extreme value techniques have been shown to be particularly 
relevant in the statistical treatment of floods, strength of specimens, 
climatological extremes, duration of human life and for stock market 
predictions. In this thesis extreme value theory will be shown.to 
have relevance to the design of a number of building services.
3.3,4 Other distribution functions relevant to building design.
The Poisson distribution is applicable to discrete events where the 
probability of occurrence of an individual event is low and the upper 
limit to the number of simultaneously occurring events is very high. 
Possible applications in building design are the arrival of passengers 
for the lifts, dining facilities, lavatories, the arrival of cars at 
garages, and the incidence of accidents, faults or breakdowns.
N The Poisson distribution can be used to approximate to the 
binomial distribution when the chance of each individual event is 
small (less than 0.1) and the total possible number of simultaneous
events is large.
The negative exponential distribution is applicable to a 
continuous variable with zero minimum and infinite maximum values.
This distribution can be used to model the interval between the events 
which have been listed above as possible applications of the Poissons 
distribution.
When observations cannot be sufficiently accurately represented 
by a theoretical distribution function then probabilistic statements 
can be derived from a graphical plot of the cumulative frequency dis­
tribution. The cumulative frequencies are obtained by adding success­
ively, starting from the bottom of the individual frequencies. As an 
illustration of this procedure Table 3.1 gives cumulative frequencies 
and cumulative percentages for summer temperatures. The associated 
cumulative distribution function is shown in Figure 3.3..
3.4 Regression Techniques
When a mathematician speaks of the existence of a functional relation* 
between two variable quantities he means that they are connected by a 
simple 'formula* such that if the value of one variable is known then 
the value of the second variable can be found. Engineering is not pure 
mathematics, engineering formulae or mathematical models are based upon 
experimental results or observations. Because of the influence of 
disturbing factors in nature the plotted relation between the two 
variables will frequently not conform exactly to a theoretical function.
In such a situation it is necessary to draw conclusions based upon a 
trend relation, and upon an indication of the degree of confidence 
associated with the use of this approximate function. As an example 
consider a problem for which there are theoretical grounds to suppose 
that an underlying linear relationship links the two variables X and Y
i.e. Y = m . X + c
The best fitting line may be good or bad but there will always be a 
straight line which fits the observations better than any other 
straight line. ^There are a number of criteria which can be used to
DAILY MEAN 
TEMP.
No. of 
OBSERVATIONS
CUMULATIVE
PROBABILITY
4 5 - 4 9 3 .003
50 - 54 54 .063
55 - 59 234 .313
60 - 64 374 .713
65 - 69 195 .923
70 - 74 54 .99
75 - 79 7 1.0
Table 3.1 Cumulative Probabilities of Mean Daily Temperatures in 
London during the Summer
(Data taken from Shellard & Brown^*^^)
0.8
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Figure 3.3 The Cumulative Distribution Function for the Data given 
in Table 3.1.
derive the best fitting line. However the least sum of squares of the 
errors is the generally accepted regression criterion, although fitting 
the curve by feyeT is often acceptable when only limited data exists. 
The least squares procedure is best described using an example.
Suppose an investigation were made concerning the relationship linking 
two quantities Y and X. Let Table 3.2 represent the value of Y 
observed for several values of X.
Y 5 8 9 10
X 1 2 3 4
Table 3.2 Observed values of Y for various values of X.
Assuming the best fit line is represented by the expression 
Y = m x X + c
then draw up a table of predicted and observed values of Y. Finally 
compute the discrepancy at each point. This procedure is illustrated 
in Table 3. 3.
Value of X Predicted Y Observed Y Discrepancy, s
1 m + c 5 m + c - 5
2 2m + c 8 2m + c - 8
3 3m + c 9 3m + c ~ 9
4 4m + c 10 4m + c - 10
Table 3.3 Least squares regression procedure.
The1least squares1 criterion requires that the value of m and c 
be found which minimises the sum of the squares of all the discrepancies 
listed in the fourth column of Table 3. 3. The sum of the squares of 
the errors is given by
£ s2 = 30m2 + 4c2 + 270 + 2omc - 176m - 64c
This expression is a minimum for values of m and c found by
equating the first differential of this expression to zero and 
solving. That is
d(s)
dm
- 60m + 20c - 176 = 0 - 3.10
a n d  8 c + 20m - 64 = 0 - 3.11
dc
d(s) =
Solving
m . = 1 . 6  and c . = 4min min
Hence the best fitting straight line is given by the expression 
y = 1.6X + 4
In general form the gradient and intercept of the best fitting 
line are given by
(IX).(lY)
. * • — —
" "  I*-as*
(£x).(Jxy) - (£y).(£x2 ) 
d X )2 - N.(£x2)
and c . = --------------------- — —  - 3.13
min
From the above two expressions it is easy to see that linear
\
regression problems can be extremely tedious when solved manually if 
there is a considerable amount of data. However the linear regression 
procedure can be solved using computer facilities. The linear 
regression problems considered in this thesis have all been solved 
using computer techniques. ■
A similar least sum of squares regression technique can be used 
to find the best fitting equation for polynomial expressions. Once 
again computer facilities can be used to reduce the arithmetical content 
of this regression procedure.
Although a regression technique has been described for determining 
the algebraic equation of the line which best fits observed data, this 
does not give an indication of the degree of correlation between the
two variables. However the correlation coefficient, frf, can be used 
for this purpose. An 'r' value of one or minus one describes a perfect 
fit between the theoretical line and the observed data, whereas an fr! 
value of zero describes the absence of a relation. The correlation 
coefficient is computing using the formula
I [(X-X) x (Y-Y)]
r = ----------— -------- t—  -3.14
K(x-X)2 x £(Y-Y)zp
where X and Y are observed values and !
X and Y are thh means of the X and Y observations respectively.
3.5 Confidence Intervals and Goodness of Fit
In this chapter theoretical frequency distributions have been des­
cribed which may be used to represent statistical data. However it is 
important to be able to quantify how well a particular theoretical dis­
tribution models the observed data. Alternatively it is important to be 
able to quantify the confidence surrounding a particular estimate of the 
population mean or standard deviation. Instead of predicting that the 
mean will be X a simple calculation can be performed to assert with ninety 
percent, or ninety-five percent, or even ninety-nine percent, confidence 
that the population mean falls within the limits Y and Z. These values 
are called confidence limits and the interval they contain is called a 
confidence interval. The ftf or students distribution is used to determine 
confidence intervals for population means and standard deviations. The ' tf 
distribution is not dissimilar from the normal distribution, but departs 
appreciably from the normal form for small N values. Thus for means of 
large samples,normal tables (Table A.l) can be used to determine con­
fidence limits. For example the ninety-five percent confidence interval 
for the mean is given by
*95 = “X 1 196 X SX
where s- is the standard deviation of the sample mean and y- is the average;
X X
However for small samples/t1 tables (Table A.2) must be used.
In this case the confidence interval depends on the number of*degrees of
freedom1, which is equal to (N-l), where N is the number of observations. 
For example using Table A.2 the ninety-five percent confidence interval 
for the population mean,when there are sixteen observations,is given by
*95 ' Ux ± 2-13 * sT
When using a theoretical distribution to represent observed data 
the question arises as to whether the difference between the observed 
and theoretical frequencies is significant. The statistic, x2>(c^  square), 
is used when a comparison of observed and theoretical frequencies is 
required, x2 is given by:
; X2 > 1 ^ -  -3,15,
where 0 is the observed frequency and E is the expected or theoretical 
frequency.
The theoretical sampling distribution of x2 is known and again 
depends on the number of degrees of freedom. Table A.3 gives the value 
of x2 for various percentage significant levels and numbers of degrees 
of freedom. In a design situation x2 is computed using equation 3.15 
and then Table A.3 is used to determine at what level of significance 
the theoretical distribution function is representative of the observed 
data. In testing the ’goodness of fit1 it is usual to require signif­
icance at least at the ninety or ninety-five percent levels.
Using significance testing techniques it is possible to determine 
control curves for a particular theoretical distribution of observed; 
data. Control curves allow one to make predictive statements of the 
kind "There is a ninety-five percent chance that the variable value 
with a Pyfailure rating will be within the interval Y to Z". In a 
previous section the derivation of control curves for an extreme value 
distribution function was described.
3,6 Reliability Design
A characteristic feature of modem industry is repetition work, 
that is the reproduction of the same thing again and again. However 
on closer examination it will be realised that in spite of the finest 
quality control in manufacture, it is impossible to achieve complete 
consistency in linear dimensions, tensile strength, electrical resist­
ance, life time, or any other parameter which quantifies the manufact­
ured article. However by measuring the length, life, or strength of 
a sample of the articles one can generate the frequency distribution 
of length , life, or strength. Then using graphical or algebraic
techniques, similar to those described earlier in this chapter, it is 
possible to determine the probability of the length, life or strength 
of an article being less or greater than a particular value. In the 
majority of cases such frequency distributions can be represented by 
the normal distribution function.
The degree of quality control surrounding the manufacturing process 
is quantified by the coefficient of variation, V?which is defined as
c
V = —  - 3.16
V
The smaller the value of V the better the quality control.
Reliability analysis becomes moire difficult when two variables 
affect the level of reliability of a product. This is the case in 
structural design where the level of reliability, or conversely the 
probability of failure, is dependent on both the strength of the 
structural component, and the expected load to which the component will 
be exposed. Both strength and loading are probabilistic variables 
and the reliability is equal to the probability of (L-S) being positive, 
where L is the load and S is the strength. This problem will be 
expanded upon in a subsequent chapter.
Building services are provided using equipment and plant made 
from many components. The life of the plant depends upon the reli­
ability of each component and the design characteristics of the plant 
system. If the plant consists of components joined in series such that 
failure of any one component will produce complete failure of the 
system then the reliability of the service system is equal to the 
reliability of the weakest component. In such cases weakest link analysis 
can be used to determine the reliability of the system. However in a 
redundant system the failure of one component will not automatically 
cause failure of the system. In this case the designer must determine 
the coincidence of events which will produce failure and then use the 
component reliability value to determine the probability of coincident 
of the events which wilL cause failure.
In a design situation the desired reliability of the system 
should be defined and component reliability values determined which 
will then produce the desired level of reliability for the whole 
systern.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TWO METHODS FOR DETERMINING ACCEPTABLE 
SUBSYSTEM FAILURE RATINGS
4.1 Introduction
• >
In the general introductipn the performance of many building 
subsystems was shown to be dependent upon at least one probabilistic 
factor. As a consequence subsystem design decisions must be made in 
the face of uncertainty and a finite risk of dissatisfaction or failure 
is unavoidable. If this risk is to be assessed for any design solution 
then the subsystem variables must be considered probabilistically rather 
than deterrainistically. In subsequent chapters detailed methods are 
proposed for a number of building subsystems which will allow the 
failure rate associated with any design solution to be determined.
However, as mentioned in the Introduction, it would be of great advantage 
if the designer could use a rational and simple method for choosing the 
desired subsystem failure rating. In this chapter two methods will be 
proposed to aid the designer in making failure rating decisions. The 
first method bases design failure ratings on the seriousness of the con­
sequences of failure or inadequacy. At the present time a designer sub­
jectively considers the consequences of failure when choosing safety failure
values, for example it is logical to use a larger safety failure when 
designing the structure than when designing the lifts. However it will 
be shown that a more objective criterion can be used to quantify the 
consequence of failure and hence rationalise failure rating decisions.
The second method is the application of cost-benefit techniques to
economically rationalise failure rating decisions. However before
describing these two design decision procedures it is necessary to 
discuss in detail the meaning of various important terms and expressions 
regularly used in this thesis.
4.2 Definition of Terms and Expressions
4.2.1 Building subsystems. In Table 1.1 a list of the 
probabilistic subsystems of a building was given with a description 
of factors which cause the performance of each of these subsystems 
to be probabilistic. However the systematic decision aids described
in subsequent sections of this chapter are relevant when making decisions 
concerning any probabilistic type of event within the building. In 
addition to the events listed in Table 1.1 this includes the reliability 
design of mechanical or electrical components, since service system 
breakdowns will also have quantifiable consequences for the operational 
performance of the building. Also for many ’subsystems* there are , 
several adverse types of events which must all be considered in design. 
Take for example the lift subsystem; failure in terms of an excessive 
waiting time for passengers can be caused by an excessively long 
round trip time of the lift, or a greater than expected passenger arrival 
rate at the lobby. For brevity the term subsystem will be frequently 
used in this, and subsequent chapters, to cover all types of adverse 
events which can occur in a building.
4.2.2 Subsystem operational performance. Performance is a 
particularly vague word having a number of completely diverse meanings. 
Even when used in a design context it may relate to the reliability of 
the system, that is the frequency with which it becomes inoperative,
or it may relate to the adequacy of the system to fulfil its purpose when 
in use. In this thesis the primary concern will be the ’sizing1 
of subsystem hardware, and performance will relate to the probability 
of inadequacy of the subsystem when in use. Quantifying sub­
system operational performance means using a numerical expression to 
represent the degree of satisfaction associated with a design, or 
stated another way, how well the design satisfies the purpose. Complete 
satisfaction can only be obtained by designing for every conceivable 
event. This can be accomplished by using very high safety factors, 
however the cost of such designs is invariably prohibitive and a risk 
of failure or inadequacy must of economic necessity be accepted, either 
implicitly or explicitly chosen.
It is impossible to determine the probability of operational 
inadequacy for any subsystem design unless the ’just satisfactory*
or ’just adequate' event is defined. This is termed the limiting 
state of failure.
4.2.3 The limit state of failure. For a number of subsystems, 
the definition of the limit state of failure is straightforward. >
Consider for example the structural subsystem; it is required that 
the building will not collapse or will not have intolerable deflections. 
Alternatively consider the allocation of power points; it is required 
that the number of sockets exceeds the number of electrical appliances 
simultaneously in use. However for other subsystems where satisfaction 
is subjective and depends on user attitudes, the limit state is more 
difficult to define. For example consider the water supply subsystem; 
an acceptable flowrate is required from every outlet, however individuals 
differ in their assessment of an acceptable flowrate. Similarly, for 
the lift subsystem the limit state of failure is that the users are, 
not inconvenienced by the lift waiting time, although the definition 
of an acceptable waiting time will vary amongst individuals. Many 
studies have been carriedout in recent years, in many cases by 
psychologists, to attempt to define more scientifically acceptable 
comfort or service standards. Several such studies were reported at 
a recent conference^. The basic aim of such studies is to establish 
a relationship between sets of subsystem performance variables and sets 
of human response variables. These latter factors may be measured by 
the use of semantic scales, which attach magnitudes to the way people 
think and speak about the services or environment, or by means of 
direct observation of nonverbal behaviour. In many instances new 
scales for measuring the environment have been devised simply because 
they relate more accurately to human response i.e. the dBA scale used 
in acoustics, or the environmental temperature scale used to assess 
the thermal environment.
If failure rates are to be consistent between various subsystems 
(see next section) it is important that the limit states of failure are 
defined in a consistent manner. Consequently it is proposed that the 
limit state of failure of any subsystem should be the average, ’just 
adequate’ level of service. When there are two distinct degrees of 
failure it is necessary to define a limit state for each level of 
failure. As an example consider the structural design where the consequences
of both the serviceability and ultimate limit states must be 
considered in design.
Unfortunately the satisfaction associated with a particular 
subsystem design will to some degree depend upon the viewpoint of 
the individual. For example the building owner will be more concerned 
with rental value, running costs and profitability of the building, 
whereas the occupants will rate comfort and convenience as a more 
important criterion for appraising subsystem satisfaction. The tenant 
will be more concerned with maximising the output of his employees and 
he will appraise the building from that point of view. As a consequence 
there are several criteria which can be used to define "failure" for 
any system, and hence, on which to base the limit state of failure. 
However it is usually possible to define the prime functional objective 
of the subsystem and it is proposed that the limit state of failure 
should be defined according to this prime objective.
As an example consider the thermal environment. The prime 
objective is to provide a comfortable environment for the occupants.
It might be feasible to reduce the fuel costs by installing a smaller 
or inferior system, however although to the owner this might initially 
seem economically advantageous, as a result the work output of the 
occupants or the rental value of the building would decrease and 
hence nullify any capital or running cost savings. In this instance 
the overriding objective is a comfortable thermal environment and the 
limit state of failure should be defined in terms of acceptable winter 
and summer temperatures.
4.2.4 The 1 failure rate* design criterion. A failure rating 
refers to the probability of operational inadequacy of the subsystem 
during any specified time period, that is one day, one year, or over 
the complete design life of the building. It is possibly easier to 
illustrate the significance of a particular failure rating to a 
designer or client by using the return period of inadequacy or x
failure, which is the inverse of the failure rating. The larger the 
return period of inadequacy the better will be the subsystems * 
operational performance.
In the design situation the aim is to make statements concerning 
the expected performance of any subsystem design. Predictive statements 
such as these can only be based upon past information, and it is 
never possible to be one hundred percent certain about a prediction 
irrespective of the reliability of existing data. As a consequence 
the reciprocal of the failure rating is the average return period of 
failure. If the variable value associated with an TN* day return 
period is used for design purposes then there is approximately a 0.63 
probability of that variable value being exceeded at least once in 
any future fN f day period. For the majority of building subsystems the 
average return period, N, will be an adequate measure of expected per­
formance. However in a number of circumstances the average return 
period does not adequately describe the expected performance to a 
client. For example a statement that the average return period of 
structural collapse is one thousand years will not be as meaningful to 
a client as the statement that there is a 0.077 probability that the 
building will collapse during its design life of eighty years. In 
general terms, if the annual (daily) probability of an adverse event is 
P^, then in a period of N* years (days), the probability Q, that the 
adverse (failure) event will not occur is given by
N*
Q = (1-Pf) - 4.2
and hence the probability that the adverse event will occur at least 
once in N* years (days) is
y  = i - (i-pf)N ' - 4.3
or using equation 4.1,
i , /, U N 1 . ,
P = 1 - (>- jj) - 4.4
where N is the average return period of the event. Figure 4.1 is
* .
the graphical solution of equation 4.3 showing that the performance of 
the subsystem can be improved by either decreasing p* or increasing 
N f. Figure 4.1 can be used as an aid in assessing the significance 
of any particular failure rating.
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Figure 4.1 Solution of equation P’ = 1 - (1 - Pf)^ ' for various P* values
In a design situation the acceptable failure rating must be defined and 
in subsequent sections of this chapter two rational procedures to aid 
the designer in making these failure rating decisions will be described. 
Before the design failure rating can be interpreted as an actual demand or 
loading value to be used i-n subsystem design,the expected probability 
distribution function for each probabilistic variable which affects 
subsystem performance must be determined. In subsequent chapters :the 
problems involved in obtaining relevant data on which to base proba­
bility distribution functions will be discussed in more detail. ■
4*3 The Failure Cost Consistent Design Criterion
,4.3.1 Introduction. As already shown the operational performance 
of the vast majority of building subsystems depends on at least one 
probabilistic variable,and hence design procedures should model these 
variables probabilistically rather than deterministically. If full 
advantage is to be taken of these more realistic analytical models 
then it is necessary to derive a rational method for choosing the 
acceptable failure rating for each subsystem of a building.
/1 \
Rodin has considered the problem of choosing the acceptable risk 
associated with building collapse. He concluded that for a constant 
risk of death the failure rate should decrease as the number of 
storeys increases, because the consequences of failure increase with 
the building height. This concept that the failure rate should depend 
upon the consequence of failure can be applied to all those probabilistic 
subsystems of a building for which a completely safe or operationally 
satisfactory design is iiot possible, and hence, for which a failure 
rate exists whether explicitly or implicitly chosen.
Rodin’s approach of relating the acceptable failure rate to the 
consequence of failure can be taken a stage further. If the product 
of the failure rate and the consequence of failure is constant across 
all. building subsystems, (more precisely for all types of adverse events), 
then the expected losses over any time period will be identical for each 
subsystem and INTER-SUBSYSTEM OPERATIONAL CONSISTENCY may be said to 
exist within that building. This rational approach for choosing
subsystem failure ratings will therefore produce a'balanced building.'
Since the failure rate and return period of failure are inversely 
related, as an alternative the failure cost consistency criterion can 
be defined as follows;
"The ratio of the return period of failure N to the consequences 
of failure should he constant for all subsystems or adverse types of 
events ",
Algebraically this can be expressed as
N = K x I - 4.5
where I represents the consequence of failure and K is given by
K - a x c - 4.6
where‘a’ is the calibration coefficient which is a constant determined 
using a subsystem, or adverse event, where both the acceptable return 
period of failure N, and the consequences of failure, I are known or can 
be accurately estimated. *0 * is the conservatism coefficient, and is 
held constant for all subsystems of a particular building project. 
However ’c’ can be increased or decreased to improve or reduce the 
operational performance of the total building, and hence alter the 
total cost of the project whilst retaining operational consistency.
The philosophy of design summarised above is unacceptable when 
considering similar types of buildings of differing size. It is 
found using equation 4.5 that as the building ?size* increases the 
safety or performance of the building improves. As a consequence 
employees in a large office building will be ’safer’ and more 
’satisfied1 than the occupants of a smaller office building. This is 
clearly undesirable, consequently a parameter which is a function of 
the building ’size1 must be included in the consistency equation to 
ensure that the failure cost consistency criterion produces levels of 
safety and satisfaction which are independent of the building ’size’. 
Equation 4.7 is the revised consistency equation incorporating a 
building size parameter
N ■ - I x a x c x —  - 4.7
Pop
where Pop is the total number of people who could feasibly be 
affected by the adverse event.
In words the philosophy of this revised consistency equation 
is that the expected failure losses per person during any time 
period will be equal for each subsystem (type of adverse event).
A prerequisite for using equation 4.7 is that the consequence of 
failure, I, for every subsystem be defined using a similar scale. The 
’cost of failure1, as measured in pounds sterling, will be proposed 
as just such a scale in the next section. N is measured in days, weeks 
or years depending upon the subsystem. For example when considering 
structural collapse it is logical to measure the return period of 
failure in years, however when considering the simultaneous use of power 
points it is more realistic to measure the return period in days.
4.3.2 The cost consequences of failure. To enable this failure 
cost consistency criterion to be used for subsystem design a method 
must be devised for quantifying the consequence of failure for each 
subsystem. A common scale is required so that the consequences of, 
for instance, overheating can be compared with the consequences of an 
inadequate number of water closets. Failure can take a number of forms 
each having different consequences, it may simply cause annoyance to 
the occupants, alternatively it may cause partial, or in more serious 
cases total prevention of intended use. The prevention of intended 
use of the building may be due to loss or inaccessibility of space, 
to unsuitable environmental factors or to a health or safety risk for 
the occupants. It is difficult to determine a common scale which will 
quantify the differing consequences of failure for all the various 
subsystems. The most feasible solution is to quantify the consequence 
of failure using a monetary scale. These ’costs of failure’ will be 
determined from direct losses i.e. repair or rebuilding costs, and 
indirect consequential losses, such as productivity losses, fatality 
and injury compensation, or the reduction in the rental value of the buildin 
Frequently a nature of failure factor will be required to account for
the inconvenience or annoyance caused to the occupants of the building. 
Invariably the evaluation of the indirect losses will depend upon the 
purpose or use of the building being appraised or designed. The 
operational value of a commercial office building can be based upon the 
average wage rate of the employees, and then in order to cover profits 
and overheads it can be assumed that a man’s time is worth double his 
wage rate to his employer. For a hospital the operational value can 
be based on D.H.S.S. estimates of the weekly ’cost’ of a hospital bed. 
For schools the ’in-use* value can be based upon D.E.S. estimates of 
education costs per pupil, or alternatively on the wage rate of the 
teachers, making the necessary allowances for overheads etc. It is 
proposed that the estimated costs of failure,*1^  should quantify the 
importance of each subsystem, or type of adverse event, to the building.
Frequency
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/  Value
Probability 
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Figure 4.2 An Example of a Probability Distribution Function
Figure 4.2 represents the frequency distribution function of a typ­
ical probabilistic variable. It can be seen from this figure that 
varying degrees of failure can occur. For example the subsystem demand 
or load may only just exceed the design value as at point Y on Figure
4.2 or alternatively the demand may substantially exceed the design value. 
The frequency of a particular overload is given by the ordinate of the 
frequency distribution at the corresponding value of demand, small over­
loads occurring more frequently than large overloads. The consequence 
of failure is a function of the degree of failure; a small overload will 
often result in a reduction in the service provided, and thus will have 
a small or possibly negligible consequence, whilst a large overload may 
result in a complete loss of service and thus will be associated with 
serious consequences. It is proposed that for consistency the ’I 1
r
value for every subsystem should be the average cost of failure. In 
reality the relationship between cost and degree of failure is not 
necessarily linear; however for simplicity this function will be 
assumed linear for each subsystem considered in this thesis unless 
the actual function relating the cost and degree of failure relationship 
is,known. As a consequence the representative cost of failure used in 
the consistency equation (equation 4.7) is that associated with the 
average degree of failure. As an example, if the design value of the 
probabilistic variable, x^ is associated with a 0.75 cumulative proba­
bility then the average failure variable value is that associated with 
a 0.875 cumulative probability. The average degree of failure, x^, is 
given by
The determination of x, is the objective of the failure cost consistency
a
design procedure, consequently the average degree of failure, x^, must 
be estimated and then checked when the design failure rating has been 
determined. Should there be any significant difference in the assumed 
and actual x^ values then the failure cost consistency design procedure 
must be repeated with a revised estimate of x^. However it will be 
shown in subsequent chapters that when the design failure rating is 
small, which is usually the case, x^ is insensitive to changes in 
failure rating values and this iterative design procedure is frequently 
unnecessary.
When subsystem reliability is being considered there are only two 
states which can exist, either adequacy or failure. In these circum­
stances the cost of failure is independent of the magnitude of the
overload and hence there are fewer problems involved in assessing 
the cost consequences of failure.
4.3.3 Evaluating human life. A discussion of the precise 
methods proposed for determining the cost of failure is left until 
each probabilistic subsystem is considered in detail in subsequent 
chapters. However whenever one of the consequences of subsystem 
failure is personal injury or death then the value of life and compen­
sation for injuries must be quantified.
There has always been a social and political stigma attached to 
financially evaluating human life. In 1964 Fry^*^ studied the cost 
of fires in the U.K. between 1947 and 1962, and although he stated that 
approximately 700-800 deaths were caused by fires each year, he did not 
attempt to assess these losses in economic terms. Since then a number 
of criteria have been used to establish a value of life. The value of 
a human being to the nation in terms of production and consumption is 
one possible criterion. An attempt to evaluate life using this 
criterion was made by Abraham and Thedie for the purposes of esti­
mating reasonable expenditure for safety measures to prevent road 
accidents in France. Figure 4.3 illustrates the variation of the 
economic value of human life with age and sex.
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However it is not sufficient to base the worth of a life solely 
on the economic value to the nation, human and social factors are 
probably just as important as the economic factors and the problem still 
remains of quantifying these human factors.
An alternative method of assessing the expenditure justifiable 
to prevent loss of life in buildings is to ensure that the risk of 
death due to a fire or structural collapse is of a comparable order of 
magnitude to the risk accepted by society when undertaking other 
activity such as travelling, working, swimming or smoking. This 
technique has been discussed by both Allen^*^ and Rodin^^. It is 
important that the hazard chosen for comparison is one that society cannot 
avoid in everyday life. It would be irrational to base the acceptable 
risk of structural collapse on the risk associated with sky-diving or 
water skiing which are unnecessary and avoidable. Table 4.1 indicates 
the risk associated with various activities. Unfortunately this 
technique of comparing the risk of death within a building with the risk as 
ia'ted with other activities does not directly lead to an economic evalua­
tion of human life. All the various techniques which have been developed
for evaluating human life have been summarised by Melinek^^, In
(21)
another paper Melinek used the "consumer preference" technique to 
estimate the implied value of life associated with the behaviour and 
opinions of individuals. This study indicated that through its own
actions the community suggests that a human life is worth in the region
of fifty thousand pounds.
Damages awarded by courts and insurance companies can also be 1 
used as a basis for assessing human life. In the U.K. compensation is 
based on the support previously given by the victim to his or her
dependents. In general terms;
i 1
Compensation = (annual net loss for dependants) x y - 4.8
where fy* , which is measured in years, is dependent upon
a) the victim1s remaining working life
b) the chance of being killed by other causes during his or
her remaining working life
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Necessities of life:
Structural failures < 1 7,500 6,000 8,000
Rabies (outdoors) 0.4 200 0.08 200 0.08 200 0.04
Being vaccinated 1.3 30 0.04 0 10 0.01
Building fires 2.9 7,500 22.0 6,000 17.0 8,000 23.0
Occupation:
Desk work 1(guessed) 1,760 2 0 . ■- 0 -
Giving birth 30 per 108 0 - 0 J birth per 75
births year
Construction work, 218 0 - o ■ •- 0 -
total (Ontario)
Construction due to 35 0 - 0 ■ 0 ■ ■ - ■.
collapse (Ontario)
Coal mining (Britain) 400 0 - ■ 1,760 704 i0 -
Professional boxing 70,000 0 - 0 - 0 -
(Britain)
Travel:
Bus or rail travel 80 400 32 100 8 0 -
Waiting near roads 420 250 105 80 35 120 50
Climbing stairs 550 30 16 30 16 180 100
Automobile travel 1,040 100 104 500 520 200 208
Air travel (ICAO) 2,400 0 - 96 96 0 -
figures
Pleasure:
Exposure to lightning 200 0 10 2 1 0.2
Boating (small boats) 1,325 20 27 80 106 20 27
Cigarette smoking 2,600 0 - 365 948 100 260 •
Mountain climbing 2,700 0 60 162 ’ 0 -
(United States)
Swimming 3,500 30 105 10 35 10 35
Motorcycle riding 4,420 0 - 400 1,766 : i 4
(Canada) !
Rock climbing (Alpine) 40,000 0 - 0 .0 —
Total: 413 or 4415 or. 782 or
-------- ■■■— — 0.04% 0.4% —  - - 0.08%
Projected Risk of
Structural Failure
(1)Probability of fail­ 10 7,500 71 6,000 57 8,000 76
ure310“2 (30-year life)
(2)Probability of fail- 0.10 7,500 0.71 6,000 0.57 8,000 0.10
ure=10“^(30-year life)
(3)Probability of fail- 0.001 7,500 0.01 6,000 0.01 8,000 0.01
ure=10-6(3o year life)
Table 4.1 Risk of Death during various Activities (Taken from Allen*'I9 )^
c) the life expectancy of the victim at the time of the 
accident based on the health of the individuals.
In general fy f is rarely estimated to exceed half the victim1s 
expected remaining life at the time of the accident. As an example 
consider an average man. Assume his age to be thirty and his net income 
to be two thousand pounds per year. Should this man die, Ty* would, 
on average, be of the order of fifteen years and hence the compensation 
awarded to his dependants would be thirty thousand pounds. Under 
the British method of awarding compensation, social and distress 
factors are not taken into consideration. However in the U.S.A. where 
the courts are obliged to assess these intangible factors, compensation 
rates can be worth double the British equivalents, hence once again the 
approximate figure of fifty thousand pounds is arrived at as an average 
value of a human life.
Finally the compensation awarded for various types of injuries will 
be briefly considered. Injury compensation is split into two sections,
a) Special damages i.e. wages lost while incapacitated and the 
replacement value of personal effects.
b) General damages, i.e. thirty pounds per week approximately 
for the time the victim is away from work plus injury compen­
sation if there are residual effects.
The residual injury compensation will depend on age, future prospects
. . . . . (22)and type of injury. Typical injury compensations are;
visible scar 
loss of a leg 
loss of an eye 
loss of an arm
It should be emphasized that the largest proportion of any
compensation is that awarded for the effect on the future prospects of 
the victim and hence compensation awards will vary considerably. As
a generalisation and for the purposes of this project it will be
assumed that a residual injury will result in eight thousand pounds 
total compensation and the cost consequences of a non-residual injury 
will be on average eight hundred pounds.
£500
£8,000
£6,500
£7,000
4.3.4 Evaluating the calibration coefficient. Before the
failure cost consistency equation (equation 4.7) can be used, a value
must be assigned to the calibration coefficient, *a*, The calibration
Coefficient is a constant which simply converts ’costs of failure* to
acceptable return periods of failure. It is proposed that *a*
should be evaluated using an adverse event for which the cost of failure
can be accurately assessed, and for which society has already defined
ah acceptable frequency of occurrence. Acceptable failure ratings
have been proposed for a number of subsystems of a building and thus
any of these could be used to determine a value for *a*. However it
has been decided to base *a' on the analysis of structural failure.
The following calibration calculation is based on the structural
(19)
failure analysis proposed by Allen
It is assumed that the design life of a building is eighty years
and that during this period the acceptable risk of complete structural
. . -4 .
failure is 4 x 10 i.e. one m  2500 buildings will, on average, collapse
during its design life. If it is assumed that for buildings which fail 
there is a one in two chance of failure occurring without warning, and 
that should failure occur without warning then half the occupants will 
be killed, then the annual risk of death per occupant is given by
0.5 x 0.5 x 0.0004 
P 80
= 1.25 x 10"6
Using Table 4.1 it is seen that this risk of death is acceptable 
when compared with the risk associated with other normal daily events. 
This indicates that the assumed risk of complete structural failure 
during the design life is a reasonable figure. The average return period 
of failure associated with a 0.0004 risk of failure during eighty years 
is given by
  K = 0 5 0 4  “ 200 > °°° yearS -  - —  - -
The total consequences of building collapse will be a combination 
of deaths, injuries, reconstruction costs etc. However although it is 
very unlikely that a quarter of the population will be fatally injured, 
the financial consequences of this event will be assumed to represent
the average total losses associated with structural failure. That is
I = 50,000 x 0.25 x population . pounds
Fifty thousand pounds is the socio-economic value of life proposed 
in the preceding section. Assuming that this hypothetical structural 
failure is associated with a conservatism coefficient value of unity then 
equation 4.7 can be used to determine the calibration coefficient, i.e.
N x Pop
a = ---   year persons per pound sterling
200,000 x Pop 
0.25x 50,000
= 16 year persons per pound sterling ■
or 58.4 day persons per pence
This calibration coefficient suggests that only one person should be 
affected by an annual event which has consequences equivalent to one 
sixtieth of a pound.
The failure cost consistency equation can now be written as 
N = 16 x I x c x pi- - 4.9
when I is measured in pounds and N in years
S
or N = 58.4 * I * c x -4.10 iPop
when I is measured in pence and N in days.
4.3.5 The conservatism coefficient. Having designed an 
operationally consistent building the total cost may be less or 
unacceptably greater than anticipated. In order to modify the
total cost of the project but retain operational consistency between ---
the adverse events the return periods of inadequacy of every event 
are scaled by a factor 1c* which is termed the conservatism coefficient. 
The design procedure is then repeated for each subsystem. The larger 
the value of ' cT the better the general performance of the total 
building, and hence the greater the total building construction cost 
and vice versa.
4.3.6 Summary of the failure cost consistency criterion. Figure
4.4 illustrates, as a flow chart, the failure cost consistency design 
criterion. The first step is to determine the expected average cost 
of failure, I, on each occasion failure occurs for the type of event 
being considered. The consistency equation (equation 4.9 or 4.10) is then 
used to determine the acceptable return period of failure equivalent 
to this I value. Figure 4.1 can, if necessary, be used to give the des­
igner a better appreciation of the relevance of any particular failure 
rate value. This aid is particularly useful when the subsystem or type 
of event is associated with an extremely small design failure rating.
}
The probabilistic method used to model the variability of the 
probabilistic factors of a particular subsystem will depend on the 
characteristics of those factors. Extreme value theory provides the 
best modelling technique for several probabilistic variables, such as
lift usage and electricity consumption. Extreme value theory was used
. . (23) 1to develop the current wind loading design guide . ':
The binomial theory offers a technique for modelling subsystems in 
which simultaneous demand causes inadequacy; for example, the allocation 
of sanitary appliances, telephone extensions, power sockets or water 
pipe sizing. Its basic aim is the calculation of the probability of 
any given number of events occurring simultaneously (see chapter three).
In some cases simple cumulative frequency distribution methods are 
suitable. This will be shown to be the case for the thermal, structural 
imposed load and cold water consumption subsystems. It should be noted 
that when more than one probabilistic variable affects a subsystem it may 
be necessary to use a combination of probability techniques to model the 
uncertainty in subsystem performance. The method used to determine the 
subsystem hardware requirement associated with a particular failure 
rating will vary with each individual subsystem. In a number of cases 
design values are determined for each probabilistic factor and the 
current subsystem hardware design procedures used. For other subsystems 
revised hardware design tables and charts will allow failure ratings to 
be directly translated to hardware requirements. However irrespective 
of the method used to determine the hardware requirement the client and
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designer will know in quantitative terms the operational performance 
of that hardware design. Finally the total capital cost of all the 
probabilistic subsystems is calculated and, should the total cost be 
unacceptable, the conservatism coefficient is used to reduce or increase 
the total cost whilst retaining inter-subsystem consistency within the 
building.
4.3.7 Reliability analysis. In an earlier section it was emphasized 
that in theory the failure cost consistency model could be applied when 
considering any type of adverse event. This includes operational 
failure caused by service plant being inoperative. In subsequent chap­
ters the failure cost consistency criterion will be used to illustrate 
its application to reliability design. However in practice it.im­
possible that the desired level of reliability based upon failure cost 
consistency will prove prohibitive from a capital cost point of view. 
Consequently it is important when making reliability decisionsto ' 
consider the total cost implications, in which case the use of a cost 
benefit technique will be more appropriate.
4.3.8 Discussion. The failure cost consistency criterion allows 
each subsystem to be designed with respect to all other probabilistic 
subsystems of the building. Its aim is to ensure that the failure 
rating for each adverse type of event is of the right order of magnitude 
when considering the relative consequences of each type of adverse event. 
The resulting total design will only be consistent if the confidence 
associated with the predicted performance of each subsystem is uniform. 
This confidence depends upon the confidence surrounding the probability 
distribution assumed to model the uncertain factors affecting subsystem . 
performance. This in turn will depend upon;
a) The extent of the data used to define the probability model
b) The closeness of fit of the estimated distribution function 
to the actual data.
The first of these factors will not affect the consistency of 
design providing the data sample is large and representative for the 
building being designed. For example, in designing lifts in hospitals, 
lift passenger data from hospitals must be used. Similarly for offices,
schools etc. It is often feasible to use correction factors to enable
probabilistic data to be modified according to particular factors. For
(23)
example in the U.K. wind loading guide correction factors are 
incorporated to account for topological variations at the site, b.uild- 
ing size and/or height, and ground roughness.
L
The closeness of fit of the assumed distribution function is, 
quantified by the Chi Square statistic (chapter three). Tables }can 
be used to determine the confidence associated with any assumed dis­
tribution function.
The use of the failure cost consistency criterion is desirable from 
the user*s view point. However the satisfactory performance of a 
building means that money has been wisely spent, the owner will have 
a desirable building and in general he will be refunded in an optimum 
rentable value. Consequently the use of the failure cost consistency 
criterion will benefit the owner in addition to the users. Although 
reconstruction costs, content losses and repair costs are not financial 
consequences which affect the user they do affect the owner and thus must 
be considered in balancing the design of subsystems.
As the function relating capital expenditure and the subsystem 
failure rating is not required in the failure cost consistency design 
criterion, this criterion will not necessarily produce the most 
economically efficient building. The rate of reduction of capital cost 
associated with unit increase in expected losses will vary betweein 
subsystems. Economically it would be best to balance the performance 
of each subsystem such that the sum of the capital cost and failure 
losses is a minimum for each subsystem. The result of using this design 
criterion will be the most economically efficient building. In the 
following section this cost benefit method of economically optimising 
the design of each subsystem will be considered in greater detail.
4.4 The Application of Cost Benefit Techniques to Subsystem Design
- ' *
Producing a building which gives the best value for the money
available should always be a design objective. However there are many
different interests served by a building, and hence many ways of 
quantifying the benefits of a ouilding. For some people the building is 
source of future income or a hedge against inflation, others may see it 
as a place for communication and for people to gain the maximum enjoy­
ment in their working life, others will see it as a market for a t 
particular product, and yet other people will appraise it for its.visual 
significance to the urban landscape. The tenant will be primarily 
concerned with his employees undertaking their tasks as efficiently as 
possible, for the designer the building will be his source of income 
through design fees and as a visual advertisement of his ability.
In economic terms the degree of satisfaction associated with(a 
subsystem design can be quantified by considering the initial capital 
costs, the recurring running costs and the economic disbenefits associated 
with the design. Considering the total financial implications is a con­
venient method of rationally determining the desired operational per-
, !.
formance of each subsystem of the building. There are two economic
techniques which can be used to aid in design decision making. The
*
first is cost effective studies which aim to minimise the cost for a 
given benefit or to maximise the benefit for a given outlay. Thus an in­
finite number of cost effective solutions exist, depending upon the 
level of benefit required or the level of financial outlay available.
Cost effective studies do not show which projects are worthwhile or 
what is the optimum level of expenditure. However the second technique, 
cost benefit analysis, endeavours to answer these questions. It does 
so by evaluating both costs and benefits, and then maximising thediff-
s
erence (benefit minus cost). Cost benefit analyses aim to take adcount 
of all costs, including the running costs and all benefits including 
intangibles such as safety, security and enjoyment.
In general benefits, both social as well as financial, can be 
divided into three types depending on whom they affect. These ark;
a) financial benefits to the building owner
b) consumer surplus; for commercial buildings this is the amount 
by which the total value of the building to the tenant exceeds 
his costs (rent)
c) externalities, which are the effects that the building has on 
persons not directly involved. For example visual intrusion,
atmospheric pollution or any other community disbenefit. ,
The use of the cost benefit technique to determine the economic­
ally optimal subsystem design does not necessarily require the 
summation of all the benefits for each possible design solution.
Assume that the absolute maximum benefit which can be gained fronj a 
subsystem is Z. The use of a subsystem design which has benefits equal 
to Z, and hence no disbenefits whatsoever, will not be the economically 
optimal design because the cost of such a design solution will be 
inconceivably high. As the benefits are reduced i.e. disbenefits 
incurred, the capital ?cost! of the subsystem design will decrease.
The economic optimum design is that associated with minimum total cost, 
the total cost being the sum of the capital cost, E, and the total disben­
efits, L, expected over the life of the building. The expected dis­
benefits (losses) are a function of the cost of failure for the 
particular subsystem being designed. In the previous section methods 
were proposed to financially quantify the consequences of subsystem 
inadequacy (failure). Although it is often difficult to place a monetary 
value on these losses, a value is implied when making design decisions 
using current design methods, and explicitly estimated values must be 
equally, if not more useful than the implied values. The problem of 
evaluating intangible losses will be considered in more detail iii 
subsequent chapters.
The subsystem losses due to failure or inadequacy during a design 
life of n years will be given by;
■ i
L = n x I x pf — 4.11
where I is the losses per occasion failure occurs and is the annual 
failure rating.
Now the capital cost of the subsystem hardware will also be a 
function of the failure rating.
It is also possible that the running costs might also be a function 
of the failure rating of the subsystem, should this be the case then 
this function must be included in the total cost equation. However 
for descriptive simplicity it will be assumed that the running costs are 
independent of the failure rating in which case the total cost, C, is 
given by
C = n x I x Pf + f(Pf) - 4.13
Figure 4.5 illustrates the characteristic variation of the expected 
losses, L and capital expenditure, E as the subsystem failure rating 
is altered. The optimal P^ value can be found graphically by combining 
the loss and expenditure curves. From the resulting fU f curve the min­
imum total cost point can be identified and hence the optimal P^ value 
found. Alternatively the optimal failure rating can be derived alge­
braically by equating the first differential of equation 4.13 to zero.
Cost
'Optimum
Provision
Cost
Figure 4.5 Graphical Method of Finding the Optimal Failure Rating
Running costs and all failure losses will occur during the life 
of the building and should be given less weight than initial costs paid
in the first year or two of construction. One reason for this weighting 
is the opportunity cost; money to be spent at a future date, or losses 
expected in the future can be profitably invested in the meantime, 
although inflation affects the actual weighting associated with invest­
ment profitability. This weighting process is known as discounting.,
The net present value of any project is the value when all costs 
and losses have been discounted to the present or any base year.
The discounted value is the amount of money which must be put by now 
to pay for future annual expected losses and annual expected running 
costs. The discounted cost depends upon the value of money i.e. the 
interest rate. When using the cost benefit technique it is essential 
to compare the present day capital cost of provision with the discounted 
value of the stream of annual losses expected during the design life. 
Using traditional economic terminology the most economic level of design 
is reached when the marginal increase in capital cost is equal to the 
discounted marginal utility associated with this increase in cost.
At this point the sum of the capital cost and discounted annual disbene­
fits is a minimum. Beyond this point the marginal utility associated 
with a unit increase in capital cost will be less than one, and hence it 
will be economical sense to invest additional money to cover future1 
annual losses. !
The discount rate is equal to the net value of money. In a nori- 
inflationary world this is equal to the bank interest rate, Tr*. In an 
"equilibrium inflationary world" the bank interest rate increases by an 
amount equal to the inflation rate and thus the real discount value will 
always be 'r1, the interest rate associated with a non-inflationary ' 
world. In such a situation !r f is used as the discount rate and » 
inflation can be ignored in the cost benefit analysis. Unfortunately in 
the real world a "disequilibrium inflationary world" exists where tlie 
actual rate of interest does not always equal the interest rate r, 1 
plus the inflation rate. Very often the real rate of interest is nega­
tive, as is the case in the U.K. at the present time. However cashflow 
constraints prevent individuals borrowing large sums of money to invest 
in ventures which may be economically sound. By definition inflation 
prevents individuals from meeting their expectations. If one could
predict accurately during inflatipnary periods then an equilibrium 
rather than disequilibrium world would exist, in which case the discount 
rate would equal r, the net value of money. When using cost benefit tech 
niques the best one can do is assume an *equilibrium inflationary world1, 
in which case the discount rate is frV.
The government can influence the financial decisions of individuals 
or companies by using taxation incentives. One effect of company 
taxation in Britain is to encourage companies to spend too little on 
the construction of buildings and too much on running them, as compared 
to the best levels for the community. The discount rate 'r1, used to 
determine the present value of future payments is the net value after 
the effects of taxation have been taken into consideration.
The total cost equation (equation 4.13) must be modified to take 
account of this discounting effect. Present value tables,(Table A.8 , 
Appendix III) must be used to determine the total present worth of all 
expected losses and future running costs. The failure loss function 
(equation 4.11) thus becomes
L = D x I x p -4.14
nr f
where D is the discount factor, taken from Table A.8 , associated 
nr
with a design life n, and discount rate, r.
Table A .8 shows that the present worth of future payments decreases 
as the discount rate increases and that the present worth at first
increases rapidly with the design life, however it levels off and
(
stabilizes for design periods in excess of thirty years.
'■ (
Figure 4.6 is the general flow diagram for design based on 
minimising the total life cycle cost of the subsystem.
When the occurrence of subsystem failure depends on a number of 
probabilistic factors then equation 4.13 will be of the form
C =n»I«Cf(P],P2 ,P3)] + f(P],P2 ,P3 ...) -4.15
To find the optimum values of Pj, P^ etc. it is necessary to
Information relating 
CAPITAL COST and the
'An assessment of the
EXPECTED LOSSES SHOULD
FAILURE RATING FAILURE OCCUR
The resulting FAILURE RATING 
is the optimum value
TOTAL COST FUNCTION
CAPITAL COST FUNCTION EXPECTED LOSS FUNCTION
Equate the FIRST DIFFERENTIAL 
of total Cost Function to zero
Figure 4.6 Flow Chart illustrating the General Cost Benefit 
Design Procedure
•' ' •
equate to zero the first differential of equation 4*15 with respect
to Pj, P2 * P 3 etc*> an<* solve the resulting set of simultaneous equations.
An example of this will be seen in a later chapter.
This cost benefit procedure can be used to determine the economic 
level of design for each probabilistic subsystem or adverse type of’event. 
The optimal design of the total building will only result from com­
bining the optimal designs of each subsystem if the various subsystems 
are mutually independent. This unfortunately is not the case, for
example decisions taken which economically benefit the acoustic design
. ’
may be detrimental to the design of the heating system. However the
assumption of mutual independence is permissible for a large number
of subsystems especially those in the building services category, which
is the main field of study of this thesis.
The economically optimal subsystem design can be used when there 
is no limit on the( amount of capital available for the building. However 
when a capital cost constraint exists the designer must consider to 
what extent he should deviate from the optimal design of each subsystem 
in order to obtain the overall best value for the available money.
4.5 Cost Effective Design
■ c
When a capital cost constraint exists then a cost effective rather 
than a cost benefit technique should be used to divide the financial
resources between the various subsystems in the most efficient way.
i s
If the total capital constraint is less than the sum of the optimal
capital costs of each subsystem then the design failure rating for all
4 . ‘
subsystems must be increased above their optimal values, but by how
; <
much? If the total cost of one subsystem is more sensitive than any 
other to changes in the capital expenditure, then the decrease in capi­
tal expenditure on that subsystem should be less than the decrease i n ---
capital expenditure on other subsystems. The exact failure rating 
value for each subsystem needed to produce a building which is the best 
value for the available money is achieved by examining quantitatively 
the exact function relating the total life cycle cost, and the capital 
expenditure, for each subsystem.
As an example of a cost effective problem assume that in a part­
icular building a total expenditure limit exists for the lifts, fire 
protection, and the heating system. The performance of each of these 
subsystems is dependent upon at least one probabilistic factor. Assuming 
that the capital expenditure functions and expected failure loss 
functions are known for these three subsystems then the absolute 
optimal failure ratings can be determined by using either the graphical 
or the algebraic methods described in the previous section. Assume 
that the optimal capital expenditure for each subsystem is E'^, E*B 
and E*£ respectively, and that the combined capital cost of the optimal 
designs is in excess of the total capital available. Assume that 
Figure 4.7 illustrates the functions relating total cost and capital cost 
for the three subsystems. (In practice these curves will be derived by 
using equations 4.11 and 4.12).
Total Cost
Capital Cost
E 1
Figure 4.7 Example of the Exact Cost Effective Design Procedure
The theoretical criterion which will ensure that the best 
possible benefit is gained from the capital available is that each 
subsystem be designed with an identical level of marginal utility. The
marginal utility is the incremental increase (decrease) in satisfaction 
gained (lost) by a unit increase (decrease) in capital expenditure. 
Satisfaction is quantified by the failure losses and running costs'. The 
criterion of equal marginal utility for the three subsystems illustrated 
in Figure 4.7 requires that the three curves linking total and capital 
cost have an equal gradient at the design capital expenditure values.
As an additional constraint the sum of the individual subsystem capital 
expenditures must equal the total capital available i.e.
E - E + + E ' -4.16M A B C  ;
where E., is the total capital available and ,M I
E^, Eg, B Ec are the capital expenditures for the three 
subsystems.
Satisfying both these criteria requires a trial and error procedure. 
Such a trial and error procedure is difficult when there are three sub­
systems involved, however for a typical building with many more proba­
bilistic subsystems a solution could only be found using computer 
facilities.
(24) . . . .
Maver developed a simplified technique for subsystem decision
making when a total capital constraint exists. Consider the three*
subsystem problem described a^ jove with optimal capital expenditures
E*, E^, and E*. For each decrement of money spent below the optimal 
A B t
expenditures there will be a corresponding increase in the total cost 
because the expected failure losses will increase to a greater extent.
If pairs of values of capital decrement and total cost increments are 
plotted,as illustrated in Figure 4.8, then three curves are obtained, 
one for each subsystem. If these curves are now summated a total curve, 
(4), is obtained. The origin of Figure 4.8 is the true optimum solution. 
If along the y axis there is plotted the difference between the total 
capital available, E^, and the sum of the three subsystem optimal capital 
costs, E 1, then the total capital available for provision of all.three 
subsystems, (point y^), is obtained. By projecting this point across to 
curve (4) and then dropping a vertical line onto the x axis an inter­
section point is obtained on each of the subsystem curves (points y^,
y^, and y^). These points represent the amount by which the capital 
expenditure on each subsystem should be reduced below the true optimal 
value to achieve a good, but not the best solution for the capital 
available. The design will not be the optimal solution because the 
gradient of the three subsystem curves at the design points are not 
necessarily equal, and the gradient represents the subsystems ’ marginal 
utility.
AE
-E
S u b s y s t e m  A
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Figure 4.8 Illustration of the Cost Effective Design Procedure developed 
by Maver^4
Another feasible, but not optimal, solution to this resource 
allocation problem has been developed by the author. Consider the 
general total cost function for any subsystem;
C ** L + E - 4.13
t.
Now, in general L might be assumed to be a linear function of P^,
hence
55-  » K + K ’ xf(Pf) - 4.16
f r .
where K and K* are constants.
If equation 4.16 is equated to zero then the optimal P^ value can
be determined. The optimal capital expenditure, E 1, can then be found
by substituting the optimal failure rating into equation 4.12. Both
the capital expenditure, E, and -2. are functions of P^, hence can
f ■ f
be found as a function of E, i.e.
i
= K + K"xf(E) - 4.17dC
dP,f ' ■ • A  ’
Now E = E 1 ± 6E - 4.18
• i ]
6E is the difference between the optimal capital expenditure and
dC 1the capital expenditure associated with a non-zero -7=* value. Thus
. . f
equation 4.17 can be rewritten as
= K + K"'xf(6E) - 4.19 j
t
since E* has already been determined. For each probabilistic subsystem
dC ■ '■
the exact relationship linking -r^  and 6E can be plotted graphically
f 1
as illustrated in Figure 4.9 The individual subsystem curves are,then
summated and the total curve is also plotted, (curve (4), Figure 4.9).
dCThe proposed criterion for design is equality of the -jp values for
f
each subsystem. Hence if the money available is 6ET below the total 
capital cost of the optimal subsystem designs, then a horizontal line is 
projected across to curve (4) at a y value equal to 6E^ ,. A vertical 
line is then dropped from this point onto the x axis and the inter­
sections with the individual subsystem curves give the capital expendi­
ture reductions, 6E, for each individual Subsystem. This criterion for 
design ensures that the total cost functions of each probabilistic sub­
system have a common gradient at the design P^ values. However since a
unit change in the failure rating value will not necessarily result from 
an identical unit change in E for every subsystem, the solution using 
this criterion will again not be the true optimal solution for the 
capital available.
S u b s y s t e m  AA  ♦  B * C
dC/dP
Figure 4.9 Illustration of an Alternative Simplified Cost 
Effective Design Procedure
4.6 Discussion of Cost Benefit and Cost Effective Design
Three rational procedures have been described to allocate capital 
resources between subsystems when a capital expenditure limit exists. 
Only the first of these procedures gives the true economically optimal—  
solution. Unfortunately this procedure requires a trial and error 
approach which will prove unfeasible in practice without using computer 
facilities. However this theoretically accurate method for economically 
balancing the capital expenditure on each subsystem does exist if, and 
when, such a rigorous design approach is found desirable. The other two 
alternative procedures are more practical approaches to subsystem design
when a capital expenditure limit exists. However it should be emphas-
ized that these two methods do not produce the truly optimal solution.
kaver’s method is basically a graphical approach while the procedure 
dC
based on constant values for each subsystem depends on algebraically
knowing the total cost function of each subsystem.
: 5
Cost effective design requires that all the various subsystems 
must be considered simultaneously, as illustrated in the example of 
the previous section.
1 When no capital cost limit exists, or when this constraint is in 
excess of the sum of the costs of the economically optimal subsystems 
designs, then each subsystem can be designed independently using the 
cost benefit approach.
4.7 General Discussion
The failure cost consistency technique and cost benefit analysis 
are both systematic design aids which will improve the rationale of
i .
subsystem design. The cost benefit and cost effective procedures are 
relevant when a thorough economically orientated criterion for design 
is desirable. This will be especially relevant when a building is 
being designed as an investment. Design based upon the failure cost 
consistency criterion is relevant when a well balanced building with 
a satisfactory operational performance is the major objective. The 
use of failure cost consistency does not depend upon subsystem capital 
expenditure functions, however failure loss functions are needed for 
both these design approaches. The derivation of these failure cost 
functions requires that events which are usually considered implicitly 
rather than explicitly should be costed. However as will be shown,^ 
for the majority of subsystems explicit failure costs can be estimated 
based upon the function of the building.
For very serious consequences of failure, such as caused by fires 
or building collapse the owner will reduce his possible losses by taking 
out insurance cover. In this case injury and fatality compensation is 
paid by the insurance company, however this is still a loss when viewed
65
from the communitys point of view. Alternatively one can argue that 
premiums will depend on the risk, and if actuarial information is correct 
then the premium payments over the design life will reflect the risk 
involved. Consequently, the owner will still, in theory, be economic­
ally motivated to reduce the risk of failure. When an organisation has 
many buildings there is no economic advantage in taking out insurance 
policies, the organisation might just as well invest that money to pay 
for the losses when failure occurs. In general insurance policies can 
be ignored in assessing failure losses because they should not influence 
design decisions.
In the following chapters of this thesis a number of building 
subsystems will be used to illustrate the analysis of subsystem uncert­
ainty and an outline of the application of the failure cost consistency 
and cost benefit techniques as aids to subsystem design will be 
attempted. For simplicity it will be assumed that no capital cost limit 
exists and hence it will be appropriate to use the cost benefit rather 
than the cost effective design approach. However feasible cost 
effective criteria have been shown to exist.
c
i
i
CHAPTER FIVE
SANITARY APPLIANCE ALLOCATION
5.1 Present S&nit&ry Appliance Provision Recommendations
Present scales of provision for various classes of buildings are
. . . (25)contained m  the British Standard Code of Practice 305 Part 1 .
The recommendations of this code are based on various reports and regu­
lations, some of which are statutory, such as the Offices, Shop and
(26)
Railway Premises Act 1963 , the Parker Morris report 'Homes for today
(27) (28)
and tomorrow , Standards for School Premises Regulations and
(29)(30)various Scottish regulations . Wherever possible the CP 305 scales
have been compiled such that they comply with any statutory regulations, 
although it was obviously not always possible to consider all local or 
regional regulations. Unfortunately conflicting scales of provision
(13) . .
are published in the IHVE Guide , however it is thought that this 
anomalous situation will be rectified when the IHVE Guide is revised. 
Tables 5.1 add 5.2 illustrate the conflicting recommendations of CP 
305 and the IHVE Guide. Since the CP 305 scales of provision are those 
generally used by designers, these will now be considered in greater 
detail.
There seems to be no scientific basis to the recommendations of CP 
305, consequently although the present guides are acceptable from the 
users viewpoint there is no proof that these guides do not represent 
an over estimation of the true requirements either in part, i.e. incon­
sistencies within a particular design chart, or in total. To check the 
recommendations of CP 305 the Building Research Station observed the use 
of sanitary appliances in a number of schools and offices. These 
studies will be discussed in more detail in a subsequent section. Two 
peculiarities of the CP 305 recommendations are immediately obvious.
t
The first concerns the recommendations for WC's and urinals In 
offices and schools. The total number of appliances is specified, but
Appliances
Accommodation other than principals, etc.
For male staff For female staff
WCs 
(no urinals 
provided)
1 for 1 — 15 persons
2 for 16 -  30 persons 
3 fo t 3 1 -  SO persons
4 for 5 1 -  75 persons
5 for 76 -  100 persons 
For over 100 plus 1 for 
every additional 25 
persons or part thereof.
1 for 1 — 15 persons
2 for 1 6 -  30 persons
3 for 3 1 -  50 persons
4 for 5 1 -  75 persons
5 for 76 -  100 persons 
For over 100 plus 1 for 
every additional 25 
persons or part thereof.
WCs
(urinals
provided)
1 for 1 -  20  persons
2 for 2 1 -  45 persons
3 for 46 -  75 persons
4 for 76 -  100 persons 
For over 100 plus 1 for 
every additional 25 
persons or part thereof, 
but 1 in 4 of the 
additional fitments may 
be a urinal.
Urinals
1 stall or 600 mm 
(2 ft) o f space
0 for 1 — 15 persons
1 for 1 6 — 30 persons
2 for 31 -  60 persons
3 for 61 -  90 persons
4  for 91 -  100 persons 
.For over 100 additional 
provision determined by 
the number o f  WCs,
(see previous item)
Wash-basins, 
trough or 
washing fountain
1 for 1 -  15 persons
2 for 1 6 -  30 persons
3 for 31 -  50 persons
4 for 5 1 -  75 persons
5 for 76 -  100 persons 
For over 100 plus 1 for 
every additional 25 
persons or part thereof.
1 for 1 -  15 persons
2 for 16 -  30 persons
3 for 31 — 50 persons
4 for 5 1 -  75 persons.
5 for 76 — 100 persons 
For over 100 plus 1 for 
every additional 25 
persons or part thereof.
Table 5.I Sanitary Appliance Provision Recommendations for Offices as 
specified in CP 305 25
Number* of Sanitary fittings recommended for uscia vinous type* ot building
Type of.Buildine 
or Accommodation Occupant!
Water Closets
Urinal* Laratory Basins Baths
Mai* Penult Mala Femala M ala. Female
Accommodation for 
staff in most 
Buildings
1-100 1 +  1 per 25 1 4- 1 per 14 1 +  1 per 25 1 +  lp e r2 5 1 4-1  per 14
over 100 add 1 per 30 
to the above
add 1 per 20 
to the above
add 1 per 30 
to the above
add !  per 30 
to the above
add 1 per 20 
to the above
Accommodation for 
transient public
1-200
1 per 100
2 per 100
200-400
add 1 per 100 
to the above
1 per 50 1 per W.C. o r range o f  W.C.S — —
*
over 400 add 1 per 250 
to the above
Restaurants
{Public)
1-200
1 per 100
2 per 100 1 phis 1 per 25
200-400
add 1 per 100 
to the above
1 per 25
over 400 add 1 per 250 
to the above
W U A JV
to the above
Day Schools 
(Children)
1-100
1 per 25
1 per 10
1 per 10
I per 8
100-200 add 1 per 15 add 1 per 10 to the above — —  '
200-300
add 1 per 30 
to the above
to the above
add 1 per 12 
to the above
add 1 per 12
to the aboveover 300 add 1 per 25 
to the above
Boarding Schools 
(extra over Day)
1-100
1
1 per 10
1 per 3 1 per 30 1 per 5
over 100 * add 1 per 12
Nursery Schools . — l p e r 6 — 1 per 5 1 per 40
Hotels
(R esidential A reas)
— 1 per 9 rooms 4-
any en suite
— 1 per bathroom, 1 per 
bedroom 4-1 per W.C.
1 per 9 rooms 4- 
anv en suite
•Certain regulations may differ from the above recommendations.
Table 5.2 Sanitary Appliance Provision Recommendations of the IHVE Guide
the number of WC's is fixed at one third of this. Since a large 
proportion of the scale requires a total of four or eight appliances, 
the split between WC’s and urinals depends on the designer’s inter­
pretation. The second anomaly concerns the uneven increase in the 
required number of appliances in the current provision scales for 
schools. At the extreme this anomalous situation requires that the 
number of appliances be doubled when the population increases from 
thirty nine to fifty one, and as a second example two extra appliances 
are required when the population increases from forty nine to fifty one.
It quickly becomes apparent that the CP 305 recommendations are not
as rational as they might be and that a more scientific evaluation of
the performance of sanitary appliances would prove beneficial.
The author is indebted to the Building Research Station for
allowing the use of data resulting from their studies to be used to 
illustrate a statistical method for estimating the performance of various 
sanitary appliance provisions, and furthermore to illustrate the use of 
the failure cost consistency and cost benefit design procedures to 
determine the desirable failure ratings for sanitary appliance 
provision.
5.2 Demand Uncertainty
5.2.1 Description. The number of persons wishing to use a given
type of appliance in a specified time period can be defined as the
sanitary appliance demand. In all types of buildings the demand will
vary with the time of day, and it is logical to design the sanitary
appliances for the heaviest daily demand period. For the benefit of this 
analysis the maximum number of users during any fifteen minute period
of the day will be defined as the demand variable. For schools, where __
the peak usage periods are more sharply defined, it is more appropriate 
to use the heaviest daily five minute , rather than the heaviest daily 
fifteen minute , demand for design purposes.
Due to the random behaviour of individuals the daily peak fifteen 
minute (five minute) demand for any sanitary appliance will vary from 
day to day. Irrespective of the demand value used for design purposes
there will always be a finite probability that the provision of 
appliances will be inadequate on any day. If the peak daily demands 
are analysed statistically then the probability of a particular peak 
daily demand being exceeded can be quantified.
5.2.2 Illustrating demand variability. Referring to section
3.3.3 it is seen that sanitary appliance demand is amenable to the 
use of extreme value theory to illustrate demand variability. For a 
thorough statistical analysis peak daily fifteen minute demand 
distributions would be required for each type of appliance for each class 
of building. To allow data to be combined from cloakrooms with varying 
potential number of users it is proposed that demand data be expressed 
as a percentage of the total cloakroom population.
5^2.3 Demand distributions for appliances in schools and offices.
The studies undertaken by B.R.E. concerning the use of sanitary appliances
in schools and offices provide considerable statistical information.
(31) (32)(33)These surveys are adequately reported elsewhere __ and hence
will not be described in detail here. In addition, the author was able
to survey the use of the sanitary appliances while undertaking a lift
. (34)usage survey in an office building . This data has been combined 
with the usage data resulting from the B.R.E. surveys to derive the 
extreme value probability distributions for sanitary appliance usage 
in schools and offices, Figures5.1 - 5.7. The procedure used to derive 
the extreme value probability distributions is illustrated in Appendix 
II. The technique adopted to determine the expression for the best 
fitting straight line is also illustrated in this Appendix.
The confidence surrounding sanitary appliance usage predictions 
base4 on these extreme value distributions cat* be quantified by plotting 
confidence bands around the assumed theoreticaT distribution function.
The sixty eight percent confidence interval is illustrated in Figure 5.6. 
As an example of the use of this confidence interval it can be said that 
there is ; percent confidence that the peak daily demand for
women’s WC’s associated with a. five day return period will lie 
within the range 15.4 - 18.5% Once again the method used to construct 
confidence intervals for extreme value functions is illustrated in 
Appendix II.
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It is often necessary to use data from 'n' years (days) to 
predict the variable value associated with the 'X' year return period, 
where 'X1 is greater than 'n'. Gumbel suggested a method for extra­
polating the extreme value distribution beyond the last plotted point. 
This extrapolation procedure is illustrated in Appendix II,and as an 
example has been used to extrapolate the distribution function of Figure
5 .6 .. ■
Consider now the peak sanitary appliance usage distributions for
offices shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. From a thorough investigation of
appliance usage for cloakrooms in their own buildings, the Building
Research Establishment were able to estimate the proportion of people
(33)entering the cloakroom who use each type of appliance , In all ; 
subsequent studies only the cloakroom arrivals were monitored and 
appliance usage figures derived using the type of appliance usage prop­
ortions determined from the B.R.E. buildings. Consequently the varia­
bility of water closet and washbasin fifteen minute demands are identical 
to the variability of cloakroom arrivals, only the demand scales have 
been modified. Consequently Figure 5.6 illustrates the extreme value 
distribution of ladies' WC and WB usage, and Figure 5.7 illustrates the 
extreme value distribution for men's WC, WB and urinal usage. Although 
these distributions are based on a limited amount of data there is little 
scattering of the points and hence the distribution function can be used 
with confidence for predicting the use of sanitary appliances in office 
buildings. However the confidence surrounding any prediction will 
greatly increase as more statistical data is incorporated into the fre­
quency distributions.
Figures 5.1 - 5.5 illustrate the extreme value distribution for‘ 
sanitary appliance usage in schools. Once again these distributions 
are based on limited data. However as more data from schools is 1 
collected then these distributions can be improved and hence, the degree 
of confidence when using them as predictive tools for the design of 
schools will increase.
5.3 The Limit State of Failure
When a prospective user enters a cloakroom there are a number of 
closets, urinals, or washbasins which he or she will be able to use. 
Consequently subsystem performance is not equivalent to the chance of 
any single appliance being engaged, rather to the user failure 
will occur when all the appliances are engaged. The limit state of fail­
ure will be reached when all the appliances are simultaneously engaged 
and another prospective user arrives. Using mathematical terminology 
the criterion of failure for 'n* appliances is (n+1) or more simultan­
eous prospective users, and the performance of the ?n f appliances is 
equivalent to the probability, P^, of this event occurring.
When allocating urinals it can be argued that vacant closets can 
be used as alternatives, consequently failure will not occur until all 
urinals and WC's are engaged. This modification will be taken into 
account when assessing the consequence of failure for urinals. 1
5.4 Hardware Design
, . 5.4.1 Introduction. In a preceding chapter it was stated that 
in general, current subsystem design techniques would be used once the 
design value of each relevant probabilistic variable had been rationally 
determined. For sanitary appliance allocation,subsystem design is 
represented by the design tables in CP 305. In an earlier section the. 
shortcomings of these design recommendations were briefly discussed, 
and the lack of any scientific basis for these scales was a prime 
criticism. It was thought therefore that this opportunity should be 
taken to propose revised provision scales based upon a rational mathem­
atical analysis.
   The use of a set of appliances is probabilistic in nature because____
of the daily variation in peak fifteen minute (five minute) demand, and 
also because of the random arrival pattern of users during any fifteen 
mitiute (five minute) period. As a consequence of this double uncertainty 
it is impossible to state categorically the probability of inadequacy 
associated with providing any particular number of appliances for a given 
population. Using Figures 5.1-5.7, or any more relevant daily peak demand
distributions, it is possible to determine the daily probability of any 
fifteen minute (five minute) demand being exceeded. However it is 
also necessary to determine the probability of inadequacy, as defined 
in the previous section, associated with any numbers of appliances 
and with a predefined fifteen minute (five minute) demand.
5.4.2 Assessing the performance of a set of appliances. Using
the binomial function, (section 3.3.1), it is possible to predict tlie
probability of coincidence of any given number of independent events
if the probability of occurrence, p, of each event is identical and
known. Consider the sanitary appliance problem, if it is assumed that
the design fifteen minute (five minute) demand is 'D1 users, then the
probability, p, of any one of the D individuals using an appliance at
t
any instance is approximately where t is the mean occupancy time for 
users of that particular type of appliance in that class of building, 
and T is the design time period, (either fifteen or five minutes).
Using the binomial function, the probability, px, that fX? of the ’D* 
individuals will wish to use the set of appliances simultaneously at any 
particular time is given by
Px = DCX * PX * (1“P)D X -5.1
where °CV denotes the combination of D individuals taken X at a time and
A
is calculated using
D *V  = xrx(F-'xTr ^ is the s 8^n f°r factorial)
: ■ i
Now if there are only fn f appliances installed, then the probability 
of inadequacy, P^ is equal to the sum of the chances of (n+1), (n+2)?, (n+3) 
up to D simultaneous users. This can be expressed algebraically as
Pf * PX*n+l + PX=n+2 + PX=n+3 PX4*D “ 5,2
is equal to the proportion of the T minute period when the number of 
appliances is insufficient, and hence quantifies the performance of that 
particular number of appliances.
Equation 5.2 can be simplified because' the sum of the probabilities 
of all possible numbers of coincident users is equal to unity, i.e.
PX=0 + PX«1 + PX=2 + PX»3 + PX=D “ 1 
hence equation 5.2 can be written as
p
f
- 5.3
Using equation 5.3 it is possible to determine P^, the probability of
minute (five minute) demand, and ftf the mean occupancy time are known 
for the particular type of appliance under design. *DT can be given 
various values, however the probability of any *DT value being exceeded 
on any day is found using
and the relevant extreme value distribution of peak daily fifteen 
minute (five minute) demand. If P^ is to represent the average 
probability of failure on any day then D should be the average peak 
daily fifteen minute (five minute) demand.
It is proposed that in a design situation the client or designer 
will stipulate the acceptable average failure rate, P' , during the peak 
fifteen minute (five minute) period for each type of appliance, i.e. 
washbasin, water closet or urinal. The average peak daily fifteen 
minute demand, D, is then found using equation 5.4 and the relevant ex­
treme value distribution of peak daily fifteen minute demand. Providing 
the average occupancy time,’tjis known equation 5.3 can then be solved 
for various 'n' values until the number of appliances, 'n1, is found which 
is associated with the acceptable failure rate. However ,n t can only 
take whole number values, hence the integer value associated with a P^ 
value nearest to, but smaller than the acceptable P^ value is used for 
design purposes.
This design procedure with the associated numerics would prove
tedious for the design engineer, especially when D is large. However
  (35)---- . .------- . ----  ------- -------
Bull derived a simple practical formula to estimate the probability
associated with any number of draw off points being in use simultaneously
in a building. Bul^s approach is applicable for evaluating the number
of sanitary appliances ,'n', associated with any failure rating, P^.
Consider the example when 'DT is one hundred and p is 0.2; equation 5.1
can be solved and a plot of P versus X, as illustrated in Figure 5.8,
X
can be drawn. This curve is the familiar normal frequency distribution.
failure, for any number of appliances if fD f , the design fifteen
. - . ' -    - - - -   -  ~  - — --- x —
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Figure 5.8 Frequency Distribution Curve
It will be observed that the most likely number of simultaneous users 
is D.p, i.e. 20. It will also be noticed that almost all the curve is 
covered by the range X equals (D.p-s) to X equals (D.p+s), where's’is 
twelve.
In order to find a simple practical formula for evaluating *n'* it 
would seem reasonable to integrate the expression for the curve and 
choose a value of V  such that the area under the curve from X equals (D.p 
to X equals (D.p+s) is equal to P^ percent of the entire area under 
the curve. Then the required value of fn* is (D.p+s). Bull showed that
s = Zf x [2 x D x p x (1-p) ~|2
where Z^ is determined from error function tables for each value.
If the performance factor is 0.99 then Z^ = 1.8.
Thus
_  _ 1
n = D.p + zf x [2 x D x p x (1-p) J 2 - 5.5
This formula can be used with sufficient accuracy for all cases 
excepting those vttien Tn* is small. In the latter event it is more 
accurate and not difficult to evaluate ’n' from equations 5.1 and 5.3.
In practice the peak period demands, D, will not be large and 
thus full advantage cannot be taken of equation 5.5. However the 
computer is ideally suited for solving tedious, repetitive calculations 
and thus a programme was written to solve equations 5.1 and 5.3 for var­
ious p and D values.
It is obviously not satisfactory to the designer to continually have 
to resort to using computer programmes every time he needs to find the 
number of appliances suitable for a particular cloakroom. The designer 
will be more interested in tabulated or graphical guides which can be 
easily interpreted and used. Consequently a method was derived for 
illustrating the computer solutions of equations 5.1 and 5.3 graphically.
5.4.3 Proposed provision scales for schools and offices. The 
derivation of provision scales based upon the solution of equations 5.1 
and 5.3 requires that the average daily peak fifteen minute (five minute
for schools) percentage demands, d, and the mean occupancy times,’t', be 
found by observatipn for each type of appliance in each class of building. 
The surveys recently undertaken by the Building Research Station and 
used to determine the extreme value distributions of rdr for the various 
appliances in offices and schools, (Figure 5.1 - 5.7), also provided the 
mean occupancy times for the various types of appliances. Consequently 
the proposed probabilistic design scales will be illustrated for sanitary 
appliances in offices and schools. The d and't’values for office appli­
ances are given in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, and the equivalent values for 
school appliances are given in Tables 5.5 and 5.6.
Using the appropriate't*value for each type of appliance, equation 
5.# was solved for a range of *n? and fD f values. Thus the relation 
between the number of appliances, ?n*, the design demand 'D* and the 
failure rate, P^, was found. Using the average daily peak percentage 
demand values of Tables 5.3 or 5.5 and equation 5.4, the *0* scale of 
these functions was converted to an equivalent cloakroom population 
scale.
This procedure was applied to each type of appliance in schools and 
offices and the resulting relationships are illustrated graphically in 
Figures 5.9 - 5.14. Given the expected cloakroom population and the 
acceptable failure rating the designer can use these graphs to determine 
the required number of appliances. For clarity only 0.01 and 0.001 fail­
ure rating curves have been shown for each type of appliance. These 
failure rates are equivalent to failure occurring, on average, for 9 and 
0.9 seconds each day in offices, and 3 and 0.3 seconds each day in 
schools, assuming that failure only occurs during the daily peak usage 
period. Additional failure rating curves could easily be drawn for 
other P^ values. Only integer ’n' values are relevant, hence, for 
design purposes the stepped design line, based on a maximum P^ value 
equal to the acceptable P^ value (possibly 0 .001) should be used, [/See 
Figure 5.1 3^.It must be stressed that the chance of failure associated 
with any number of appliances, as specified by Figures 5.9 - 5.14, is 
correct only when the average daily peak fifteen minute (five minute) 
demand occurs. When the actual peak fifteen minute demand is below d 
the chance of failure on that day will be smaller than the P^ values of 
Figures 5.9 - 5.14, and vice versa. To summarise, P^ is the average 
probability of failure at any time during the peak fifteen minute (five 
minute) demand period of the day.
TYPE OF APPLIANCE AVERAGE PEAK 15 MIN. DEMAND 
AS A PROPORTION OF CLOAKROOM 
POPULATION 'd'
Ladies WC's 12.7%
Ladies WB's 16.4%
Mens WC's 2 .6 %
Mens WB's 13.8%
Mens Urinals 12.6%
Table 5.3'd' values for appliances in offices
TYPE OF APPLIANCE MEAN OCCUPANCY TIME 't' 
(Secs.)
Ladies WC's 80
Ladies WB's 19
Mens WC's 267
Mens WB's 18
Mens Urinals 39
Table 5.4 Mean occupancy times for appliances in offices
TYPE OF APPLIANCE AVERAGE PEAK 5 MIN. DEMAND AS A 
PROPORTION OF CLOAKROOM 
POPULATION 'd'
Infants WC's 9.5%
Infants WB's 10%
Junior Mixed WC's 7.5%
Junior Mixed WB's 1 2.6%
Junior Girls WC's 1 0%
Junior Girls WB's 10.4%
Junior Boys WC's 2%
Junior Boys WB's * 8%
Junior Boys Urinals 9%
Table 5.5'd' values for appliances in primary schools
TYPE OF APPLIANCE MEAN OCCUPANCY TIME 't' 1 
(Secs.)
Infants WC' s ’ 47
Infants WB’s 28
Junior Mixed WC's 35
Junior Mixed WB's 21
Junior Girls WC's 41
Junior Girls WB's 17
Junior Boys WC's 76
Junior Boys WB's 17
Junior Boys Urinals 21
Table 5.6 Mean occupancy times for appliances in primary schools
wc,s CP 305 WB's & WC's
WB's
M-l
o
6040 80 1000 20 120 140 160 180 200
Cloakroom Population
Figure 5.9 No. of Appliances Required in Ladies Cloakrooms
7
URINALS
WC's
WB's
CP 305 CP 3056
5
o
S52
.oi
400 20 60 80 5 00 120 140 160 180 200
Cloakroom Population 
Figure 5.10 No. of Appliances Required in Men's Cloakrooms
No
. 
of
 
Ap
pl
ia
nc
es
 
N
o
. 
of
 
A
pp
li
an
ce
s
CP 305 WC's & WB’sWC's12
WB's
10
8
6
.OV
4
2
180 2008040 10060 120 140 160200
Cloakroom Population 
Figure 5.13 No. of Appliances Required in Infants' Cloakrooms
WC's CF 30 5 WC's & WB's12
•WB's
10
8
6
4
2
20060 80 100 
CI oakroom Populat ion
18016020
Figure 5.12 No. of Appliances Required in Junior Mixed Cloekroums
No
. 
of
 
Ap
pl
ia
nc
es
 
No
. 
of
 
Ap
pl
ia
nc
es
CP. 305 WBTs & WCfs12
10
STEPPED DESIGN CURVE 
FOR A 0.001 FAILURE RATE
8
6
4
•01
2
40 6020 800 100 120 140 160 180 200
Cloakroom Population 
Figure 5.13 No. of Appliances Required in Girls1 Cloakrooms
WC's
10
CP 305
6
CP 305
4
2
20 40 60 80 100 180 2001400 I 20 160
Cloakroom Population 
Figure 5.14 No. of Appliances Required in Boys’ Cloakrooms
Once demand and occupancy time information is available for 
sanitary appliance usage in other types of buildings it will be possible 
to derive similar probabilistically orientated design scales.
Figures 5.15 — 5.27 illustrate an alternative method of graphic­
ally representing the information contained in Figures 5.9-5.14. In 
these revised figures the number of appliances, 'n1, has been determined 
as a function of the performance P^, and curves drawn for various 
cloakroom populations. Interpolation between the curves is necessary 
for any other population values. The advantage of this method of 
presentation is that the relationship between 'n* and P^ can be 
assumed log-linear over the 0.00001 - 0.04 P^ range. A least sum of 
squares linear regression programme can then be used to determine the 
equations of each n-P^ function of Figures 5.15 - 5.27. Unfortunately 
a single design chart for each type of appliance is required and hence 
the design manual for all types of buildings would be extremely large. 
However all the information contained on each of Figures 5.15 - 5.27 can 
be approximately represented by a single equation relating the cloakroom 
population, number of appliances, and performance. These equations for 
the various types of appliances in offices and primary schools are given 
in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. The dashed lines of Figures 5.15 - 5.27 represent 
graphical solutions of these approximate design equations. As can be 
seen the error involved in using these generalised design equations is 
small. Since fractions of appliances are not feasible, and thus round- 
ing-up to whole numbers is necessary, for design purposes the relevance 
of this error is much reduced. These tables are as concise as the
‘ I
present tabulated guides in CP 305 and they have the added advantage 
of being conducive:to computerised solution.
If nationally accepted failure ratings could be defined for each 
type of appliance then the approximate design equations of Tables 5.7 
and 5.8 could be simplified by a tabulated presentation similar to those 
existing in CP 305.
5.4.4 Comparison of existing recommendations with the probabilistic 
design scales. The present recommendations of CP 305 have been super­
imposed on each of Figures 5.9 - 5.14. Generally these recommendations 
are associated with extremely low failure rates. The choice of acceptable
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TYPE OF 
APPLIANCE
DESIGN EQUATION
Womens
WC*s
n - - 0.12 /Pop log P^ + 0.01 Pop
Mens
WCfs n = - 0.07 i/Pop log P^ + 0.02 Pop - 0.5
Womens
WBfs
n = - 0.09 /Pop log - 0.1
Mens 
WBf s n = - 0.0833 v'fcop log P^ - 0.15
Mens
Urinals
n = - 0.1 v^ Pop log P^ + 0.1
Table 5.7 Design Equations for Appliances in Offices
TYPE OF 
APPLIANCE
DESIGN EQUATION
Infants
WC's
n = - O.ll JPop log Pf + 0.0186 Pop - 0.11
Infants
WB's
n = - 0.095jPop log Pf + 0.0112 Pop
Junior Mixed 
WC's
n = - 0.1 JPop log Pf + 0.0152 Pop - 0.05
Junior Mixed 
WB's
n = - 0.09 JPop log P^ +0.0117 Pop - 0.24
Junior girls 
WB's
n = - 0.09 JPop log Pf + 0.0077 Pop - 0.31
Junior girls 
WC's
n = - 0.1 JPop log Pf + 0.018 Pop + 0.006
Junior boys 
WC's
n = - 0.02^) Pop log Pf + 0.0088 Pop - 0.14
Junior boys 
WB's
n = - 0.08 J^POP lo<3 pf + 0.0064 Pop - 0.3'/
Boys urinal n = - 0.085JPop log Pf + 0o008 Pop + 0.04 
_________e----------------------- - --- -------------- ----
Table 5. 8 Design Equations for Appliances in Primary Schools
failure rates is a subjective decision but from practical considerations 
the recommendations of CP 305 appear extremely conservative. The author 
proposes that a failure rate in the region of 0.001 would be adequate 
in most cases; this being equivalent to failure occurring on average, 
for one second per day in offices and one third of a second per day in 
schools. However, it is the shape of the present recommendationscompared 
to the probability curves of Figures 5.9 - 5.14 which is of immediate 
interest. In general the stepped design lines, shown in Figures 5.9 - 
5.14, representing the CP 305 recommendations, increase at a faster rate 
than would stepped lines based on a constant failure rate. As a con­
sequence the ’safety1 provided by present scales increases with the 
potential cloakroom population. The stepped design line based on a 
0.001 failure rate for WC’s in girls1 cloakrooms, (Figure 5.13), shows 
that for constant ’safety’ the rate of provision of appliances can be 
gradually reduced as the population served by the cloakroom increases.
The present provision scales for each type of appliance will now be 
considered in more detail. The present scale of provision for men’s 
urinals follows very closely the 0.001 probability curve, although the 
washbasin and water closet scales are associated with much smaller fail­
ure ratings. This suggests that at present different standards of per­
formance are provided by the three types of appliances; therefore, a 
reduction in the WC and WB scales would seem logical. For hygenic reasons 
CP 305 recommends more washbasins that can be justified on usage grounds, 
thus the present washbasin scale is associated with an extremely low 
failure rating. However, even taking hygiene into consideration there 
is still room for some reduction in the present scale of provision espec­
ially at the higher cloakroom population values. The present scale of 
provision for WC’s in ladies* cloakrooms closely follows the 0.001 prob­
ability curve but again, on purely usage grounds, an equal number of
washbasins is unnecessary. To account for hygiene a P. value of 0.0005
* t
might be used instead of 0.001 for washbasins, however this would still 
necessitate a reduction in the washbasin scale.
Consider now the provision of appliances in primary schools,(.Figures 
5.11 - 5.14.) In general, there is a greater discrepancy between the 0.001 
failure rate curves and the present provision scales for schools than for 
offices. Figures 5.11 - 5.13 show that the number of WC’s and WB’s could be 
substantially reduced in cloakrooms without urinals, i.e. those used by infants 
or junior girls. However, although the probability curves suggest, on
average, one less washbasin than the number of water closets, to take 
account of hygiene it is reasonable to provide an equal number of 
washbasins and water closets. As mentioned in a previous section using 
the CP 305 recommendations, a population increase from 39 to 51 involves 
no less than four extra washbasins and four extra water closets being 
installed. If this inconsistency were removed then the gradient of the 
present scale would be much closer to that of the probability curves.
The discussion of appliance provision in junior boys' cloakrooms 
is more complicated because of the need for urinals. The total number 
of WC’s and urinals is specified, but the number of WC’s is fixed at 
one third of this. When the number of WC’s add urinals is four the 
designer must decide whether one or two WC’s should be installed.
Similarly when the total number of WC’s and urinals is eight, the designer 
must decide whether to install two or three WC’s. Hence, the scales 
illustrated in Figure 5.14 are based on the author’s interpretation of 
the present provision recommendations. If design guides are to be based 
on a 0.001 failure rate the present scales of provision could be reduced 
for all three types of appliances. According to the probability curves 
it would be logical to install an equal number of urinals and washbasins, 
this would give the washbasins a slightly smaller probability of failure 
to account for hygienic requirements.
These comments concerning the present scales of sanitary appliance 
provision for schools and offices assume that the data contained in 
Tables 5.3 - 5.6 reflects the true use of appliances during the peak 
usage period of the day. The reliability of the data will obviously 
increase as more surveys are undertaken.
5,4.5 Conclusions. A method has been described and illustrated 
to determine the performance associated with any number of appliances 
in a cloakroom. It is concluded that for the majority of types of 
appliances in primary schools and offices a reduction in the present 
design scales is possible without,from the user’s viewpoint, a notice­
able deterioration in performance. The over conservatism of the present 
design scales generally increases as the cloakroom population rises.
No rational reason could be found for the rapid increase in the 
number of appliances required when the population increases from 39 to 
51 in school cloakrooms. Also a problem was found when interpreting the 
recommendations of CP 305 for boys1 urinals and WC’s, This should be 
corrected to avoid confusion.
The design method proposed here to assess sanitary appliance 
performance could be used for any type of building if the average peak 
daily demand and the mean occupancy times of each type of appliance 
were known.
This method of analysing the performance of sanitary appliance 
allocations assumes that each individual is independent. However in 
practice this is not strictly true, there is the distinct possibility 
that two or more individuals will visit the cloakroom together or 
that the cloakroom might even be used for social gatherings. As a con­
sequence the theoretically derived failure ratings will slightly over­
estimate the true performance of sanitary appliance allocations.
5.5 Appliance Allocation based on Failure Cost Consistency.
5.5.1 Introduction. In the previous section a method was proposed 
to enable the performance to be determined for any number of appliances 
in a cloakroom. Performance has been defined as the average probability 
of an inadequate number of appliances at any time during the peak daily 
fifteen minute (five minute) usage period. As a result of sanitary 
appliance failure a queue will form and the failure cost consistency 
criterion offers a rational method for choosing the acceptable frequency 
of this event occurring.
As described in detail in a previous chapter the first step in the 
use of the failure cost consistency design procedure is the financial 
assessment of the consequences of failure.
5.5.2 The cost of failure. ’I* is defined as the cost of one min­
ute’s accumulated waiting time, this loss will occur if one man waits 
one minute or two individuals wait thirty seconds, or any other combina­
tion which results in an accumulated waiting time of one minute. Table
5. 9 estimates the value of*1*for various types of appliances in a 
number of different types of buildings. It is proposed in Table 5.9 that 
the cost consequences of inadequacy should be based upon the average 
value of the user’s time. If the building is commercial then the value 
of time can be determined from the average wage rate of the occupants or from 
tariff charges. if the building is provided as an asset to the 
community, i.e. a hospital or a school, then the cost of running that 
building per patient or pupil might be used as a basis for the value of 
time. In commercial offices, a prospective user will find waiting for 
an appliance both embarrassing arid an inconvenience, hence the estimated 
value of time has been trebled to take account of these additional factors. 
Similar 'nature of failure' factors have been used in estimating all the 
'I'values proposed in Table 5.9.
The current Code of Practice recommends that an equal number of 
washbasins and toilets should be provided in cloakrooms, although, as 
shown in the previous section, this cannot be justified on usage grounds.
It is feasible to increase the ’nature of failure* factor for washbasins 
to account for the hygienic implications. However to justify an equal 
number of washbasins and toilets would require a ’nature of failure’ 
factor ten or twenty times larger for washbasins than for toilets. In 
the remainder of this chapter washbasins and toilets are defined as 
having equal importance, although it is acknowledged that there are 
grounds for using larger'I*values for basins.
5.5.3 A numerical example illustrating the use of the failure cost 
consistency criterion. Problem one:- Determine the number of WC’s re­
quired in a ladies’ cloakroom serving one hundred personnel.
Assume the average value of each employee to be five pounds per 
hour (twice the assumed average wage rate). Consequently using Table 
5.9 the cost consequences of one minute’s cumulative failure is
T o 500 ocI = 3 x — = 25 pence.
If N is the acceptable return period in days of one minute’s 
accumulated waiting time, then using the failure cost consistency 
equation (equation 4.10) and assuming a conservation coefficient value 
of unity;
TYPE OF 
BUILDING TYPE OF APPLIANCE
BATH SINK WASH
BASIN
WATER
CLOSET URINAL
Dwellings PERFORMANCE
_______
I RATINGS NOT APPLICABLE
Offices - 2.5 x E 3.0 x E 3.0 * E 3.0 x e
Schools - 2.5 x E 5.0 x E 5.0 x e 4.0 x e
Hospital Y x E 
Y depends 
on ward
2.5 x E 3.0 x E 3.0 x e 3.0 x e
Higher
Education
AS FOB OFFICES
Hostals 3.0 x E 2.0 * E 3.0 x E 3.0 x e 2.0 x e
Hotels 3.0 x E 2.5 x E 3.0 x e 3.0 x e 2.0 x e
Restaurants - 2.0 x E 3.0 x e 3.0 x E 2.0 x e
Factories - 2.0 x E 3.0 x E 3.0 x E 2.0 x E
fE* is a relevant "value of time" parameter for each type of building
Table 5.9 Nominal *1* values for various Appliances in Different Types 
of Buildings
TYPE OF TYPE OF BUILDING
APPLIANCE SCHOOLS SPECULATIVE
OFFICE
PRESTIGE
OFFICE
WATER
CLOSETS
0.005 0.005 0.0025
WASH
BASINS
0.0025 0.0025 0.00125
URINALS 0.006 0.005 0.0025
Table 5.10 General Failure Ratings
N = 58.5 x 25 x
= . 14.6 days.
The average accumulated waiting time acceptable in any day is 
given by the reciprocal of N, i.e. 0.068 minutes. Now if it is assumed 
that failure only occurs during the peak fifteen minute period of 
the day then the desirable peak fifteen minute failure rating, P^, is 
given by 4
P = = 0.0045
x lo
Using Figure 5.9 or the relevant equation of Table 5.7 it is 
found that four appliances are required to ensure the performance is 
better than 0.0045 during the peak fifteen minute period of the day.
Problem two:- Determine the number of WC’s required in an infant’s 
cloakroom, if the cloakroom serves four classes, that is approximately 
120 children.
An inadequate number of sanitary appliances in schools will 
inevitably prove inconvenient for the teachers as well as for the 
children, since it will involve the teachers in extra supervisory 
duties. Consequently it is suggested that the economic basis for 
assessing the consequences of failure should be the wage rate of the 
teachers. In addition an inadequate number of appliances will prove 
particularly unhygienic in schools and thus it is proposed that a 
’nature of failure’ factor of five should be used for schools. However 
to allow for the fact that boys can use WC’s when all the urinals are 
occupied the nature of failure factor will be reduced to four for 
urinals.
Returning to the example; assuming a teacher’s time is worth five 
pence per minute, then the cost consequences of failure will be given 
by
I *= 5 x 5 = 25 pence per one minute’s accumulated failure.
The return period of one minute’s accumulated failure (assuming a 
conservatism coefficient of unity) is found using equation 4.10, that is
N = 58.5 x 25 x *7-577 = 1 2 . 2  days.
It is acceptable for there to be an inadequate number of WC’s 
for, on average, 0.082 minutes of every- day. Now unlike offices, there 
are a number of peak demand periods during a school day. If it is assumed 
that one quarter of failures occur during the actual peak five minute 
period of any day then the acceptable peak five minute failure rating 
is given by
P = M ® 2 x_2Ll25 = 0.0041
t D
As in the previous example either Figure 5.11 or the relevant 
equation of Table 5.8 can be used to determine the number of appliances 
associated with this failure rating. For this example five WC’s are 
required.
5.5.4 Discussion. The above examples assume that the P^ » value, 
as derived using the failure cost consistency criterion, and the P^ 
values of Figures 5.9 —  5.14 have identical meanings. This is not 
precisely true; the performance values determined using the failure cost 
consistency criterion are allowable accumulated waiting times as a pro­
portion of fifteen minutes (five minutes). The performance values of 
Figures 5.9 - 5.14 define the proportion of the fifteen minute period 
when failure exists and is independent of the number of individuals in 
the queue. If Q is defined as the accumulated waiting time as a pro­
portion of fifteen minutes then
Q = P^ + Pj + 2Pg + 3P^ ...
where P^ is the failure rating as defined in Figures 5.9 - 5.14
?2 is the probability of two users queuing simultaneously
Pg is the probability of three 11 ” 11
P^ is the probability of four 11 11 "
Now the value of the second, third, fourth etc. terms are very small 
when compared with P^, Consequently when combined with the fact that 
appliances can only be provided in unit intervals and hence extremely 
accurate P^ values are not imperative, it can be assumed that Q equals
P^. That is the probability values given in Figures 5 ;9 to 5.14 
represents the accumulated waiting time as a proportion of fifteen 
minutes.
Failure ratings based on the failure cost consistency criterion are 
a function of the total population served by the cloakroom. As the 
population reduces in size, so the desired performance increases. To 
illustrate this a failure cost consistency design curve has been super­
imposed on Figure 5.9. This line is based on an'I*value of 25 pence 
per minute. However it is necessary to round up designs to the next 
highest whole number of appliances. Hence the actual number of 
appliances will not be affected by small changes in P^, and the cloak­
room population will have only a small effect on actual sanitary appli­
ance provisions. As a consequence it is thought valuable to illustrate 
how simplified provision recommendations might be derived based on a 
single, invariant failure rating value.
5.5.5 Simplified provision recommendations. The preceding examples 
show how easily the failure cost consistency design criterion can be 
used to determine the accfep table probability of inadequacy for sanitary 
appliances.
If general'I*values can be assumed for all buildings of a given 
type then a single design P^ value can be defined for each type of 
appliance in each class of building. As a consequence simplified 
tabulated recommendations, similar in nature to those existing in CP 305 
can be derived. As an example general failure ratings have been 
derived for sanitary appliances in school, speculative offices and 
prestige offices. These general failure ratings, shown in Table 5.10, 
are based on generalised E values and the ’nature of failure* factors 
specified in Table 5.9. The simplified provision recommendations, found 
by combining the failure ratings of Table 5.10 and the design charts of 
Figures 5.9 - 5.14, are illustrated graphically in Figures 5.28 - 5.37 
and are tabulated in Table 5.11. For comparative purposes the CP 305 
recommendations have been superimposed on these proposed provision 
scales. Figures 5.28 - 5.37 show that halving the failure rate, as is 
proposed for prestige offices, does not have a great deal of effect on 
the provision of appliances.
Proposed (Speculative Office) 
" (Prestige Office)
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I
■ t
  >
r~ 
l 
i
20 40 60 80 100 
Cloakroom Population 
Figure 5.28 Scales of Provision for Womens WC's
120 140 160
No. of Appliances
20 40 60 80 100 
Cloakroom Population 
Figure 5.29 Scales of Provision for Womens WB's
120 140 160
No V of Appliances
 It
i
=  V- - " Sfl
r- —
20 40 60 80 100 
Cloakroom Population
120 140
Figure 5.30 Scales of Provision for Men's Urinals
160
—  No. of Appliances
 r
j J
.1 1__L
o 20 40 60 80 100 
Cloakroom Population 
Figure 5,31 Scales of Provision for Men's Washbasins
120 140 160
■ r "" i— i— r
No. of Appliances
r~  *f
i L
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Cloakroom Population 
Figure 5.32 Scales of Provision for Men's WC's
120 140 160
— No. of Appliances
r
i r----------
i ;
r
.i!
CP 305 
WC's
WASHBASINS
J L
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Cloakroom Population 
Figure 5.33 Scales of Provision for Infants* WB's and WC's
65
4
3
2
1
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
I
*
6
5
4
3
2
1
1NU. UJU JL J.CH.1UOO
r ~
i r*‘
i !
CP 305 (WB's & WC’s) 
PROPOSED WC's 
11 WB's
J ________ I_______ L
J
20 40 12060 80 100 
Cloakroom Population 
?igure 5.34 Scales of Provision, Junior Mixed Cloakrooms
140 160
No. of Appliances WC's
P.'Ji.
I
1
_ ^ ul '
i
. J
i i 
J J
_ L
20 40 60 80 100 
Cloakroom Population
^igure 5.35 Scales of Provision, Junior Girls' Cloakroom
120 140 160
No. of Appliances
1 I
CP 305 A
_I
20 40 120 14060 80 100 
Cloakroom Population
igure 5.36 Scales of Provision for Urinals in Junior Boys'Cloakroom
160
No. of Appliances
__J
WB's (CP 305) I
WC_'s_ (CP 305)
r
#
K
.'l
tiB's (Proposed)
_ _ _ WC ]_s _( P r o ^ o § e d ________j
20 40 60 80 100
Cloakroom Population
120 140 160
Figure 5.37 Scales of Provision for WC's and WB's in Junior Boys' 
Cloakrooms
S
C
H
O
O
L
S
JU
N
IO
R
 
B
O
Y
S
N
O
. 
R
E
­
Q
U
IR
E
D
r - N C n — CM CO *3- ©  — CM CO St
PO
PU
­
L
A
T
IO
N
1
-7
0
7
0
-1
3
5
1
3
5
-
1
-2
5
2
5
-6
5
6
5
-1
2
5
1
2
5
-
1
-1
0
1
0
-2
7
2
7
-5
5
5
5
-1
1
5
1
1
5
-
JU
N
IO
R
 
G
IR
L
S
[N
O
. 
R
E
­
Q
U
IR
E
D
*- cm co •d 'm  so ~  cm co ««■ m
PO
PU
­
L
A
T
IO
N mm  o  «n m  cm —• co m  co — 
I I  I I  1 I 
—• in  o  m  m  in— CO to CO CSI
1
-2
0
2
0
-5
0
5
0
-1
0
0
1
0
0
-1
5
5
1
5
5
-
JU
N
IO
R
 
M
IX
E
D
N
O
. 
R
E
­
Q
U
IR
E
D
cm co s t  «n — cm co -a- m  vo
P
O
PU
­
L
A
T
IO
N uo©  ©  m  co 
cm m  co —
1 1 1 I 1 
- o o m m  
cm m  co co
m  ©
©  m  m  ©  vo
T ? f T T  .— o  m  m  m  o  
— CO vO ©  VO
IN
F
A
N
T
S
N
O
. 
R
E
­
Q
U
IR
E
D
—■ cm co s t  m  io —• cm co sr  m
PO
PU
­
L
A
T
IO
N o  min  m  o  m
— CO VO CO — — 
1 1 1 I I  1
— in in  o  m  ©  
— CO VO co —•
1
-1
5
1
5
-4
0
4
0
-7
0
7
0
-1
2
0
1
2
0
-1
6
5
O
F
F
I
C
E
S
M
EN
S 
C
LO
A
K
R
O
O
M P
R
E
ST
IG
E H• M
Q  (3 
!S O'
— CM co 4* —• CM CO St ©  — CM CO St
PO
PU
­
L
A
T
IO
N
1
-5
0
5
0
-8
5
8
5
-1
3
0
1
3
0
-2
0
0
1
-2
5
2
5
-8
0
8
0
-1
6
0
-
1
6
0
-
1
-1
0
1
0
-2
0
2
0
-5
0
5
0
-1
1
0
1
1
0
-1
7
0
•
u
w N
O
. 
R
E
­
Q
U
IR
E
D
— CM CO St •“  CM (O O  — CM CO St
tO
PO
PU
­
L
A
T
IO
N
1
-5
5
5
5
-9
5
9
5
-1
4
0
1
4
0
-2
1
0
1
-3
5
3
5
-1
0
0
1
0
0
-1
8
0
1
8
0
-
O  O  
m  o  o  cm m■ CO vD 
1 1 1 I I
m  o  o  ©  v•— CO vo Ov
W
OM
EN
S 
C
LO
A
K
R
O
O
M
8w
a N
O
. 
R
E
­
Q
U
IR
E
D
CM CO st st — CM CO St
s
O)
PO
PU
- 
1  
LA
TI
O
N 
'
m
0  o  m  o  cm
—  co in ov •—
1 i i i i
— o  o  m  o  
•— co m  ov
O0  m  co 
cm m  •—
1 i l I 
— ©  m  o
cm m  co
•
o
g
n
• M
O  O  
S3 a
—  cm co m — CM CO s t
CO
P
O
PU
­
L
A
T
IO
N o  o  
m  m  m  o  st 
— CO VO — — 
l i 1 1 I 
m  m  in o
— CO VO ©
1
-3
0
3
0
-7
0
7
0
-1
5
0
[1
5
0
-
TY
PE
 
O
F 
A
PP
L
IA
N
C
E
W
A
TE
R
i
C
L
O
SE
T
S
W
A
SH
b
a
s
in
s
U
R
IN
A
L
S
•wO
aH
o
oJBo
to
1
8 ,\
c
•H
•aH
*3
«
o c•iM o
•H
•w 4J
O C#Ha 9
•H o>
Oto o .0>
9 0»3
9
H w
fit 0B
Q.< 01
•s
C0 00
4J 9•H •H
9 >Cl w
CO 01
09
MM
o 8oa o
o u
•rt
09 %
•H o
>  rH
O oMru 0)
rH
00
o 9
•9
09 09
ati—i 9
<co 9
CO *H
03 T3
a> (0
09 M
o •H
P. 9o D*
n fl>
(X H
.
m
01
rH
£<e
H
Simple tabulated recommendations, as illustrated in Table 5.11, 
will be popular with a designer. However the benefit of using Tables 
5.7 and 5.8 or Figures 5.9 - 5.14 for sanitary appliance design is that 
the actual requirements of each building, rather than each type of 
building, can be considered. Ail analogy can be made between buying a 
ready to wear suit or having one tailor made for the individual.
5.5.6 Reliability design. As discussed in a previous chapter it 
is feasible to apply the concept of failure cost consistency to subsystem 
reliability design. Reliability failure is equivalent to the appliance 
being out of order for one of a variety of reasons, such as mechanical 
failure, disruption of water supply or blocked waste pipes. It is 
feasible to assess the consequences of an appliance or set of appliances 
being out of action, and hence using the failure cost consistency 
equation the acceptable frequency of reliability failure can be deter­
mined. Although in theory it is possible to determine the statistical 
likelihood of mechanical failure, it is difficult to assess the fre­
quency of blocked pipes or disruptions to the water supply. Consequently 
a much more thorough analysis than is feasible here is required to 
consider in detail sanitary appliance reliability. In addition sanitary 
appliance reliability will not in practice be a serious problem in 
buildings and consequently there is no practical reason for a thorough 
analysis. It has only been mentioned here for purposes of completeness.
5.6 Appliance Allocation based upon a Cost Benefit Approach
5.6.1 Introduction. If a more rigorous economic treatment of san­
itary appliance provision is desired then the cost benefit technique 
should be used. As described in the previous chapter this entails 
considering the capital cost implications in addition to the expected 
failure losses and attempting to minimise the sum of the two, taking
due account of any design constraints which might exist.
5.6.2 The failure loss function. Table 5.9 gives general cost 
of failure values for the various sanitary appliances in various types 
of buildings. These*1*values financially quantify the consequences of 
a set of appliances being inadequate for an accumulated waiting time of 
one minute. The actual daily losses due to an inadequate number of
appliances will depend upon the daily peak.period failure rating,
P^ , and-the duration of the daily peak period, V, (fifteen minutes for 
offices). The annual expected losses are given by
L' = m x  I x .x t -5.6
where m is the annual number of working days for the type of building 
being designed.
If the sanitary appliances have a design life of n years and the 
discount rate is r , then the total discounted losses is given by,
L = D x m x I x P x t — 5.7nr f
where D is the relevant discount factor value taken from Table A. 8. nr
5.6.3 The capital cost function. For a given number of potential 
cloakroom users the required number of appliances will be a function of 
the failure rating. Unit cost information for the various types 
of appliances can then be used to determine the algebraic function link­
ing capital expenditure and failure rating. In a previous section it 
was shown that for the 0.00001 - 0.04 range the number of appliances 
fn f required for a particular cloakroom population is a logarithmic 
function of the failure rating, i.e.
n = K x log Pf + K* - 5.8
It has also been shown that the number of appliances, the failure 
rating, and the total possible number of cloakroom users can all be 
combined in a single equation. The approximate general equations for 
schools and offices are given in Tables 5.7 and 5.8.
Consider now in detail the unit cost of a sanitary appliance.
The cost of an appliance is a function of;
a) The unit cost of the appliance - u
b) The cost of the associated pipework - I
c) The labour costs associated with installing - f
the appliance
d) The value of the space occupied by the appliance - s
The unit appliance costs shown in Table 5.12 are taken from 
( 36)
Spons 1974 price lists . These costs include the cost of the 
associated pipework, the fitting costs, and eight percent has been 
added to account for preliminary costs. In economic terms the value 
of a building, whether an office block, a school or a hospital is 
related to the usable (rentable) floor space. It can be argued that 
an appliance requires a finite floor space which cannot be usefully 
rented, thus economically the cost of an appliance must be related to 
the space it occupies in addition to the cost of the unit and the 
associated labour costs. However it can also be argued that there 
must always be a certain amount of circulation space in a cloakroom 
and reducing the number of appliances would not necessarily alter the 
size of the cloakroom. It can also be argued that the rentable value 
of the building will decrease as the sanitary appliance performance is 
reduced. For these reasons it has been thought applicable to ignore 
space value in the cost benefit analysis of sanitary appliance provision.
Using equation 5.8 the general capital cost function can be 
written as
E = S x (K log Pf + K !) - 5.9
The relevant value of 0 is taken from Table 5.12. However 
this function does not include the potential number of cloakroom users 
as a variable. A more useful form of the capital cost equation is
E = S x (a x i/Pop x log + b x Pop + c) — 5.10
Using Table 5.7 or 5.8 and Table 5.12 the actual capital cost
function can be derived for any type of sanitary appliance in offices
or schools.
5.6,4 The total life cycle cost equation. The total life cycle 
cost is equal to the sum of the present value of the expected losses 
and the capital cost. Algebraically
TYPE OF APPLIANCE COST (£)
Washbasin 21.60
Water Closet 29.16
Urinal 69.12
Bath 55.00
Sinks 27.00
Table 5.12 Total Cost of Installing a Single Appliance 
(Taken from Spons 1973 Price List^-^)
TYPE OF APPLIANCE
pf , opt V ’ (£)
Womens WC's 0.00185 128.5
Womens WB's 0.001 56.0
•Mens WBfs 0.001 51.0
Mens WC1s 0.0011 75.0
Mens Urinals 0.0036 176.0
Table 5.13 Optimum Failure Ratings and Capital Expenditures 
for the Various Types of Sanitary Appliances in 
Offices
The optimal P^ value is found by equating the first differential of 
equation 5.11 to zero.
The procedure for determining the optimal failure rate will now 
be illustrated, for the women's WC's in an office cloakroom. The 
procedure is identical for any other type of appliance and/or type of 
building.
5.6.5 A numerical example. Determine the optimum number of WC's 
required in a cloakroom serving one hundred female office personnel. 
Assume a design life of thirty years and a net discount value of 
four percent. The annual number of working days is assumed to be 
260.
Referring to Table 5.12, the total installation cost for a single 
i thirty pounds. According to ' 
for one hundred female personnel is
WC is Table 5.7 the relevant n-P^ function
n = - 1.1828 log Pf + 1.05 -5.12
and hence the capital cost function is
E = - 35.484 x log P^ + 31.5 pounds - 5.13
The discounted failure loss function is determined using 
equation 5.7, Table 5.9 and Table A.8.
L 17.3 x 260 x 0.25 x 15 x P^ - 5.14
The total cost equation is found by combining equations 5.13 and
5.14.
C 35.48 x log pf + 31.5 + 18896 x pf -5.15
Differentiating the total cost equation
§ = -35^ 8 +I8896 
0 f f
J/1
The optimum P^ value is given by equating -gp— to zero. That is
P  s  35.48 _ Q Q | g 7  
*f „ 18896 -Wi*/
opt
The optimal number of WC*s is found by substituting this optimal 
failure rate value into equation 5.12.
n ' - - 1.1828 x log 0.00187 + 1.05opt °
= 4.27
Using total life cycle cost consideration it is found that four 
WC*s should be provided in this ladies clockroom.
In this example the running costs have quite reasonably been 
assumed to be independent of the failure rating.
The optimal failure rating found using this cost benefit method 
is three times smaller than the design failure rate based on the failure 
cost consistency criterion. However, because provision recommendations 
must be rounded up, or down to the nearest whole number the actual 
allocation of appliances is only sensitive to order of magnitude changes 
in P^. As a consequence the provision of WC*s in this cloakroom is 
identical for designs based on the failure cost consistency or the 
cost benefit procedure.
5.7 An Example of Cost-Effective Design
5.7.1 Introduction. The best overall ’value* for the available 
capital is the design criterion when a capital cost constraint exists. 
This criterion entails balancing the resources allocated to each 
subsystem, thus it is not possible to design subsystems independently. 
Expenditure and loss functions are required for each probabilistic sub­
system which must be financed from the limited capital resources.
The theoretical criterion which will produce the most economically 
efficient allocation of resources between subsystems was discussed in 
a previous chapter. However it was shown that the design procedure 
which results in the optimal solution is lengthy and complex. Two 
simplified design procedures for allocating a fixed capital between 
a number of subsystems were proposed, and although these two design 
techniques do not give the true optimal solutions they would both be
more acceptable from a practical point of view. It was suggested that 
it was not possible to illustrate these design procedures with an 
example because of the lack of comprehensive cost information for all 
the probabilistic subsystems of a building. However these cost 
effective design techniques can be illustrated for sanitary appliance 
allocation, each type of sanitary appliance being considered to be an 
independent subsystem.
5.7.2 A numerical example. As an example assprne that the capital 
available for all the sanitary appliances of an office building con­
taining one hundred females, and one hundred male personnel is eighty 
pounds less than the optimal total expenditure. As in the previous 
example it is assumed that the design life is thirty years and the net 
discount rate is four percent.
An approximate solution to the problem of allocating the sanitary 
appliances in this building can be found by balancing the values of 
the first differentials of the total cost functions of each type of 
appliance. The loss functions of each type of appliance have been derived 
using Table 5.9, assuming the user’s time to be worth five pounds per 
hour, The expenditure functions are derived by combining the appliance 
unit cost data of Table 5.12 and the provision functions listed in 
Table 5.7. The total cost functions for the various appliances are:-
For women’s WC’s;
C = - 35.48 x log Pf + 31.5 + 18896 x Pf
For women’s washbasins;
C = - 19.44 x log Pf - 2.16 + 18896xpf 
For men’s WC’s;
C **' -20.41 x log Pf + 14.58 + 18896^Pf 
For men’s washbasins;
C *= - 18 x log Pf - 3.24 + 18896 x pf
- 5.16
-5.17
- 5.18
5.19
For men's urinals;
C * - 69 x log + 6.91 18896 x P^ - 5.20
For each type of appliance the algebraic function relating 6E, 
the reduction in capital expenditure below the optimum value,and
dC
dP,
must be derived. As an example consider the ladies' WC's.
Differentiating equation 5.15
dC
dP,
35.48 + 18896
f f
and E = - 35.48 x log P^ + 31.5
Equation 5.22 can be rewritten as,
E - 6E = - 35.48 x log p. + 31.5
opt t
Combining equations 5.21 and 5.23
6E « E - 31.5 + 35.68 x log 
opt °
35.48
18896 - dC_dP,
- 5.21
- 5.22
- 5.23
-5.24
The optimal capital expenditures (E t) are found by equating the 
first differential of equations 5.16 - 5.20 to zero and substituting 
the resulting optimal P^ values into the capital expenditure functions 
of each appliance. Table 5.13 tabulates the optimal P^ and Optimal 
capital expenditure values for the various types of appliances. Using
the relevant E . value of Table 5.13 equation 5.24 has been solved for 
dC opt
dPj
5.38.
various values and the solution is graphically presented in Figure
f dCUsing a similar analysis the expressions relating 6E and
for all other types of sanitary appliances have been plotted on Figure
5.38. The origin of this figure is equivalent to the optimal total 
expenditure for all the sanitary appliances. This example assumes that 
the capital available for the sanitary appliances is eighty pounds
less than the optimal total cost. The 6E values for each type of appli­
ance associated with 6E^ , equal to eighty pounds can be found using Figure
5.38. Table 5.14 illustrates how the required number of appliances is 
found once the 6E value for each type of appliance has been determined.
It is not possible to design to the precise expenditure figures shown in 
column three of Table 5.14 because fractional numbers of appliances
116
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TYPE OF 
APPLIANCE
E
opt
£
SE
£
E - E -<5E 
opt
£
NUMBER OF 
APPLIANCES 
N
Womens
WC’s
128.5 17.25 111.0 3.8 (4)
Womens
WB’s 56.0
9.5 46.6 2.15 (2)
Mens
WC’s
75.0 10.2 65.0 2.22 (2)
Mens
WB’s
51.0 9.0 42.0 2.0 (2)
Mens
Urinals
176.0 33 143.0 2.06 (2)
Table 5.14 No. of Appliances required when the Finance Available is 
£80 below^the Total Cost of the Optimum Allocation of 
Sanitary Appliances (Algebraic Method)
TYPE OF 
APPLIANCE
E
opt
£
6E
£
E * E -6E 
opt
£
NUMBER OF 
APPLIANCES 
N
Womens
WC’s
128.5 17.5 110 3.8 (4)
Womens
WB’s
56.0 13.5 42.5 2.0 (2)
Mens
WC’s
75.0 14.5 60.5 2.1 (2)
Mens
WB’s
51.0 13.0 48.0 2.22 (2)
Mens
Urinals
176.0 21.0 155.0 2.24 (2)
Table 5.15 No. of Appliances Required when the Finance Available is 
£80 below the Total Cost of the Optimum Allocation of 
Sanitary Appliances (Maver’s Method)
cannot be provided. However if a policy is adopted of installing the 
nearest whole number of appliances then the total cost should be approx­
imately equal to the capital available. The number of appliances 
recommended in Table 5.14 is based upon the unit prices of Table 5.12.
Maver's method for determining the degree to which each optimal 
subsystem design should be modified when a limited amount of capital is 
available requires that the relation between 6E and 6C be determined for 
each type of appliance (<5 C being the reduction in total life cycle cost 
below the optimum value). As an example of the derivation of this 
relationship consider the women1s WC’s. Equation 5.22 can be rewritten 
as;
E - 6E = - 35.48 log(P. + 6P.) + 31.5 -5.25
opt ® f _ fopt
This equation can be used to determine <5E for any departure from the 
optimal failure rating, 6P^.
Now the failure loss equation (equation 5.14) can also be 
rewritten;
L „ + SL » 18896 x (p + fip ) - 5.26
opt foPt £
Hence the change in failure losses 6L,can be determined for any 
departure, SP^, of the failure rating from the optimal value.
The change in total cost, 6C, is given by
6C " « - 6E + 6L - 5.27
Using equation 5.25,
6C = - 6E - L + 18896 x (p + <$p_) - 5.28
opt 1 I
opt
Now Lq . xs equal to 18896 x p_^  for each type of sanitary appliance,
opt
consequently combining equations 5.25 and 5.28, and using the optimal 
design information contained in Table 5.13, the relation between 
<5C and 6E can be graphically illustrated, as shown in Figure 5.39.
Similar curves for the other types of sanitary appliances have been 
derived using an identical method of analysis, and these curves are also 
shown on Figure 5.39. As in the previous design approach the origin
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of Figure 5.39 is the optimum total cost for the sanitary appliances. 
Using Figure 5.39 the desired reduction in capital expenditure for each 
type of appliance can be found for a given total capital outlay. As 
an example Table 5.15 lists optimal capital expenditures and the 
equivalent number of appliances corrected to the nearest whole number 
for 6Et equal to eighty pounds.
5.7.3 Discussion. Comparing Tables 5.14 and 5.15 it is found
that the allocation of appliances is identical for both cost effective
design approaches. However this is due to the rounding up or down
procedure required to obtain whole number provision recommendations.
If the 6E columns of these two tables are examined it is found that
Mavers design method produces 6E values for each type of appliance
which have less variance than the 6E values based on balancing the
-rr—  values of each type of appliance, 
f
It should be stressed that neither of these methods gives the 
absolutely best solution for the capital available. This occurs when
dc
■jUjr is equal for all subsystems. Now
= dc x ^ f  - 5 29
dE dPf dE
dChence the error involved in using the criterion of balancing -rp
dPf
values for each subsystem depends upon the similarity between 
dpf
the values of each subsystem. The functions relating capital
expenditure and failure ratings for the various types of appliances 
are similar, and hence the criterion of equality of the ~  values
# f
probably gives the closest approximation to the 'best* solution
in this particular instance.
It might be considered superfluous to use such rational economic 
methods simply to allocate sanitary appliances in a building, and 
furthermore rarely will a capital cost constraint exist for the sanitary 
appliances. However the object of this example has been to illustrate 
the use of cost effective procedures as an aid to design decision 
making when there is a restriction in the capital available. In reality 
thdse cost effective methods will have far more relevance to fundamental 
resource allocation problems associated with building design.
CHAPTER SIX 
LIFT DESIGN
6.1 A Summary of Lift Design and Performance
6.1.1 Introduction. The dynamic qualities of a building are
extremely important, and the freedom of movement within a building is
(37)greatly affected by the performance of the lifts. It has been said
that no other building service is likely to create such an immediate
impression of the building's functional quality, or lead to more
rapid obsolescence and depreciation in capital value when there is
serious user dissatisfaction. This comment is particularly relevant
to modern high rise buildings. The importance of the lifts in high-
rise buildings can be appreciated when it is realised that they account
for anything up to twenty percent of the total building cost. The
population of an office building can increase by as much as twenty five
(38)
percent in a period of five years after first occupation . Unfortu­
nately it is extremely difficult to economically increase the handling 
capacity of the lift system once installed, hence it is extremely 
important to get the design correct from the outset. In planning lift 
installations the problem must be reduced to the simplest possible 
terms; how many lifts should there be? What size should they be? What
speed should they travel at? and where should they be placed within the
building? There will usually be several combinations of speed, size 
and number which will theoretically give a satisfactory performance. 
However when local building characteristics, such as use, locality, 
height, shape and of course economics are taken into consideration then 
the design possibilities are soon reduced, add invariable one solution 
has greater benefits than any other.
In recent years lift design has become more complicated for a
number of reasons;
a) Sophisticated control systems have been developed.
b) The use of multi-banked systems: for instance, one bank of lifts
serves the first fifteen floors; a second bank by-passes the first
fifteen floors and serves floors fifteen to thirty etc.
c) The use of sky lobby systems, in which case lifts leaving the
ground floor only travel as far as say the thirtieth floor,
passengers wishing to travel higher must use an express liff to 
the thirtieth floor and then alight and use a second bank 
serving the thirtieth to the fiftieth floors.
d) Double decker lifts which are basically two lifts on top of each 
other, thus effectively reducing by half the number of stops.
These various techniques have been introduced to solve the diffi­
cult problems of vertical communication in very tall buildings, however 
they all add to the complexity of lift analysis.
Before the lift system can be designed two design criteria must be 
defined. First the acceptable interval between lifts must be specified. 
This is theoretically equal to the maximum waiting time experienced by 
any user, and is here defined to be the limit state of failure for the 
subsystem. Secondly, the design handling capacity, either in terms of 
passengers per five minutes or passengers per thirty minutes. It is 
logical to design the lifts for the most onerous period of the day, 
hence for design purposes five minute or thirty minute handling 
capacities are estimated for;
a) the morning up-peak period of the day
b) the peak two-way usage period of the day (i.e. during the 
lunch hour).
6.1.2 The limit state of failure. According to CP 4 0 7 ^ ^  the 
interval, as given by the 'round trip time' * of one car divided by the 
number of cars interconnected in the common group system, provides a 
criterion for measuring the quality of service. The average waiting
* The time taken for the complete lift cycle from the first person 
entering the car to the doors re-opening at the ground floor.
time may therefore be expressed theoretically as half this interval, 
however in practice it is probably nearer three quarters of the interval. 
It is impossible to state categorically the maximum waiting time which 
will prove satisfactory to all employees. The defining of a maximum 
acceptable waiting time is a difficult task and in the past it has been 
arrived at in a somewhat negative way, i.e. by analyzing the service in 
buildings where minimal complaints have been made. The maximum 
acceptable waiting time depends on the temperament of the individuals, 
and also on the number of floors the individual wishes to travel; 
for example a person travelling thirty floors will be willing to wait 
longer for a lift than an individual travelling three floors. A 
psychologist is better equipped to tackle problems based on user 
attitudes, however experience has shown that an interval between lifts, 
and hence a maximum waiting time, of twenty five to thirty seconds 
provides a very good service in office buildings. Intervals of thirty 
to fifty seconds are considered fair in non-critical investment type 
buildings, however such waiting times may be unacceptable in the 
prestige or single purpose buildings. An interval of sixty seconds or 
over is classified as a poor service for office accommodation, however 
in flats CP 407 suggests that intervals as large as ninety to one hundred 
seconds might still prove satisfactory. Table 6.1 gives maximum waiting 
times presumed acceptable during up-peak and two way lift usage periods 
for various types of buildings. These are equivalent to the maximum 
acceptable lift intervals in the various types of buildings, and are 
thus presumed as the limit states of failure for lift design.
OFFICE BUILDINGS UP-PEAK
Secs
TWO-WAY
Secs
Prestige 25-30 30-40
Investment 25-35 30-50
Professional - 30-50
Self-parking garage 40-50 40-60
Stored - 30-50
Industrial buildings 25-30 30-40
Table 6.1 Suggested Intervals, (Strakosch'**)
6.1.3 The cause of failure. If the maximum acceptable waiting time 
is presumed to be thirty five seconds for an investment office block
then failure is defined to have occurred if the interval, and hence the 
maximum waiting time of the passengers, exceeds thirty five seconds.
If, for example, the morning arrival period is considered then failure 
will occur at the ground floor when the actual arrival rate, henceforth 
referred to as the demand, exceeds the handling capacity of the lift 
system, because under these circumstances queuing will result in some 
passengers waiting longer than thirty five seconds.
It is also feasible for failure to be caused by the round trip time 
of a lift being greater than that assumed for design purposes. As a 
consequence of such an event the lift interval will be greater than the 
design interval and hence a number of prospective passengers will wait 
longer than the maximum acceptable waiting time. However the occurrence 
of a greater than assumed round trip time, henceforth referred to as the 
R.T.T., will in general be restricted to journeys when a capacity load 
is being carried, since, as will be shown, the design round trip time is 
determined assuming the lift to be carrying the maximum possible number 
of passengers. However when a lift has a capacity load there are a 
number of extreme events which will produce a greater than anticipated 
round trip time, and hence possibly cause an excessive waiting time for 
some passengers. In a subsequent section the possibility of an excessive 
round trip time will be analysed in greater detail.
The third cause of an excessive waiting time is a reduction in the 
handling capacity of the lift system resulting from one or more lifts 
being out of action during a peak usage period. The . reliability design 
of lift equipment will be discussed in detail in a subsequent section.
6.1.4 Current design methods. Modern methods for determining lift 
requirements for buildings are based on procedures proposed by
R.S. Phillips in his book "Electric Lifts", first published in 1938^^.
This analytical design procedure has the advantage of simplicity 
since it only considers the maximum up-peak load, however the possibility 
of unsatisfactory performance at any other time of the day is ignored.
It has the disadvantage of only being suitable for buildings with one
bank of lifts, and furthermore the majority of the occupants must 
arrive at substantially the same time. Phillips1 method requires that 
the probable round trip time, (R.T.T.), during the early morning up- 
peak period be calculated for an assumed lift size and speed based 
on the experience of the designer. The R.T.T. is given by,
R.T.T. = 2 x H x' tj + S x t2 + t^ " 6.1
where H is the expectation of the highest floor reached by the car 
(reversal floor)» 
tj is the storey height divided by the contract speed,
S is the expectation of the number of stops, not forgetting the 
ground floor stop,
is the door operating time at each floor plus the time by 
which braking and accelerating at each floor is slower than the 
lift travelling at contract speed over the same distance,
Y\
t^ is the total transfer time of the IT passengers.
r\
For a given number of passengers F, and a particular number of
U  ■
storeys served by the lift, #,(usually the number of storeys above the
first floor),the round trip time on each journey will vary because H, S
and t^ are all probabilistic variables. The variability of R.T.Tfs is
the reason for using the probable or mean R.T.T. value for design
purposes. The design of lifts based on the concept of a representative
R.T.T. requires that mean values for the reversal floor H, the number
of stops, S, and the transfer time, t^, be found for each possible
combination of lift capacity . and number of storeys served. As
(41) .early as 1923 Bassett Jones proposed a theoretical method for
determining the probable number of stops made by elevators, and Figure
6.1 illustrates the results of this probabilistic analysis for various
1N 1 and*n'values. The probable reversal floor can also be determined
probabilistically if a passenger is equally likely to travel to any
floor. However in practice it is assumed that with a full load the car
will always travel the full height of the building. Transfer times,
both when loading and unloading, have been studied through observations
in buildings, and Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 are based on surveys of
(42)
transfer times reported by Fletcher
Figure 6. !
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Figure 6.3 
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To illustrate the determination of the round trip time, consider
a twelve passenger lift with a speed of 500 f.p.m and acceleration of
2 . .2 f.p.s , serving seven floors with an eleven feet rise per floor.
The population of the building above the first floor is assumed to be
750. The seventh floor is assumed to be the reversal floor hence,
2 x H x tj = 18.48 seconds
According to Figure 6.1 the expected number of stops per trip is 
six. Assuming t2 to be nine seconds per stop, and not forgetting the 
ground floor stop then,
S x t^ = 7 x 9  = 6 3  seconds.
According to Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 the total transfer time of the 
twelve passengers is thirty seconds. The total design round trip time 
is thus given by
R.T.T. = 1 8 . 5 + 6 3 + 3 0  - 111.5 seconds.
The expected number of passengers handled by each lift in a five 
minute period is given by,
, M 300 
* XR.T.T
For the example used here,
300
111.5
<#> = 12 x M  = 32.3 persons per lift.
The next stage in Phillips* design procedure is to estimate
the thirty minute demand which the lift system must be capable of
handling. The rule of thumb in general practice .is that the lifts
should be capable of handling seventy five percent of the population
above the first floor during any thirty minute period. Again using
the example quoted here the required thirty minute handling capacity
of the lifts will be 0.75 * 750 or 562 persons. Hence the five
minute handling capacity will be ninety-four persons. If it is
proposed to use twelve passenger lifts with a contract speed of five
94hundred f.p.m then three lifts, will be required.
<$>
Finally it is necessary to determine the interval between lifts. 
This is simply equal to the R.T.T. divided by the number of lifts.
For the hypothetical design used as an example here the interval will 
be ——  or thirty seven seconds. If a constant passenger arrival rate 
is assumed then the interval is equivalent to the maximum waiting time 
of the passengers. Should the interval for a proposed lift system prove 
unsatisfactory then the lift procedure is repeated for another trial 
system. This procedure is repeated until a system is found which is 
economically acceptable and provides a satisfactory service.
The selection of a satisfactory lift system has been simplified 
by the production of selection tables, which at a glance give the
designer the handling capacity and interval associated with any lift
. . /'3q\ ( 4 3 ) (4 4 )
design for a particular number of floors served. '
It was mentioned in section 6.1.2 that the acceptable waiting 
time is dependent on the journey length. P h i l l i p s p r o p o s e d  an 
expression for grading the quality of lift service on the basis of the 
combined waiting and travelling time.
He proposed that,
WT
Q = —  (2 + L) seconds - 6.2
where Q measures the quality of service
WI is the waiting interval,(which equals the R.T.T. divided
by the number of lifts)
L is the number of lifts.
(4 5 )
In recent years Jones has analysed the assumptions of equation
6.2 and proposed a more accurate up-peak performance formula based On 
computer simulation techniques. Tregenza^^ has recently shown how the 
performance of lifts can be analysed using purely theoretical methods.
He also states that because of variations in R.T.T. and the randomness 
of passenger arrivals for a particular mean arrival rate (a uniform 
arrival pattern is assumed in traditional design methods), queuing 
can occur when the mean arrival rate is less than the value assumed for 
design purposes. As a consequence the interval between lifts is not
equal to the maximum possible waiting time of the passengers. Tregenza 
based his analysis of lift performance on the assumption that the 
arrival of potential passengers is a random process which can be 
described by a Poisson distribution. He determined probability dis­
tributions of passenger waiting times which more accurately model 
lift performance.
With the advent of the computer it became possible to use simu­
lation techniques to accurately model the performance of lift systems. 
When simulation methods are used it is not necessary to use a single 
representative value for the number of stops, reversal floor or 
passenger transfer time. Each of these factors can be modelled as a 
random variable. The passenger arrival pattern can also be incorporated
as a random variable rather than as a uniform function as is the
(47)assumption of traditional design methods. Parlow was one of the
first to report the use of computers to simulate lift performance.
(48)(49)
Since then a number of simulation programs have been developed ,
however by far the most comprehensive work in this field is being under­
taken by B a r n e y a t  U.M.I.S.T. The results of such simulation methods 
are only as accurate as the input data characterising the building being 
appraised or designed. The distribution of the arrival rates during 
the peak usage periods (i.e. in the early morning or at lunch time) 
the distribution of transfer times, and the weightings quantifying the 
variation of population between floors must all be known or assumed be­
fore simulation design can proceed. Unfortunately weighting factors for 
each floor depend on accurate knowledge of the future use of the building, 
and the random arrival pattern and transfer time distributions can only 
be estimated from the appraisal of existing buildings. However the 
rapidly increasing height of modern building indicates the importance 
of reliable lift design methods. This, when combined with the necessar­
ily complex lift systems which must be used in these very tall buildings, 
would seem to point to an ever increasing use of simulation methods for
life design in the future. For a comprehensive discussion of all the
(51)
problems involved m  lift design the reader is referred to Strakosch
6.2 Lift Survey - Canterbury House
As shown in the previous section present design methods are based 
on the passenger traffic likely to be experienced during the early 
morning period when the occupants are arriving at the building. In 
the past little importance has been placed on the performance of the 
lifts at other times of the day, it has usually been assumed that if 
the lifts are satisfactory in the morning then they will prove satis­
factory during the lunch-time and in the evening down peak period. The 
analysis of lift performance during the lunch period of the day has 
been neglected because of the difficulties encountered when attempting 
to analytically model any lift system when two way traffic is involved. 
Because of staggered lunch hours, which means some people are entering 
the building as others are leaving, and because of the possibility of 
rest rooms or cafeterias on upper floors, the number of stops made on 
each round trip during the lunch period could be much higher than the 
number of stops occurring during the morning arrival period. Consequent­
ly it is feasible that passenger waiting times might be as long, if not 
longer during the lunch period. Computer simulation techniques are 
able to handle the complex passenger movements occurring during the lunch
period, however statistical passenger usage information is required.
(52)
Two pilot surveys conducted by the Building Research Establishment 
provided passenger demand information during the three peak usage 
periods of the day, (morning, lunch-time and evening). This information 
allowed simulation techniques to be used to predict the expected 
passenger waiting times for various lift systems during each of these 
peak usage periods. It was decided that more reliable information 
concerning lift usage during the lunch period was required. Consequently 
the author undertook a survey of lift usage in the Canterbury House 
office building in Croydon on behalf of the Building Research Establish-
/ a /  \
ment . Unlike the previous two surveys on this occasion the perform­
ance of the lifts, in terms of passenger waiting times, was monitored 
in addition to collecting passenger arrival rate data. It was hoped 
that this would enable actual waiting time distributions to be compared 
with the predicted distributions determined using simulation methods. 
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 illustrate the probability histograms of maximum 
passenger waiting time per trip at the ground floor during the early 
morning and lunch-time periods respectively. Comparing these histograms
it is seen that the distributions of waiting times are similar, and A  c.®.^  >a 
that during both usage periods approximately ten percent of the 
passengers wait longer than thirty five seconds. From this it was 
concluded that the increased number of stops during a round trip at 
lunch-time is counterbalanced by the concentrated passenger arrival rate 
experienced in the morning. It was estimated that only six percent of 
the population use the lifts during the peak lunch five minute period 
as opposed to sixteen percent during the peak morning five minute per­
iod. As had been suspected the lunch period can .prove as onerous with 
regard to lift performance as the morning period.
The similarity between the morning and mid-day performance was 
verified by monitoring the round trip times during these two periods 
The histograms of R.T.T's are shown in Figures 6.6 and 6.7. Both have 
median round trip times of eighty-five seconds. A different picture 
is given by the waiting times experienced on upper floors during the 
lunch and mid-morning periods. At these times thirty-seven and twenty- 
five percent of passengers respectively had to wait longer than thirty- 
five seconds. The histograms of waiting times on upper floors during 
these two usage periods are shown in Figures 6.8 and 6.9. The reduced 
level of performance experienced on upper floors in this particular 
building is thought to be the result of the control system which parks 
each lift at the ground floor when not in use.
(52)It is clear from this survey that, as concluded by Courtney 
using simulation techniques,lunch time traffic can prove as testing for 
the lifts as the intense morning period. Therefore it would seem 
rational, when designing lift systems to consider more carefully than 
at present the lunch time traffic, especially when there is the 
intention to provide cafeteria’s or rest-rooms on upper floors.
During this survey the number of passengers in each lift, the 
number of stops and the reversal floor per trip were all monitored.
This information is useful for comparative purposes should theoretical 
techniques be developed for deriving these distribution functions,
(see section 6.6). Figure 6.10 shows that the average number of 
passengers during the peak thirty minute period of each day was only
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three. Figure 6.11 illustrates the frequency of each floor being 
the reversal floor. The dashed line is the theoretical curve for a 
building identical to Canterbury House with three passengers per trip.
This figure illustrates the accuracy of using theoretical probability 
distribution to determine the reversal floor (see section 6.6).
Finally Figure 6.12 is the distribution of the number of stops assoc­
iated with the number of passengers illustrated in Figure 6.10.
6.3 The Failure Cost Consistency Criterion as an Aid to Lift Design
based on the Phillips* Procedure
6.3.1 Introduction. The selection tables most commonly used for
(43)(44) . . . .
lift design are based on Phillips criterion of ensuring satis­
factory service during the up-peak period of the day. The possible use 
of the failure cost consistency criterion as an aid to lift design based 
on the Phillips' procedure will be considered in this section.
It has been shown in a previous section that Phillips'procedure 
requires that a trial lift size and speed be chosen, and that then the 
probable round trip time is determined for the building under design.
The number of lifts required to give a satisfactory service is then 
calculated following an estimation of the passenger traffic expected 
in the morning peak thirty minute usage period.
Queuing as a result of a passenger demand in excess of the 
handling capacity of the lift system is the main cause of failure when 
the lift system is designed using Phillips'method. Over a five minute 
period the maximum handling capacity of the lifts can be determined 
using the mean expected R.T.T. If the actual demand in any five 
minutes exceeds this handling capacity then queuing will occur. Figure
6.13 illustrates the variability of peak daily five minute arrivals at
the ground floor, as monitored in the office building studies reported
(52) (34)
by Courtney and Green . The sixty eight percent confidence
interval has been drawn around this extreme value distribution function,
and a least sum of square curve fitting technique has been used to determine
the equation of the best fitting line as illustrated in Figure 6.13. The
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procedures used to plot the extreme value distribution, determine the 
confidence interval, and to derive the equation of the best fitting 
line are all described in detail in Appendix II. Arrival rate distribu­
tions similar to Figure 6.13 could be determined for other types of 
buildings, such as hospitals, schools, hotels etc., following a number 
of surveys of existing buildings. Unfortunately it is not realistic 
for a single handling capacity distribution to represent all offices. 
Many factors such as car parking facilities, urban transportation 
systems, the locality of the building and the function of the building 
may affect the early morning arrival pattern. To account for these 
factors it is proposed that correction scales should be used. Figure
6.14 illustrates a possible correction scale for the urban transport 
and parking factor.
URBAN TRANSPORT SERVICE POSSIBLE CORRECTION FACTORS
No Public Transport 
Services 0.8
Poor Public Services, 
majority of employees use 
private cars
0.9
Adequate Bus and Rail 
Services within 5 minutes 
walk
1
Excellent Public Service, 
all employees assumed to 
use this service
1.5-2.0
Table 6.14 Illustration of an Urban Transport Correction Factor 
to be used with General Lift Demand Distributions
If an office lift system were designed to handle twelve percent of 
the population above the first floor, and if the building had similar 
characteristics in terms of use, location, and urban transportation to the 
office buildings represented by Figure 6.13, then it is predicted that
4c
a queue will form on average once every forty eight days . It will be
* It is not intended that Figure 6.13 should be thought as generally 
representative of all office buildings. This distribution is based on a 
small sample of buildings and only illustrates the form of the five 
minute extreme demand distribution. Figure 6.13 can be modified and thus 
improved as more data from other similar buildings becomes available.
shown that the failure cost consistency criterion can be used to 
determine the acceptable return period of an excessive five minute demand 
and hence aid in the choice of the design demand rate.
Current design tables are based on the peak thirty minute, rather 
than on the peak five minute demand. The arrival rate will not be 
constant during any thirty minute period, consequently the number of 
arrivals might not exceed the assumed figure for thirty minutes, but 
nevertheless queuing might still occur due to overloading during any 
five minutes of the thirty minute period. For this reason it is 
proposed to use the peak five minute demand as opposed to the peak 
thirty minute demand as a criterion for lift design.
6.3.2 The cost of failure. The first step in using the failure 
cost consistency criterion is the assessment of the cost of failure,
’ij which in this case is caused by a five minutearrival rate in excess 
of the lift system handling capacity. In general terms^will be 
given by
d
I = E x y x I t - 6.3
o
where E is the average value of an employees time to the employer 
y is a factor quantifying the inconvenience and annoyance
caused to the individual in addition to the pure financial losses 
quantified by E
d is the number of passengers waiting longer than the maximum 
acceptable waiting time when failure occurs
t, is the excess time spent waiting for a lift by each of the ’d f 
d
individuals.
The value of a user’s time was discussed at length in a previous chapter 
and it was stated to be dependent upon the use of the building. For 
office accommodation it has been assumed to be twice the average wage 
rate of the employees. In schools it relates to the cost of running 
the school per pupil, for retail premises such as shops, restaurants 
etc. it relates to the average profit per customer or tariff charges.
The excessive waiting time experienced by the fdf individuals 
will depend on the degree of failure; that is the extent to which 
the five minute handling capacity of the lift is exceeded. As for 
every other subsystem of the building it is proposed that the losses 
associated with an average degree of failure should be assessed.
. (53)It is necessary to consider elementary queuing theory when
estimating the waiting time of each individual. At the beginning of the
average failure five minute period only a small proportion of passengers
will be unable to travel by the first lift which departs after their
arrival. However as the five minutes progresses the queue will grow
and hence the proportion of arrival unable to travel by the first
departing lift will increase. Eventually all the prospective passengers
will queue for longer than the lift interval and this situation will
continue until the arrival rate falls below the handling capacity of
the lifts. As an example of this procedure consider an office block
which has eight storeys above the first floor with a total population
of 750 individuals. The maximum acceptable waiting time, that is
the acceptable lift interval when the lifts are being used to full
capacity, is defined to be thirty seconds. As a trial design assume
that ten person capacity lifts with a contract speed of 300 f.p.m. are
to be used in this building. According to the Hammond and Champness 
(44)
design tables the R.T.T. of each lift will be 122 secs. Hence 
four lifts will be required if the lift interval is not to exceed thirty 
seconds. The five minute handling capacity of each lift will be 24.5 
persons hence the five minute handling capacity of the whole lift 
system will be one hundred persons i.e. 13% of the population above 
the first floor. According to Figure 6.13 the average failure five min­
ute handling capacity will be 14.1% or 106 persons. Thus during six 
of the ten thirty second periods of the average failure five minute 
period there will be eleven, as opposed to ten arrivals at the lobby. 
Figure 6.15 shows how these six periods might be distributed between 
the ten thirty second periods.
30 SEC. PERIODS 1st 2nd 3rd 4 th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10 th
No. of Arrivals 
No. of Passengers
10 11 10 11 11 10 11 11 10 11
waiting longer 
than 30 secs.
0 1 1 2 3 3 4 5 5 6
Total Excessive
Waiting Time 
during the 
Period 
(Average) 
(Secs.)
0 1.36 1.5 5.46 12.26 13.5 21.8 34 37.5 50
Total Excessive Waiting Time = 176 secs.
Figure 6.15 An Example of the Computation of Excessive Waiting 
Time during a 5 min. period of Excessive Demand
The second row below each thirty second period indicates the
number of people who will be expected to arrive in that thirty second
period yet not travel by the first lift to depart, and the third row
indicates the expected excessive waiting time 1t* of these individuals.
. d
The summation of the third row gives £ t^ ; for this example 176 sec­
onds . 0
To determine'I*for this hypothetical lift design problem it is now
only necessary to give ?E* and fy* values in equation 6.3. As in the
previous chapter concerning the allocation of sanitary appliances fE ? 
is assumed to be five pounds per hour in office buildings. A nature of 
failure factor of two is required because personal inconvenience is 
involved. However the excessive waiting time will not be equally 
distributed among the unfortunate passengers who must wait longer than 
thirty seconds, and the relationship between inconvenience and excessive 
waiting time will be a power, rather than a linear function. To take 
due account of this it is proposed that the nature of failure factor 
should be doubled i.e. a ’y* value of four should be used. Hence the 
estimated losses associated with an excessive five minute demand is 
given by
1 = 60 x 60 * 4 * 176 Pence 
- 98 pence.
6.3.3 Application of the failure cost consistency equation. Using 
the failure cost consistency equation (equation 4.10), the acceptable 
return period of failure, N, is given by
N = 58.5 x I x c x —
Pop
Assuming the conservation coefficient for the building is unity then 
for the hypothetical problem examined in the previous section
N = 58.5 x 98 x
= 8.0 days.
The acceptable daily probability of failure, F^, is the reciprocal 
of the acceptable return period, i.e. 0.125. Using Figure 6.13 it is 
found that this daily probability of failure is associated with a 9.5 
percent demand. Now for the ten person capacity lifts assumed in this 
example the design handling capacity is thirteen percent for a thirty 
second lift interval. It can be concluded that according to the 
failure cost consistency criterion this lift system is more than 
adequate. The design procedure is thus repeated using eight person 
capacity lifts, in which case the five minute handling capacity will be 
eighty persons, i.e. 10.66 percent of the population above the first 
floor. According to Figure 6.13 the average failure demand will be 11.8 
percent or 88 persons. Without accurately deriving the cost of failure, 
TI?, it is possible to deduce that the average losses for this design 
will be approximately equal to that for the ten person capacity lifts. 
Consequently the acceptable daily chance of failure, will again be 
0.125, and the design demand will be 9.5 percent. As a consequence four, 
eight person capacity lifts with a 10.66 percent five minute handling 
capacity will be an adequate system according to the failure cost 
criterion. It is interesting to note that the thirty minute handling of 
this system is sixty-four percent of the population being served by the 
lifts, this is some ten percent less than the design criterion which
is commonly used at present.
In this example two trial lift systems were shown to have similar 
cost consequences of failure. In general when the probabilistic factors 
affecting subsystem performance can be represented by an extreme value 
function then the average cost consequences of failure will be approx­
imately constant i.e. independent of the design value assumed for the 
probabilistic variable. The whole of the lift design procedure described 
in this section is illustrated as a flow chart in Figure 6.16.
This design procedure requires that the expected building population 
above the first floor be known. Unfortunately in many instances, 
especially when the project is a speculative office block, the expected
population will not be known,consequently a density table as given
(44) (51)
in Hammond and Champness , or in Strakosch must be used.
It is important that the most accurate estimate of the expected building
population be used when designing lifts.
d
When 'costing1 failure the determination of £ t^ has been shown to
o
be a rather laborious procedure which will prove unpopular with designers.
To give an approximate, but adequate assessment of'i*the following 
formula may be used;
I = E x Y x 0.33D x 0.2T - 6.4
where D is the total five minute handling capacity of the lift system and 
T is the acceptable lift interval (thirty seconds for offices).
6.3.4 The implications of round trip time variability. The 
R.T.T. for a given type of lift will vary from trip to trip even if the 
number of passengers remains constant, and in fact for simplicity it is usual­
ly assumed that the lifts are being used to capacity during the early 
morning peak usage period. The R.T.T. is dependent on three probabilistic 
factors; the number of stops, the reversal floor, and the total passenger 
transfer time, and hence there is a possibility of queuing being caused 
by a greater than assumed R.T.T. In the above design procedure it has 
been assumed that the probability of an R.T.T. in excess of the design
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value is smaller than the acceptable probability of occurrence based 
on the consequences of an excessive R.T.T. Phillips1 procedure is 
based on the use of the mean R.T.T., consequently during a five minute 
period when the passenger arrival rate is in excess of the handling 
capacity the probability of an R.T.T. in excess of the design value 
is 0.5. The design example considered in the previous section will be 
used to examine whether this R.T.T. failure rating is acceptable.
To assess the average cost of an excessive R.T.T. it is necessary 
to determine the R.T.T. associated with an average degree of failure.
This can only be found using the R.T.T. probability distribution 
function. However the complexity of the factors affecting the R.T.T. 
makes it extremely difficult to theoretically determine this distribu­
tion function. As an alternative the cumulative probability distributions
of R.T.T. illustrated in Figure 6.17, which are based on the observed
(3 4 )
R.T.T?s of Canterbury House can be used. According to Figure 6.17 
for a design R.T.T. equal to the median value the average failure RXT. will be 
fifteen seconds greater than the design value. A R.T.T. greater than 
the design value will only affect a single car load of passengers, con­
sequently the losses due to this event are given by:
d*
I _ _  „ = E x y x V t ,  - 6.5
R.T.T L df
•o
d'
where \ accumulated additional waiting time of passengers
d ito d
in excess of thirty seconds. Assuming the average value of \ ^ i ^ 8
o
equivalent to failure on the sixth trip for the design illustrated in
d f
Figure 6.15, then £ t^f is given by
o
I t,f = 1 6 . 5 + 1 9 . 5 + 2 2 . 5 + 1 3 . 6 + 1 0 . 9 + 8 . 2 + 5 . 5 + 2 . 8
L d1
= 1 0 0  seconds.
When estimating the consequences of an excessive five minute 
passenger demand, a 'nature of failure* factor of four was used. A 
similar value will be used to assess the losses associated with an 
excessive R.T.T. Thus for this example
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Using the failure cost consistency equation (equation 4.10)
N,R.T.T
4.33 days.
The associated daily failure rating is 0.23, in which case it is
permissible for an excessive R.T.T. to occur once every 4.3 days. Now 
the lift system for this hypothetical building has so far been designed 
such that the five minute handling capacity is exceeded, on average 
once in eight days. Now there is a 0.5' probability of an excessive R.T.T. 
on any of the ten trips during a five minute period with an excessive 
demand, hence the average return period of an excessive R.T.T. is
Since the acceptable return period, 4.3 days, is greater than the 
actual return period, 1.6 days, it is necessary to modify the lift 
design by increasing the number of cars or speed of the cars. In this 
way the return period of an excessive handling capacity is increased 
to a level where the return period of a greater than anticipated R.T.T. 
is 4.3 days. The modified return period of an excessive handling 
capacity is given by
Njj = 0 . 5 x 1 0 x 4 . 3  = 21.5 days.
Using Figure 6.13 the handling capacity associated with this revised 
return period can be found and then current lift selection tables used 
to find a satisfactory lift system. According to Figure 6.13 an eleven 
percent five minute handling capacity is associated with a twenty one 
day return period, consequently four, eight person capacity lifts 
is not adequate. . Instead four, nine or ten person capacity lifts 
are required, in which case the thirty minute handling capacity will be 
seventy percent of the population served. This is very close to the 
present lift design criterion for offices. The modified design pro­
cedure incorporating the uncertainty of R.T.T. is illustrated in Figure 6.18
Design handling 
capacity from 
procedure illus­
trated in Fig.
YES
R.T.T.
NO
Design Lift System 
using DR -.T T as the 
Design Handling Capacity
Use the failure cost consistency
procedure to determine the
ACCEPTABLE FAILURE RATING, P£
fa
Determine the COST CONSEQUENCES 
of an Excessive R.T.T
Use Fig. 6.13 to determine the
DESIGN HANDLING CAPACITY, Dd „
R  • J. • i.
Determine the RETURN PERIOD OF AN 
EXCESSIVE HANDLING CAPACITY such 
that there is a 0.5 probability of 
an excessive R.T.T per trip during 
this period
Design Lift System 
according to Fig. 
6.16
Figure 6.18 Flow Chart illustrating Proposed Design Procedure 
Taking into Consideration the Chance of Excessive 
Waiting Times being caused by Excessive R.R.T's.
6.4 The Failure Cost Consistency Criterion as aii Aid to Lift Design
based on Simulation Techniques
6.4.1 Introduction. A simulation program can be used to analyse 
the performance of trial lift systems during the peak usage periods of 
the day. For each trial design the computer will generate the associated 
passenger waiting time distribution. Once the maximum acceptable waiting 
time has been specified (thirty seconds for offices), then the waiting 
time distribution can be used to determine the probability of a passenger 
experiencing an unsatisfactory waiting time, P^. It is proposed that the 
failure cost consistency technique might be used to determine the 
acceptable P^ value. The lift system found using simulation methods to be 
associated with this acceptable P^ value is then the desired lift system 
for that building. This design procedure is shown as a flow chart in 
Figure 6.19.
6.4.2 The cost of failure. The cost of an individual waiting longer
than the maximum acceptable waiting time is given by
I = E x y x d - 6.6
'E' and *y* are factors already defined in this chapter, and 'df 
is the average additional waiting time experienced when the maximum 
acceptable waiting time is exceeded for a prospective user. *df cannot 
be determined until both the actual distribution of waiting times and the 
maximum acceptable waiting time (limit state of failure) have been defined. 
However,if the passenger waiting time is normally distributed then .'d1 
will not vary significantly with the lift system analysed providing the 
failure rating is small. Consequently in practice fdV is found for a 
single trial system and then the cost consequences of failure estimated 
using equation 6.6. The failure cost consistency equation (equation 4.10) 
can then be used to determine the acceptable failure rating. Finally 
using the simulation program the lift system can be found which satisfies 
this acceptable failure rating criterion.
6.4.3 A numerical example. Consider an office building with 750 
employees above the first floor. Since a simulation program was not avail­
able, the average 'd1 value for small failure ratings was assumed to
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be 2.5 seconds. tE t is assumed to be five pounds per hour, and the 
'nature of failure1 is again assumed quantified by using a 'y* value
of four. Consequently using equation 6.6
1 = 6 0 ^ 6 0  X 4 X 2-5 = 1.38 pence.
The acceptable return period associated with this event is 
found using the failure cost consistency equation (equation 4.10). 
Assuming a conservation coefficient value equal to unity
N = 58.5 * 1.38 x yL-' = 0.107 days.
Consequently it is permissible for , i.e. nine passengers, 
to wait longer than thirty seconds on any day. If the peak thirty 
minute usage period in the morning is assumed as the most onerous lift 
usage period of the day, and if it is also assumed that seventy five 
percent of the population above the first floor use the lifts during 
this period, then the acceptable probability of a passenger experiencing 
an unsatisfactory waiting time during this peak morning period is given 
by
Pf 0.75 x 750 “ 0 *0165
The lift system which, according to simulation analysis, has an.expected
early morning waiting time distribution with a 0.0165 probability of an 
individual waiting longer than thirty seconds is the desired lift system 
for this building.
A similar failure cost consistency design procedure can be used 
as an aid to lift design should a theoretical method, as opposed to a 
simulation method, be used to determine the passenger waiting time 
distribution. Tregenza^*^ showed how the theoretical waiting time 
function might be derived when it is assumed that passenger arrivals 
are modelled by the Poisson's distribution law.
6.5 The Failure Cost Consistency Criterion as an Aid in Lift
Reliability Design
The interval between lifts, and hence the waiting time of some 
passengers will be longer than acceptable if one or more of the lifts 
is inoperative. Now the chance of this event occurring is dependent on 
the reliability of the various lift components. It is not an objective 
of this project to consider reliability analysis in detail, it is 
sufficient to say that using weakest link analysis techniques it is 
feasible to determine the return period of an inoperative lift, in terms
of number of journeys. The need for improved statements of reliability
. . (54)
from lift manufacturers was recommended by Godwin at a recent symposium
Briefly consider the effects of a single lift being out of order.
If there are 'n' lifts in the system then the handling capacity will 
effectively be reduced by a factor — . As an example assume there are 
four lifts in an office building, should a single lift break down 
then the result will be a seventy five percent effective handling 
capacity. If this event occurs during the early morning peak usage 
period, and if originally a 0.1 failure rating had been used to determine 
the acceptable handling capacity, then according to Figure 6.13, the 
probability of the demand exceeding the handling capacity of three 
lifts, and hence causing failure on a day when one lift is out of 
action, is 0.37. Using Figure 6.13 the average failure arrival rate for 
the three lift system is 8.5 percent of the population above the first 
floor, consequently the average losses associated with one lift being out 
of action is equivalent to an 8.5 percent five minute arrival rate 
occurring when the handling capacity of the lifts is only 7.2 percent.
Using the approximate loss equation (equation 6.4),%I*for this event is 
given by
I = E x  y x 0.33D x 0.2T - 6.4
= 0.1388 x 4 x 17.8 x 6
= 59 pence
However'i'is only the estimated losses associated with a single 
lift being out of action during the early morning period. A lift 
will more than likely remain out of order for at least one whole day
and consequently user inconvenience will occur during other peak usage 
periods of the day. It can be fairly confidently assumed that the total 
cost of user inconvenience caused by a lift breaking down will be two or 
three times the'l’value calculated for the morning period. Using the 
failure cost consistency equation the acceptable return period of a 
single lift breaking down under these circumstances is given by
N = 58.5 * 59 x 3 x_I__ = 13.8 days
(The conservation coefficient is assumed to be unity) 
quently the acceptable 1 
lift breaking down is 0.072.
Conse daily failure rate, P^, associated with a
Excessive waiting times due to a lift breaking down can only occur 
on days when both a lift is out of action and the passenger usage rate 
is greater than the handling capacity of the (n-1) lifts. If is 
the acceptable daily probability of a lift breaking down and causing 
unsatisfactory waiting times, and P£ is the daily probability of the 
peak five minute arrival rate exceeding the handling capacity of the 
(n-1) lifts, then Pj, the acceptable daily probability of a lift breaking 
down is given by,
Pf
F, - r -6-7
2
For the example used here P^ os 0.37 and P^ is 0.072 hence
P  =  0 »072 = 0 195
1 0.37
This lift reliability criterion is equivalent to designing for
one of the lifts to break down every ~  days, i.e. every five days.
. 1
Since there are four lifts m  the system each lilt can be designed to 
have a return period of failure of twenty days. If each lift completes 
T trips per day then the clients performance criterion for the manu­
facturer will be of the form; "Each lift may be designed to break down 
once every (20 x X  x T) trips". It will be the manufacturer's job to 
design the reliability of each component such that the overall reliab­
ility of each lift complies with the above statement. This reliability
analysis requires that the number of lifts be known. For this reason 
this reliability analysis must follow the lift system design described 
in sections 6.3 or 6.4.
For the worked example included in this section the desired 
reliability of the lifts is inferior to acceptable standards based on 
intuition. It must be emphasized that this reliability performance 
criterion (a breakdown every five days) is based solely on the effects 
of failure experienced by the user. However this level of reliability 
will be totally unacceptable when the repair costs are considered in 
addition to the cost consequences experienced by the users. As an 
example assume that as a conservative estimate the repair costs for 
a single lift are forty pounds (including labour charges). The total 
failure losses will be,
I
I = 4000 + ^80 = 4180 pence
Using the failure cost consistency equation the revised acceptable 
return period of a lift breaking down is
N = 4180 x 58.5 x y^Q" = 326 days
That is, a single lift can be inoperative approximately once a year.
To ensure that all capital cost, expected repair cost, and failure 
loss implications are considered in reliability design it is advisable 
to base reliability design decisions on a cost benefit analysis of the 
problem.
6. 6 A Theoretical Analysis of Round Trip Time Variability
In section 6.3.4 the relevance of the variability of the round 
trip time to lift performance was discussed. In that section the R.T.T. 
probability distributions were based upon observations in existing 
buildings (Figure 6.17). Theoretically the distribution of the R.T.T. 
is dependent on three probabilistic factors, the number of stops, the 
reversal floor, and the passenger transfer time. Each of these factors 
can affect the actual R.T.T. experienced on any journey.
6.6.1 Transfer time. The expected passenger transfer time 
distribution will depend on the number of passengers, and can only 
be derived from observations in existing buildings. From the calcu­
lation of a typical R.T.T., as illustrated in section 6.1.4, the 
passenger transfer time accounts for approximately twenty five per­
cent of the total R.T.T. However for a constant number of passengers 
the transfer time per trip will not vary to any great extent, therefore 
variations in transfer time will not significantly affect the total 
R.T.T.
6.6.2 The reversal floor. For medium height buildings the lift re­
versal floor for a full car is usually assumed to be the top floor.
The chance of the reversal floor being other than the top floor is 
dependent on the lift size, 'n', and the number of floors served by 
the lift, ,N*. The chance of the lift reversing at a lower floor will 
only be significant in very tall buildings, however such buildings are 
becoming increasingly common in our cities.
If it can be assumed that each of the N floors above the first 
floor, have an equal population, then the chance of any one of the'n* 
passengers wishing to travel to the top floor is Using the binomial 
expression the chance of none of the *nf passengers wishing to travel to 
the top floor is given by
P. = d  - i)" - 6.8
The chance of the lift stopping at the top floor is given by
p = 1 - P
N
= 1 - (1 - I)n - 6.9
consequently is the probability of .’failure* should the penultimate 
floor be chosen as the reversal floor. The likelihood of a passenger
leaving the lift before the penultimate to the top floor is equal to j
2 .
1 - ? Hence the likelihood that none of the .passengers will be
travelling to either the penultimate or the top floor is given by;
The chance of the lift stopping at the top or penultimate to the 
top floor, and hence the probability of 'failure1 should the second 
to the top floor be chosen as the reversal floor is given by;
V .  ■ 1 " <■ - 6.11,
Using similar logic it is possible to find the probability of 
'failure' associated with any floor being assumed as the reversal floor. 
The chance of 'failure' P„, associated with assuming the H***1 floor as the
r l
reversal floor is given by
P H = I - ( - 6.12
It is found when solving equation 6.12 for a range of *N' and *n'
values that the relationship between P„ and H is only dependent on the
. N Hratio — . 
n
Table 6.2 illustrates the function relating the
probability of 'failure', P„, and the reversal floor, H,for a range of
N . n . .
—  values. A glance at this table shows that unless the —  ratio is 
n . N
very small, or a large P^ value can be tolerated the top floor must 
always be assumed as the reversal floor when the lift carries a full 
load.
6.6.3 The number of stops. It is a far more complex problem to
theoretically predict the probability, P , associated with any particular
s
number of stops occurring during a round trip. However a mathematical 
solution is possible for up-peak journeys when it can be assumed that no 
passenger will enter the lift at any upper floor. If there are N floors 
served by the lift and 'n* passengers, then the total number of ways 
these 'n' passengers can leave the lift is Nn . The probability of only 
one stop is equivalent to the probability of all 'n* passengers leaving 
the lift at the 2nc* or 3r£* or 4 ^  ... or N+/1 floor. The probability of 
this event occurring is given by
REVERSAL FLOOR
n ‘
N
Ratio
Top
floor
N1'
floor
( K - 2)th
floor
(Hn-3)th
floor
(H'-4)tk
floor
0.5 0 O.41 0.67 0.82 O .93
0.75 0 0.54 0.80 0.92 0.97
1.0 0 0.65 ' 0.90 0.96
1-5 0 0.80 0.96 0.991
2.0 0
-
0.88 0.99
............. — ,.i
0.998
N is the number of floors and n is the number of passengers.
Table6.2 The Probability of the Reversal Floor being Higher than as stated 
(Theoretically Derived)
The number of possible permutations leading to 2 or 3 ... or N 
stops are far more complicated to assess. As an aid to the solution 
of this problem a simple example is used:-
Consider the case of a three person lift serving two floors. All 
the possible ways in which the three passengers can leave the lift 
are illustrated in Figure 6.20.
(1)
PASSENGERS
(2) (3)
1 1 1
2 1 1
1 2 1
2 2 1
1 1 2
2 1 2
1 2 2
2 2 2
Figure 6.20 An Illustration of all the Possible Ways Three Passengers 
can leave a Lift serving Two Floors
The permutation 1,1,1, represents the case where all three
passengers alight at the first floor, and is thus associated with one
stop. In general all combinations containing only one symbol are
associated with one stop, and combinations containing two different
symbols are associated with two stops. For this simple example the
. 2
probability of one stop is or 0.25 and the probability of two stops 
• 6 nis g- or 0.75.
In practical cases both ,N' and 'n* will be large, consequently the
total possible number of permutations will be much larger. However a
mathematical method is available to determine the number of permutations,
r , of fn* symbols, with values between one and fN f which have ,X* 
x ' rx
different symbols. Then is equivalent to the probability of there
N
being fX f stops when there are fn f passengers in a lift serving fN* 
floors, r is given by;
where N is the binomial coefficient and is given by 
x
N!
c (N-X)! x X!
x
is given by
q*n = sjL)
where ns n:
Constraints on are the following
a) s. + s0 + ... s - n
1 2  x
b) s. B s.-B ... s i  0J X
and c) when s, = s, or s = s then the combination — r  1----  is
1 2  y z s Ixs I ...
y z
included but not — i— — t---s ;xs :... 
z y
As an example consider the case when N = 4 and n = 4, Nn equals 256
0.0156
0.328
144 0.562
0.093
Table 6.3 An Example of the Mathematical Derivation of the Probability 
of a Lift making various Numbers of Stops
The above table illustrates that the probability of one stop 
is 0.0156, the probability of two stops is 0.328, the probability of 
three stops is 0.562 and the probability of four stops is 0.093.
rx values can only be conveniently calculated using computer 
facilities when the number of floors served, *NT, or the capacity of 
the lift, Tn* is greater than five. A computer program has been 
developed by the author to determine the rx permutations, and hence the 
probabilities, associated with all the possible number of stops for any 
pair of fn f and fN* values. The results of this computer analysis are 
illustrated in Table 6 .4 for various*N'and*n'values. This table can be 
usfed to determine the probability of any number of stops occurring for 
a particular number of passengers and number of floors served.
In the previous section it was shown that in general it is 
ndcessary to assume the top floor as the reversal floor, in which case 
the only cause of a R.T.T. in excess of the design value is a greater 
than assumed number of stops. As a consequence Table 6.4 can be used 
as a rough estimate of the probability of a trip having a greater than 
anticipated R.T.T.
A similar theoretical method to that proposed here for analysing 
the probability of various numbers of stops could be used to determine 
the probability of various combinations of reversal floors and number of 
stops. This would be useful wherever it were thought unrealistic to 
assume the top floor as the reversal floor.
The probabilistic analyses described and illustrated in this section 
would prove useful should it be found necessary to base lift design on 
R.T.T's other than the probable (mean) value.
6.7 Lift Design based upon a Cost Benefit Technique
6.7.1 Lift reliability. In section 6.5 the relevance of the 
capital cost and repair costs when making lift reliability decisions 
was introduced.
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If the probability of a lift breaking down on any day is PR, then 
the expected daily losses due to lift breakdowns is IR x PR , where IR 
is the sum of the repair costs, and the inconvenience caused to the 
users. The discounted total losses over the life of the lift system is 
given by,
L = I - X P  x W x D  - 6.15
R R nr
where W is the annual number of working days for the building being 
.designed.
D is the discount factor taken from Table A.8, and depends upon 
nr
the interest rate and design life of the lifts.
The capital cost of the lifts, E, will also depend upon the 
level of reliability.
E = K x f(PR)
The relationship between E and P might be reasonably assumed to be
K
exponential, hence,
-A x P
E = A x e - 6.16
The total cost expression is found by combining the capital 
expenditure and expected losses i.e.
C = W x d x I x p + A x e . -6.17
nr R R
The optimum level of reliability found by equating the
first differential of equation 6.17 to zero, i.e.
—A x p_ \
W x d x IR ~ A2 x e = 0
nr «•
Taking logarithms of this equation
" XX PR(opt) = lo*I? X D„r X y  " loS X2
log X2 - log(W x D x I )
hence P„ = ------------- r---- 2£----L.
(opt) A
6.7.2 The lift system - the number, size arid speed of the lifts.
The capital cost of the lift system is dependent upon the number, size 
and speed of the lifts, which in turn depends upon the design (specified) 
handling capacity and the height of the building. The general capital 
cost function for the lifts can be written as
E = K * f(h,D) - 6.18
where 'h* is the number of storeys served and ’D* is the five minute 
handling capacity in terms of persons rather than as a percentage.
(43)
Williams has produced a comprehensive selection table for lift 
systems, based on a constant level of performance. This selection 
table incorporates the cost of each lift system. Figure 6.21, which is 
based on Williams* selection table illustrates the variation of capital 
cost (at 1971 prices) with the number of storeys served and the actual 
five minute handling capacity. The general equation linking E and D is
E = m x D + K - 6.19
Now both m and K are dependent on ,h t, however using the information 
in Figure 6.2.1 the relation between E, D and h can be approximated by the 
following function for offices;
E = [52 x h - 170.5J x d + 10416 + y pounds - 6.20
where Ty* is 1680 pounds for each additional floor above the twelfth
This function was derived using linear regression methods and the 
capital cost functions illustrated in Figure 6.21. It must be stressed 
that this capital cost relationship is only applicable to medium sized 
buildings, and assumes that a good lift performance is desired, i.e. a 
lift interval of between thirty and thirty five seconds.
The function relating the percentage handling capacity and the 
daily probability of the handling capacity of lifts being inadequate,
P^, has already been shown to be an extreme value function (Figure 6.13). 
The equation of the distribution function illustrated in Figure 6.13, is 
given b y ;
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The actual handling capacity in persons will depend upon the 
building population;
D = Pop x d_ x .p % 100
Consequently equation 6.21 can be rewritten as;
D = Pop x [3.43 x (- log£-logp-Pff| ) +  4.9J *
-  6 . 22
Combining equations 6.20 and 6.22 the capital cost function for office 
buildings becomes,
E = [52 x h - 170.5] xPop x [_3.43 x (-log£-logp-Pf)])
+ 4.9J x J _  + 10416 + y - 6.23
The discounted total expected losses, L, due to five minute 
passenger arrival rates in excess of the lift system handling 
capacity is based upon equation 6.4, and is given by
L = P. x W x D x X  -6.24
f nr
For the lift design problem used as an example in section 6.3, 'i'is 
98 pence and the building has 750 occupants distributed on eight floors 
above the first. Hence using equation 6.23 the capital cost function 
is given by,
E = [52 X 10 - 170.5] X 750 x [3 .43 x (-log£-logjl-Pf)]) + 4 .9]
x w + 10416
= 23,223 + 8965(-logA{}-logji(l-P^r]) pounds - 6.25
Assuming a design life of thirty years and a four percent net dis­
count value the expected failure losses are given by ;
L = 260 x 17.3 * 98 * Pf
= 440804 x p . _ 6.26
The total cost fC f is found by combining the expected losses
and capital cost functions (equations 6.25 and 6.26)
C = 440804 x pf + 23223 + 8965(-log^{-logt(I-Pf)}) -6.27
The optimal failure rating is found by equating the first 
differential of equation 6.27 to zero i.e.
~  = 440804 + 8965 x -— J . . ■ x - A _■ x 0.1886 - 0
dPf logP - Pfo)pt (1“Pfo}pt
. . /. t» \ _ 8965 x 0.1886
logil~Pf)pt x(1~Pf0£t - ~ 440804
= - 0.00383 
Solving by trial and error;
Pf(opt) ■ °-0'
According to Figure 6.13 this failure rating is associated with a 
thirteen percent handling capacity, that is the lift system must be 
able to carry one hundred passengers in a five minute period. According 
to the Hammond and Champness design tables four lifts with a capacity
of ten persons and contract speed of 300 f.p.m. would provide this
service. This lift system is similar to the lift system resulting from 
the failure cost consistency design approach.
6.8 Conclusions
In this chapter the causes of unsatisfactory lift performance 
have been considered in detail and rational approaches suggested, and 
in some cases illustrated, for modelling the probabilistic factors.
The use of the failure cost consistency criterion as a design decision 
aid was illustrated for lift design based on Phillips' procedure, and it 
was shown that a realistic hardware design could result from the use of 
this design criterion. A method wag also outlined for using the failure
cost consistency principle when l£ft design is based on simulation 
techniquesjand also for defining the acceptable level of reliability of 
a lift system. Finally the benefits of probabilistically analysing 
lift performance was emphasised by developing cost benefit methods 
for determining the number, speed and size of lifts, and also the desired 
reliability of the lift system. The cost benefit approach and the 
failure cost consistency approach were illustrated using the same design 
example, both approaches resulted in a similar lift system.
CHAPTER SEVEN
STRUCTURAL DESIGN
7;1 Introduction
A probabilistic approach to safety, taking into account the expected 
variations in load and strength was first introduced into structural 
design in the aircraft industry in the late 1940*s. In the classical 
probabilistic theory of structural reliability, illustrated in Figure 
7.1, the relative frequency distribution of the two random variables, 
load L, and strength, S, must be known. Failure occurs whenever the 
load is greater than the strength. This event can be expressed probab­
ilistically and is represented by the hatched area of intersection of 
the load and strength distributions shown in Figure 7.1. Alternatively, 
if a distribution of(S - L) is drawn then the probability of failure, P^,
is represented by the negative area of this distribution. The risk
of structural failure can never be totally eliminated, and although this 
philosophy of safety, i.e. that a finite risk always exists, is now 
accepted in the design of engineering structures, there are a number of 
important reasons why, in practice, it is impossible to use classical 
reliability theory as a basis for structural design.
The first reason is that the probability of failure cannot yet be 
assessed accurately; it is widely recognised that the professions* 
knowledge concerning the reliability of structures lags far behind its 
ability to undertake complex stress analyses. At the very low levels 
of risk which are socially acceptable for structures, the probability of
failure is dependent upon the exact shape of the tail of the strength
and load distribution curves. To determine the distributions accurately 
would require extremely large numbers of observations and, although 
this might be feasible for loads, it is practically impossible to collect 
sufficient data concerning the strength of complex structures. A
Frequency
Probability of 
Failure
StrengthLoad
Load or Strengths
Frequency
XS-L)
Probability 
of Failure
(Strength - Load)
Figure 7.1 Classical Structural Reliability Theory
structure consists of a large number of components with many modes of 
failure, hence the prediction of the strength distribution is far more comp­
licated than if only a single component with a single mode of failure existed. 
The analytical derivation of a strength distribution is a problem which 
can only be satisfactorily tackled using numerical techniques such as 
the Monte Carlo method (section 3.7, Bibliography reference 4). The 
only alternative is to predict mathematically the form of the distribu­
tion functions for strength and load , however this freedom of choice
can lead to wide variations in the calculated probability of failure.
The second shortcoming of reliability analysis concerns the 
assumption that the risk of failure is due solely to the modelled 
uncertainty of strength and load. However this is certainly not the 
case. Collapse is frequently caused by events which are impossible to 
statistically predict. Unusual loads due to accidents, unknown defects 
in the fabrication and erection, or the errors involved in the idealisa­
tion of the mathematical model, are typical causes of collapse. A
census of failures caused by unforeseen hazards was conducted by CIRIA
(5 5 )
over a twenty four month period . The following distribution of 
incidents from all causes were noted
Gas explosion 842
Explosion of equipment and materials 490
Runaway vehicles 445
Sabotage 117
Unknown 335
2229
This survey reveals the astonishing number of incidents, which it is 
quite impossible to take into consideration in a classical reliability 
analysis of structural safety. The fundamental causes of structural 
accidents are often far more obscure than the occurrence of an extremely
/C£\
high load in excess of the design strength of the structure. Pugsley 
highlighted the general parameters of significance in accident history.
He concluded that the following factors can affect the likelihood of a 
structural accident;
new or unusual materials
new or unusual methods of construction
new or unusual types of structures
experience and organization of design and construction team
research and development background
industrial climate
financial climate
political climate
Although the application of classical probability theory to the 
design of structural members and systems is of considerable theoretical
interest it is, in fact, of little practical help to any Code Committee 
faced with the problem of choosing safety factors.
In recent years there has been a broad development away from 
classical reliability theory and more practical methods of tackling the 
problem of structural reliability have been reported at recent conferences 
devoted to structural safety (58) (59) ^ ^ complete bibliography of
all the research which has been undertaken in this field in recent 
years is not feasible, however a state of the art report by Baker 
gives an excellent detailed picture of the developments which have 
taken place.
Consider now present structural design methods and the practical 
way in which the uncertainty of structural behaviour has been incorporated 
in design codes. The "deterministic" codes, inherently recognise the 
probabilistic behaviour of structures by incorporating safety factors 
in design calculations. Such factors were usually arrived at intuitively 
after long experience and are probably sufficiently accurate for the 
majority of design purposes. The safety level is not directly specified 
when using deterministic codes, rather it is an unknown function of the 
likelihood of the design strengths and design loads being exceeded, the 
degree of conservatism of the design equation, and finally the values of 
the specified safety or load factors. Hence it is logical for safety 
design procedures to be rationalised, this view being exemplified by 
Moses and Stevenson^ ^  who observed that "the luxury of picking the 
worst possible load conditions and designing for that load is no longer 
economically feasible under broad spectrum load conditions".
The limitations of strict reliability methods have resulted in 
so called semi-probabilistic approaches being adopted for structural 
design. In reality such design methods are a compromise between 
classical reliability theory and the deterministic load factor methods. 
This alternative approach (Figure 7.2) has been called Limit State Design 
because it examines the degree of safety against certain limiting or un­
desirable states being reached, such as collapse, or simply cracks and 
excessive deflections.
MATERIAL STRENGTH
LOADS
Characteristic load L.K
Characteristic stress S
K
Design load = L * y. Design Stress = S jy K s
Global load factor = y, x TL S
Figure 7.2 Limit State Design
Limit State Design assumes that statistical distributions of 
loads and material strength are available, hence characteristic values
ities that they will not be exceeded in the case of loads, or under­
valued in the case of strengths. The design loads are the characteristic 
loads, relevant to the limit state being considered, multiplied by a 
partial load factor, y^, which takes account of factors which affect the 
desired risk but which are not taken into consideration by the probabil­
istic representation of loads. Should statistical load data not be
available then the characteristic loads are taken from CP3 chapter V 
(go)
Part 1 or any other appropriate code. An individual partial safety 
factor is used for each type of load i.e. live, wind, snow etc., however 
where two or more sources of loading are considered to act simultaneously 
then the partial factors are reduced since there is a reduced likelihood 
of extreme values occurring simultaneously.
Similarly design stresses are obtained by dividing the character­
istic strengths, S , by another partial load factor, yp, which is used 
K. S
to account for any other possible but unpredictable variation in 
strength, such as the difference between the strength of material as
of load and material strength can be selected with specified probabil-
tested and those of the material in the structure, and the reliability
of the structural analysis or the construction method. The character-
(63}
istic strength, SR , is independent of the limit state, and in CP 110 ,
which is the revised Code of Practice for the structural use of concrete 
S is given byJ\
SK = yS ” 1,64*CJS - 7.1
The use of the coefficient 1.64 means that there is only a five 
percent chance of the structural strength being below the design value.
In addition to these partial safety factors it is also necessary to 
use an additional partial safety factor, Yc> the value of which depends 
upon the following,
a) the nature of the structure, i.e., whether it would give warning 
of collapse or whether failure of a single member could lead to 
widespread collapse, and
b) the seriousness of failure in terms of possible loss of life and/ 
or economic consequences.
The global load factor (y x y0 * y ) will increase with the
J-1 u c
social and economic consequences of the limit state being reached; 
collapse clearly requiring a higher load factor than local damage such 
as cracking. Although Limit State Design considers assessible risks in 
a probabilistic manner the degree of safety is still mainly controlled 
by load factors.
In the U.K. most progress with limit state methods has been made
(63}
in the field of concrete structures where the current code is already
in limit state form, however this is to be shortly followed by limit
state codes for bridge design^^ and the structural uses of timber
(63}
and brickwork. In CP 110 partial safety factors are specified for
the ultimate and serviceability limit states. It is interesting to note
however that the partial factor is not included in CP 110, instead
the values of y and yc have been adjusted in particular instances to
(65)
deal with aspects covered by y . Rodin investigated the feasibility 
of incorporating the consequence of failure in the treatment of structural 
safety. Instead of attempting to achieve uniform safety for each struct-
ural member,Rodin was more concerned with the more significant objective 
of trying to achieve a uniform protection agsinst loss of life and 
property.
Clearly then a start has been made towards more rational probabili­
stic methods for designing structures but much remains to be discovered 
about the nature of the loading, the behaviour of structures, and on the 
most appropriate level of safety.
In this section the impracticality of using classical probabilistic 
methods for structural design has been summarised. Although a number of 
factors can be assessed probabilistically it is necessary to use 
subjective load or safety factors to account for unpredictable events 
which can affect the safety of a structure.
7.2 The Variability of Structural Loads
It is a criterion of limit state design that the characteristic 
load , Lvf be determined from a probabilistic analysis of the expected 
loads. The statistical methods which have or could be adopted to 
model the variability of structural loads will now be briefly dis­
cussed.
7.2.1 Wind loading. This is a classic example of a statistical
variable which affects the performance (safety) of a building. It was
(66)
in 1966 that Davenport first proposed a rigorous statistical
treatment of wind loads for building design. In the U.K. records of
extreme wind speeds have been analysed by the Meteorological Office
for many years, using the statistical theory of extreme v a l u e s .
However more recently Shellard^*^ has considered the application
of such records to structural design. In 1970 the Code of Practice
(23)
for wind loading was revised and based upon the maximum gust speed 
likely to be experienced on the average only once in fifty years.
However using a statistical correction factor included in this code it 
is possible to determine the wind speed associated with any return 
period of occurrence, thus if necessary giving the designer freedom of 
choice concerning wind loading safety.
In section 4.3.A it was proposed that the acceptable probability of 
complete building collapse during the design'life of the building'is approx
_4
ately 4.0x10 . Consequently the acceptable annual probability of complete
collapse is 5.0 x io ^ (assuming a design life of eighty years). There
are a number of possible causes of complete collapse, however the cause
is irrelevant to the occupants, the total annual probability of complete
“6collapse from all causes must not exceed 5 x 10 . An excessive wind
loading will rarely be the sole cause of failure although an excessive
wind load could certainly accelerate failure if other adverse events
were to occur simultaneously. The present wind loading guide, although
allowing for variations in the desired level of safety, proposes that
the fifty year return period wind is acceptable for standard design
purposes. However when the wind load for a particular probabilistic wind
speed has been calculated CP 110 recommends the use of a load factor
which will in effect increase the return period of the wind load causing
failure. A typical load factor of 1.4 corresponds to the use of a return
period of five hundred years. The use of this wind load return period
_6
is consistent with an annual risk of structural collapse of 5 * 10 if 
there is a five thousand to one chance that an excessive wind load will 
be the sole cause of complete building collapse.
This revised format of the wind loading code has met with opposition 
from practicing engineers because in general it requires a
building to be designed for higher wind loads than previously necessary. 
Obviously the construction industry finds this hard to accept, consider­
ing the relatively infrequent occurrence of collapse caused by the wind 
on buildings designed to the old standards. However this fact is 
arguably due to the excessive strength of buildings in the past which 
was a result of the use of safety factors to compensate for the lack of 
knowledge concerning structural behaviour. The professionfs knowledge 
of structural behaviour has increased enormously in the last few years, 
and the future trend will be towards structures with less undefined 
margins of safety. As a consequence it will become increasingly import­
ant to quantify correctly the risk associated with the design loads.
7.2.2 Live loading. Unlike the wind loading code, CP3, Chapter V, 
(62}
Part 1 which relates to live and dead loads, still exists in a 
deterministic form. At the present time the limit state characteristic 
loads are assumed to be equal to the deterministic figures of this code.
Table 7.1 is a reproduction of part of a design table taken from this 
code.
Use lo which bunding or structure 
is to be put
Intensity of 
distributed load
Concentrated load to-be 
applied, unless other* 
wise stated, over any 
square with a 300-mm 
(I-ft) side
■ kN/m* kgf/m* Ibf/ft* kN kgf lb
HOUSES 1-5 153 31-3 1-4 143 315
INDOOR SPORTING
FACILITIES:
Areas for equipment To be determined but
not less than'
J O 204 41-8 183t 4041
Assembly areas with fixed seating* 4-0 408 83-5 — — __
Assembly areas without fixed
seating S O 510 104 36 367 809
Corridors (see corridors)
Dressing rooms 2-0 204 41-8 1-8 184 405
Gymnasia 5-0 510 104 36 367 809
Toilet rooms 20 204 41-8 - — —
INSTITUTIONAL BUILDINGS:
Bedrooms 1-5 153 31-3 1-8 184 405
Communal kitchens To be determined but
not less than
3 0 306 62-7 4 5 459 1012
Corridors, hallways and
passageways (see corridors)
Dining rooms 2-0 204 41-8 2-7 275 603
Dormitories I S 153 31-3 1-8 184 405
Laundries 30 306 62-7 4-5 459 1012
Loungts 2-0 204 41-8 2-7 275 603
Toilet rooms 2-0 204 41-8 _ _ __
KITCHENS other than in domestic To be determined but
buildings, including normal not less than
equipment 30 306 62-7 45 459 1012
LABORATORIES, including To be determined but not less than
equipment 30 306 62-7 45 459 1012
LANDINGS Same as the floors to which they give access :
LAUNDRIES other than in To be determined but
domestic buildings, excluding not less than
| 4-5 ■equipment 3 0 306 62-7 459 1012
* Fixed seating implies that the removal of the seating and the use of the space for other
purposes is improbable.
t  Concentrated load to be determined but o f not less values than these.
Table 7.1 Design Imposed Loads (Extracted from CP 3 Ch. V Part 1 ^ ^ )
In reality the imposed loads are probabilistic in nature and it is not 
illogical to suppose that the imposed loads will have a normal 
probability distribution function and hence will be completely character­
ised by the two parameters, the mean and standard deviation. Thus for 
a more accurate representation, the deterministic values of Table 7.1 
should be replaced by the mean and standard deviation of the expected 
imposed load. If this assumption of normality is not permissible the 
imposed load could be illustrated as a cumulative distribution function, 
or even as an extreme value distribution function.
Information relating to the statistical variability of floor
loading results from surveys of occupancy loads in retail premises and
. (72)(73)offices undertaken by the Building Research Establishment and CIRIA .
First consider the factors which will affect the imposed loading
intensity;
a) The imposed load will depend upon the bay size. - In general
the load intensity will decrease as the bay size increases.
b) The floor - basements and ground floors will have different 
load intensity distributions from other floors.
c) The type of building - the greater the number of occupancy 
changes during the building life, the greater will be the 
spread of the intensity distribution and hence risk of an 
imposed load in excess of the design value.
d) The column loadings will depend upon the number of floors
supported. Statistically the likelihood of coincidence of ex­
treme loads on every floor supported by a column will reduce with 
the number of floors supported. Consequently percentage reduc­
tion factors can be used to compute the design column loads 
associated with any particular failure ratings
(73)
Table 7.2, which is taken from Mitchell and Woodgate shows the 
mean and standard deviation of imposed loads for various bay sizes in 
offices. This table also gives the imposed load which, assuming normal­
ity of loading, will only be exceeded on one, and five percent of occasions.
Similar information is given in Table 7.3 for retail accommodation, this
(72)
table is reproduced from Mitchell and Woodgate . Using the informa­
tion contained in these tables and normal statistical tables (Table 
A.l) the imposed load associated with any predefined failure
rating can be determined. This would be an accurate method of deriv­
ing the characteristic live loads for use in Limit State Design. However 
for use as imposed load design guides these tables would need to be 
combined with correction factors to account for factors (c) and (d) 
described above.
Mitchell concluded that a consistent reduction of about twenty 
five percent on all floors above the first supported floor is a conven­
ient column reduction factor to account for the unlikelihood of 
coincident extreme loads on adjacent floors. A theoretical probability 
method can be used to determine the single occupation failure rating,
P * , which corresponds to any design life failure rating, P , associated K R
with fX* occupancy changes. In explanation, if a given loading occurs 
with cumulative probability, PR f for a single arrangement of the loads,
then it will occur at least once with probabilit" after fX f arrange-
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Size Group L M N P Q R S T U V
Nominal ^ 12 17.5 30 60 100 160 800 550 950 2400
a re a  m2 1.1 1.6 2.8 5.6 9.3 14. 9 27.9 51.1 88.2 222.8
SALES ZONES lb f/f t2 (kN/m2)
Mean 16.0 15.4 16.1 16.1 15.6 15.8 16.1 15.5 15.7 15.0
(0.766) (0. 738) (0.771) (0.771) (0.747) (0.757) (0.771) (0.742) (0.752) (0.719)
Standard 16.7 15.0 14.4 12.9 11.9 11.2 11.0 10.1 10.2 8 .7
Deviation (0.800) (0.719) (0. 690) (0. 618) (0. 570) (0. 536) (0.527) (0. 484) (0. 489) (0.417)
95 % 56.5 50.5 51.0 47.0 43.5 42.5 41.5 39.0 41.0 37.5
(2.71) (2.42) (2.44) (2. 25) (2. 08) (2. 04) '(1 .9 9 ) (1.87) (1.96) (1.80)
99 * 82 78 73 64 60 55 54 51 52 51
(3. 93) (3. 74) (3. 50) (3. 07) (2.87) (2. 63) (2. 58) (2.44) (2.49) (2. 44)
99. 9 % 135 114 106 88 80 72 69 68 _■ .
(6.47) (5.46) (5.08) (4.21) (3.83) (3. 45) (3. 30) (3. 28)
NON-SALES ZONES
Mean 21.3 20.6 20.7 20.1 20.2 19.5 19.7 19.4 19.1 20. 1
(1.020) (0.987) (0.991) (0. 963) (0. 967) (0. 934) (0. 943) (0. 929) (0. 915) (0. 903)
Standard 29.8 26.2 24.3 21.1 19.6 17.0 15.9 13.8 12.7 12.2
Deviation (1.427) (1.255) (1.164) (1.010) (0. 939) (0.814) (0.762) (0. 661) (0. 608) (0. 584)
95 % 71.0 65.5 63.5 58.0 56.0 51.0 50.0 46 .5 44.0 45. 5
(3.40 (3.14 (3.04) (2.78) (2.68) (2.44) (2.40) (2. 23) (2.11) (2. 18)
99 % 160 128 121 107 . 101 89 86 72 64 67
(7. 66) (6.13) (5.79) (5.13) (4.84) (4.26) (4.12) (3.45) (3.06) (3.21)
99.9 % 272 242 212 180 153 129 115 94 .
(13.02 (11.59) (10.15) (8.62 (7. 33) (6.18) (5.51) (4. 50)
Table 7.3 Load Intensity Levels - Single Occupation (Taken from Mitchell and 
Woodgate )
ments, and thus
7.2.3 Other structural loads. The structural dead load must 
obviously be taken into consideration in design. The characteristic 
dead load, or in fact, the dead load associated with any failure 
rating can only be explicitly determined following a detailed analysis 
of the variability of member weights and sizes. Using such information 
the exact probability distribution function of expected dead load for
any member might theoretically be found.
In the U.K. the wind is the only climatic load which commonly causes 
structural damage. However failure is frequently due to the combined 
action of a number of adverse conditions and thus the snow or ice load 
which, if present alone, would not prove a problem, can easily accelerate 
damage or failure. It is important then that all meteorological loads 
be analysed statistically. Considerable climatological data exists which 
would allow ice and snow probability distribution functions to be deter- 
mined. Consequently snow and ice loading guides, similar in nature to 
the current probabilistic wind loading guide could feasibly be derived.
Clearly loading relationship functions are needed to convert snow 
or ice depths to load values. In recent years there have been consider­
able developments made in Russia and Canada in this field. A useful
summary of snow loading relationships may be found in a joint study by
(74)
Schriever and Otstavnov . Clearly the effort that goes into structural 
meteorology needs to be increased, for there is no point in having the 
capacity to design structures with precision, if the statistical meteoro­
logical loads to which the structure will be exposed are only determined 
in an imprecise way.
Finally consider random loadings caused by rare events such as 
internal explosions or impacts. Internal explosions can be caused by 
gas leaks, explosions of mechanical equipment, or terrorist attack, the 
latter becoming an increasingly common event. The consequences of an 
explosion depend to a great extent on the form of construction. If a 
'parallel* structural system is used then it is possible that the
V -  U  - O - 7.2
failure of one or more members will simply result.in forces being 
transferred to other members, and the consequences will be only super­
ficial. On the other hand if no redundant members exist, or a series 
structural system exists, then an explosion can easily lead to the 
progressive collapse of the whole building. The precautionary measures 
taken against the effects of random loadings will depend on the 
structural system used and an estimate of the likelihood of such explos­
ive or accidental loads occurring. Since such random loading events 
cannot be predicted theoretically the only way of estimating the frequency 
and severity is by surveys. Only recently, in fact following the Ronan 
Point collapse, has any attempt been made to collect information concern­
ing the risk and severity of accidental structural damage. The analysis 
of the information collected in the first two years of a CIRIA study was 
briefly discussed in the Introduction to this chapter. When sufficient 
freak incidents have been analysed it might be possible to estimate 
the chance of occurrence of an explosive load in excess of any degree of 
structural resistance. Should the risk not be compatable with the expec­
ted consequences of a severe explosion then the structural design could 
be modified to reduce or increase the risk to an acceptable level. As 
discussed in chapter four, Rodin^*^ proposed a feasible method for 
assessing the acceptable risk of structural failure due to explosive 
forces. He proposed that the acceptable risk should be based upon both 
the consequences of such an event occurring and the risk associated with 
other adverse events.
If it is desired to use more probabilistically orientated methods 
rather than partial safety factors to account for theoretically unpredict­
able loadings then the CIRIA survey of structural failures must be 
continued until sufficiently reliable information regarding the frequency 
and severity of random loadings exists.
7.3 Evaluating the Assessable Risk of Structural Failure.
One of the primary objectives of this project is to propose sub­
system design procedures which will depend upon an explicitly stated 
level of performance. In which case the failure cost consistency 
criterion or a cost benefit analysis could be used to determine the 
acceptable level of performance. In section 7.1 it was shown to be
impossible to predict the risk of structural failure.-. The Limit State 
Design method is a semi-probabilistic approach which recognises that 
there are assessable and unassessable risks involved in structural 
safety. The assessable uncertainty of strength and loadings are 
accounted for by using characteristic loads and strength,and the 
unassessable risks are quantified by partial safety factors.
Now should the failure cost consistency criterion be used to esti­
mate the acceptable risk of structural failure then a method is required 
to convert this acceptable risk to a structural member size. If the 
acceptable risk is P^ then
P. = P + P - 7.3f a u
where l*a is the assessable or predictable risk
and P is the unassessable risk due to freak events which it is
u .
impossible to analytically consider at the design stage.
If it were considered that there was an equal chance of failure 
being caused by so called unassessable, as opposed to assessable causes 
then the required member strength parameters could be found using a 
classical probabilistic method and assuming a 0.5P^ failure rating.
Unfortunately current Limit State Design methods, such as CP 110 
consider loads and strengths separately, consequently it is not possible 
to design a structural member which is associated with a particular risk 
of overloading. However Shah^**^ proposed a particularly useful method 
for determining the mean member strength associated with any level of 
reliability. He defined the mean member strength to be equal to the
mean expected load,in which case, assuming the loads and strengths can be
represented by a Gaussian (normal) distribution, the required mean 
strength of the member is given by
_ v, + w2 + K /af  + o22
D 1 - KV s
where Pj and are the mean and standard deviation of the dead load ,
^2 anc* °2 are t*ie mean an<* standard deviation of the live load ,
V is the coefficient of variation of member strength 
s
estimated from strength test data.
K is given by
K = K*
+ Jo + o ^
K* is a factor which depends upon the acceptable failure 
rating, P , and is found using Fig. 7.3.
3
4.0
3.0
0.9 0.99 0.999 0.9999 0.99999 0.999999
Reliability 
*
Figure 7.3 Reliability Coefficient K as a Function of Reliability 
(Taken from Shah^^)
The mean and standard deviation of the dead load depends upon the 
member size. Consequently determining the mean member strength using 
equation 7.4 requires that a trial member must be chosen and then the 
calculated mean strength, L  compared with the mean strength of this
trial member. Should there be a substantial difference then the value 
of uj and a^ must.be adjusted and the design procedure repeated.
By following essentially the same procedure as in this Gaussian 
model,. T a n g d e r i v e d  reliability based design equations for other 
models of load and strength. Design equations can also be derived for 
combined loads, resulting from wind, earthquakes, superimposed or snow 
loading provided a realistic theoretical distribution function can be 
assumed for each type of load.
7,4 The Application of the Failure Cost Consistency Criterion to
Structural Design
7.4.1 Introduction. First consider the main factors which will 
affect the consequences of failure of a structural element;
1) The nature and purpose of the total structure.
2) Whether the element is ductile or brittle, the former will be
associated with some degree of warning of pending failure, while 
the latter will describe members which will fail without warning 
and hence cause greater injuries and losses.
3) Whether the element is a part of a parallel system, in which 
case before failure of the individual element occurs re­
distribution of loads takes place and the consequences of 
failure are reduced, or part of a series system, in which case 
failure of the individual element leads to failure of the whole 
system.
4) The area which collapses or is affected as a result of 
structural member failure.
5) The behaviour of the structure in the damaged state.
Before attempting to quantify the *cost of failure* for a parti­
cular structural element each of the above factors must be considered.
It is possible that a member may have various modes of failure, each 
mode being caused by a different combination of loads. It is important 
that the consequences of each mode of failure be determined, and that 
the structural element is only designed after due consideration of the 
acceptable levels of reliability for each mode of failure.
7.4*2 A numerical example. As an example consider the design 
of floor slabs, assuming that only dead and live loads need be con­
sidered. The effect of failure depends upon the method of construction, 
however in this instance brittle behaviour of the slabs is assumed, 
in which case although failure will be localised, (total collapse of 
the building will not occur), it is assumed that damage will be serious 
for the floor zone which collapses. The building is assumed to be a 
speculative office with one hundred floor zones each of five hundred 
square feet. Twelve occupancy changes are expected during the design life 
of the building. The mean number of occupants per zone is assumed to be 
five, however a higher than presumed population density might well be a 
cause of failure. In addition failure will probably affect occupants of 
the floor below, consequently for the purposes of this example it is 
assumed that one person is killed, three people seriously injured, and 
seven people superficially injured. In an earlier chapter the socio­
economic value of life was estimated to be approximately fifty thousand 
pounds. Using actuarial information it was also estimated that the 
total financial consequences of a serious injury was eight thousand 
pounds and for minor injuries eight hundred pounds. These rates include 
treatment costs, wages lost, and injury compensation. Using these 
figures the total human losses resulting from this illustrative floor 
slab failure are,
I *= 50,000 + 3 x 8,000 + 7 x 800
n
= 79,600 pounds.
Other consequences of failure are lost revenue either in terms of 
rent or lost production, and the repair or rebuilding costs. For the 
purposes of this example, assume that the sum of these losses is forty 
thousand pounds, in which case the total cost consequences of failure,
I, is given by
I = 79,600 +40,000
= 119,600 pounds.
In general terms the cost of failure is given by,
where -I_ is the total compensation of each of the fK* injured or
killed personnel.
I_ is the replacement or repair costs.
K
Ip is the lost rent or profit while the building is being 
repaired or replaced.
Returning to the example, using the criterion of failure cost 
consistency, the acceptable return period of an event with financial 
consequences amounting to one hundred and twenty thousand pounds, is 
given by
H  = 16 x I x c x — L. - 4.9
Pop
Assuming a conservation coefficient value equal to unity 
U  = 16 x 120,000 x 
= 3840 years.
The acceptable annual probability of floor slab failure is given by 
P,' = 4  = 2.6 x 10~4
I K
The equivalent acceptable probability of failure during the design 
life of eighty years is given by,
P^11 = P^1 x design life
= 2.6 x 10"4 x 80 *= 0.0208
P^"' is the acceptable probability of failure after twelve occupancy 
changes, the corresponding single occupancy probability of failure, P^ ' 
is found using equation 7.2. That is
PfMI = 1 - (1-Pf")1/12 - 7.6
= 1 - (1-0.0208)1/12
r  V i[Equation 7.6 can be approximated by Pfl,f - J
P^,lf quantifies the acceptable risk of a slab zone failing for a single 
occupancy, hence if there are *nT floor zones in the building the 
design level of reliability of each zone, P^, is given by,
pR = (i-pf,M)1/n
p !l I
f
= 1 - — —  - 7.7
n
For this hypothetical example P^"1 is 0.001736 and there are one 
hundred floor zones, hence,
PB = 0.99998264
K
P is the desired level of reliability for the floor slabs. If it
K
is assumed that there is as great a chance of floor slab failure being
caused by explosions or any other unpredictable event as being caused
by assessable overloading then the reliability level which should be 
used to determine the required mean strength of the slabs is given by
P = 1 - ~~ V  - 7.8
D o
The required mean strength of the floor slabs for a given strength 
coefficient of variance can now be determined using equation 7.4, Figure 
7.3 and the relevant mean and standard deviation of live load taken 
from Table 7.2.
The calibration of the failure cost consistency equation (section 
4.3.4) was based on a structural collapse event. As a consequence it is 
thought unnecessary to illustrate the use of the failure cost consistency 
procedure for making general structural safety decisions.
In theory it should be possible to determine the structural events 
which can cause complete structural failure. The combined probabilities 
of all these events must not exceed the acceptable probability of 
complete structural failure found using the failure cost consistency 
criterion. Similarly the potential consequences of localised structural
failure can be estimated, and thus the acceptable frequency or risk 
of minor adverse structural events determined using the failure cost 
consistency criterion. Once again the combined probabilities of all 
events which can cause localised failure must not exceed the acceptable 
failure rating.
When costing the consequences of adverse structural events the 
fatality and injury compensation, the repair costs, the renewal cost of 
the contents and the lost revenue from the building must all be taken into 
consideration. Once the acceptable structural risk has been found 
equation 7.3 can be used to estimate the design level of reliability.
The probabilistic method described in section 7.3, or any other classical 
reliability analysis can then be used to size the member.
7.5 The Application of Cost-Benefit Techniques to Structural Design
Cost benefit techniques provide an economically rigorous method of 
making structural safety decisions. A cost benefit analysis is a more 
economically accurate method than the failure cost consistency criterion 
for making structural safety decisions, however accuracy can only be 
obtained at the expense of simplicity and workability. A cost benefit 
analysis requires additional information linking the initial capital 
cost of the structure to the risk of failure. The total life cycle cost 
function is given by,
C = E + P, x I x D - 7.9
f nr
where C is the total life cycle cost of the structure
E is the initial capital cost of the structure
#
P£ is the annual risk of structural failure 
r
D is the relevant discount factor 
nr
I is the total consequences for the degree of failure being 
considered.
To find the optimal failure rating, Pf(0pt)» the first derivative 
of the total cost function is equated to zero, i.e.
Freudenthal^^ proposed a logarithmic relation between the initial 
cost (which is equivalent to member weight or dimensions) antf the 
failure rating. In which case
dE _ _K_
dPf ’ Pf - 7.11
Now the expected losses due to 'failure,'-I» consist of both the cost 
of reconstruction, which may be assumed to be the same as the initial 
cost and Ic> which quantifies the consequences of failure, (lost rents, 
lost profits, injury compensation, etc.). Thus equation 7.10 becomes,
K
-   ---- + ( E + I ) x  D « 0
f(opt) n
thus
K  7 19P  = • . .. —  l - 7.12
f (opt) (E + Ic) X Dnr
K is a constant which depends on the structural cost of the 
building for a base failure rate value.
(19)
Table 7.4 is reproduced from Allen and illustrates the relation 
between relative capital cost and the probability of failure, Pf, for 
a realistic P^ range.
Case
(1)
Probability  of fa ilu re  
(2)
n = I
s
(3)
Relative Cost
S tructure  . 
(4)
Duihlis|
(5)
Steel 10~* 1.60 1.00 1.00
10“* 2.07 • 1.09 1.03
(Vs  = 0.2, V]{ ■ = 0.10) 10“ * 2.54 1.17 1.0G
Reinforced concrete 10-* 1.73 1.00 1.00
10~* 2.50 1.09 1.03
(Vs  = 0 .2 , I'* = 0.14) 10-* 3.54 1.22 1.07
Wood 10"* 1.93 1.00 1.00
10“ * 3.49 1.23 1.00
(Vs; = 0.2, Vn  = 0.18) 10“ * 7.30 1.78 1.26
* Normal distributions assum ed for the loads and strengths
Table 7.4 Relative Costs for Various Failure Probabilities 
(Taken from Allen^*^)
This table indicates that for the usual steel and reinforced concrete 
structures a one hundred fold decrease in P^ corresponds to an approx­
imate ten percentage increase in the structural capital cost. Algebraic-
-2
ally when P^ is less than 10
E = 0.05 x Efi x log Pf + 0.9 x Eg - 7.13
-2
where E_ is the structural cost associated with a 10 risk of failure.
B
Differentiating equation 7.13 
dE_ °-°5 X E B
dPf Pf - 7.14
This is similar in form to Freudenthal's proposed function, (equation
7.11) with 0.05 x e _ replacing K. Thus equation 7.12 can be rewritten
B
as
0.05 x E_
p s     - 7 15
*f opt (E + Ic) x Dnr
As an example of the use of equation 7.15 consider the hypothetical
building collapse used to calibrate the failure cost consistency equation 
(section 4.3.4). The consequences of failure, 1^, were estimated to be
15 million pounds and the construction cost, E, (based on 100 pounds per
sq. meter) was 500,000 pounds. If it is assumed that E is approximately 
equal to E, which is an acceptable assumption when considering the magni­
tude of Ic> then the optimal risk of collapse for this building is given 
by
0.05 x 500,000 
f(opt) " 15,500,000 x Dnr
Now if the building life is assumed to be eighty years and the discount
rate is four percent then D is 23.9. Thusnr
P.. „ ® 6.748 x 10“5
f opt
Now P^ is the optimal annual risk of structural collapse,
consequently the optimal risk of collapse during the design life of 
eighty years is ;
P' = 80 x 6.748 x 10”5 « 5.39 * 10~3
f opt
This economically optimal failure rating is slightly larger than the 
risk assumed acceptable when calibrating ' the failure cost consistency 
equation (section 4.3.4).
In this section a cost benefit method has been proposed to aid in 
the safety design of structures. In a much broader sense structural 
optimisation involves finding the structural form, element sections or 
shapes which will provide a satisfactory structure at the least cost - 
the least cost invariably being interpreted as the least weight. An 
alternative objective of this type of optimisation might be to determine 
the safest structural design associated with a given cost (weight). The second 
type of structural optimisation problem is extremely complex, and mathemat­
ical programming techniques must be used to ensure that all the design 
constraints, such as modes of failure, structural resistance, fabrication 
or construction methods etc, are considered in the optimisation procedure.
It is not proposed to consider this type of structural optimisation in
detail in this thesis, the reader should refer to a recent series of 
(78)
papers for a thorough discussion of structural optimisation techniques.
7.6 Discussion
R o d i n ^ ^  has made a serious attempt to include in the Limit State 
Design method a partial safety factor which exclusively takes account of 
the consequences of structural failure. Table 7.5 is reproduced from 
Rodin, and shows the variation of this partial safety failure with various 
influencing factors. However although y^ allows every structural member 
to be designed with a uniform protection against loss of life and property, 
rather than simply uniform safety, it is not possible to link the design 
of the structure to the design of other subsystems of the building 
because, as shown in this chapter the limit state method of CP 110 does 
not allow explicit levels of reliability to be determined, or conversely 
used as a basis for design.
A semi-probabilistic analysis is required for structural design 
because it is impossible to predict the risk of failure from all possible
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causes. However it is suggested that the present Limit State Design 
methods, which consider load and strength variability separately could 
be improved by incorporating these probabilistic factors in such a way 
that a member might be designed for a predefined assessable failure 
rating.
The current wind loading code is written using a probabilistic 
format, however other forms of loading are still considered in a deter­
ministic manner. An attempt has been made in this chapter to show how other 
probabilistically oriented loading codes or guides might be produced 
using loading data already available or continually being collected.
Both the failure cost consistency criterion and cost benefit 
techniques were illustrated as possible methods for determining the 
acceptable risk of structural failure.
CHAPTER EIGHT
WATER SUPPLY
8.1 Introduction
8.1.1 The problem. The provision of hot and cold water and a waste 
disposal system is often taken for granted in a building because, on the 
Whole, they work reasonably well and have been generally considered to 
be inexpensive items. However in large modern buildings the water supply 
and drainage subsystem can often account for ten percentage of the cost pf 
construction, which is far from negligible. The increasing cost of water 
services has led in recent years to considerable research being under­
taken by various organisations, in particular by the Building Research 
Establishment and by the Building Services Research Unit in the U.K.
The main aim has been to improve design information and methods of
installation* A C.I.B. Commission Seminar which was held in 1972 at
. . . (79)the Building Research Establishment highlighted the work which has
been recently undertaken in this field.
Consider briefly the criteria which should be used when sizing the 
cold and hot water tanks, and the supply and discharge pipework. Accord­
ing to CP 3 1 0 ^ ^  water storage should be provided for the following 
reasons;
a) To provide against interruption of the supply caused by 
repairs to mains.
b) To reduce the maximum rate of demand on the mains.
*
Building Services Research Unit, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, 
Scotland.
c) To limit the pressure on the distribution pipes and fittings con­
nected to the pipes, so reducing noise and the wastage of water, 
and to enable lighter and therefore cheaper pipes to be used.
Water supply and soil pipes should be sized to give sufficient dis­
charge at the various outlets at all times, thus when sizing cold or hot 
water storage tanks, or the supply and discharge pipes it is necessary 
to assess the magnitude of the expected demand, a demand which is by its 
very nature probabilistic.
8.1.2 The limit state of failure. The limit states of failure 
for pipes and cisterns can be defined using the criteria for design dis­
cussed in the previous section. Operationally the water storage sub­
system will have failed if zero water supply is experienced at any time. Simil­
arly the branch sizing of a supply pipe network will have failed if sim­
ultaneous uses are such that insufficient discharge occurs at one or more 
outlets. However this statement begs the question, what is a sufficient 
supply flowrate? Generally people will differ in their interpretation of 
an acceptable flow rate for any particular type of outlet. Technically 
the limit state of failure should be based upon human response surveys, 
however for the purposes of this thesis, the recommended flow rates given 
in CP 310^*^, and reproduced as Table 8.1, will be assumed to represent 
a reasonable estimate of the limit state of failure.
FITTING OR APPLIANCE RATE OF FLOW (cold or hot water) gal/min
W.C. flushing cistern 1.5
Wash basin tap 2
Basin spray tap 0.5
Bath tap f" s 4 •
Bath tap 1" 8
Shower 1.5
Sink tap J" ' ' 2.5
Sink tap 4
Sink tap 1" 8
Table 8.1 Recommended Rates of Flow at Various Fittings or Appliances 
(Taken from CP 310).
Finally, when designing the waste pipe network the designer is 
concerned with ensuring the network is capable of handling all waste 
discharges, and the limit state of failure for each branch of the 
network must be based on the anticipated soil discharge.
8.1.3 The probabilistic implications. First the tank sizing 
problem will be considered. Failure, as defined above, will occur 
because the tank does not satisfy the criteria for design listed in 
section 8.1.1. To be more precise either
a) the Water consumption occurring during a period of mains 
failure exceeds the tank capacity
or b) the water demand rate exceeds the supply rate for a sufficient
length of time to exhaust the storage capacity.
Unfortunately the water consumption will vary from day to day, and 
also within any 24 hour period. As a consequence of this uncertainty of 
demand there will always be a risk of failure occurring,as defined by 
a) and b), no matter how large the tank cistern. The exact distribution 
of water consumption will depend upon the following factors,
a) The use of the water.
b) The number and type of fittings connected.
c) The number of consumers served.
A typical cumulative probability distribution of water consumption 
for two bedroomed dwellings is illustrated in Figure 8.1. The derivation
of this distribution will be described in more detail in a subsequent
section.
The use of water outlets is also probabilistic, consequently there 
is a finite chance that sufficient outlets will be in simultaneous use 
to produce an inadequate flow rate at one or more outlets of the network. 
An inadequate flow rate is due to undersizing of pipes, consequently 
the performance of the supply or discharge pipes is probabilistic.
Probability of Consumption V /
. V
//
/.
9 /p= .0000474 * <f>2-0.0169 X(f> ;
+ 1.485
Experimental Curve
Normal Curve u = 76 
c = 40
—  - —  • — •* Parabolic Curve
15 50 75 100 125
Total Daily Consumption, <j> , gallons
150 200
Figure 8.1 Cumulative Distribution Function of Water Consumption in 
Small Dwellings. (Data taken from Webster(84))
8.1.4 Present design methods. Recommendations for the storage 
per resident in various types of buildings are given in CP 310^^^ 
and are reproduced as Table 8.2.
Type of Building Storage in Gallons
Dwelling houses and flats per resident 20
Hostels per resident 20
Hotels per resident 30
Offices without canteens per head 8
Offices with canteens per head 10
Restaurants per head per meal 1.5
Day schools per head 6
Boarding schools per resident 20
Nurses1 homes and 
medical quarters per resident 25
Table 8.2 Provision of Storage to Cover 24 Hour Interruption of 
Supply. (Taken from CP 310).
Where the supply is regular,storage may not be essential unless the
water undertaking requires it to be provided. The Model Water Byelaws
specify that the capacity of a storage cistern in a house should not
be less than twenty five gallons, where it is not used solely as a
feed cistern, and that if the cistern is used as a feed cistern as well
as a storage cistern the capacity should not be less than fifty
gallons. For some undertaking these figures are larger. For industrial
use it is present policy to consider each case individually. Maver under­
g otook a study of water consumption in hospitals , and this work was
used as the basis for the hospital consumption estimates of the IHVE
(82)
Guide, 1970 . Estimates of hot water consumption in various types
of buildings are also reported in this IHVE guide.
Unfortunately Table 8.2 does not indicate the performance, in 
terms of the probability of inadequacy associated with the recommendations
for storage capacity, and this is the basic criticism of this and all 
the other deterministic water consumption estimates given in the IHVE 
Guide.
Turning to the pipe sizing problem, as previously discussed 
Table 8.1 illustrates the flow rates which should be available for various 
fittings and appliances as recommended in CP 310. Present design 
methods recognise that in most buildings all the appliances installed 
are rarely in use simultaneously, if it was assumed that all outlets 
were being used then the calculation of pipe sizes would.reduce to a 
fluid mechanics problem. For economic reasons it is usual to size 
pipes assuming a certain number of outlets to be in use, which is less than 
the maximum, that is a chance of failure is accepted/
(83)
Hunter was one of the first to formulate a design method for 
pipe systems based upon the criterion of an accepted probability of 
failure, He reasoned that if an outlet has repeated cycles of use each 
lasting for an average time, t, and the average interval between uses is 
T, then p, the probability of the outlet being on at any instant is 
given by
p = t/T - 8.1
Using the binomial distribution, the probability of ,x* 
on from a total of ,n l such outlets is,
n n x Nn-x
Px = cx x P X (1-P)
The probability of r or more outlets being on is
x=n
r n x Nn-x „ „I c x p x (l-p) - 8.3
x=r x
If there are *nf outlets in a group and the pipe serving those out­
lets is designed to just give adequate flow when fr* outlets are in use 
then the chance of failure* p£> for that pipe is represented by;
x=n
x=r
outlets being 
-  8.2
If it is decided that the acceptable failure rating for a system 
is P^ then equation 8.3^  can be used to determine the equivalent value 
of r, and hence the pipe serving the !n f appliances can be sized.
Host practical pipe design problems involve outlets of more than 
one type and the probability of use, p, will be different for each out­
let. A system of fixture units* was used by Hunter to take into 
account these differing probabilities. "Fixture units" effectively 
convert the differing types of outlets to an equivalent number of base 
type outlets which can then be used in the binomial function (equation 
8.2). Using this technique design charts and tables have been derived 
which allow any number of ’fixture units* to be converted to a design 
flow rate for pipes serving a mixture of outlets. This procedure is 
still the basis of the pipe sizing section of CP 310 and the IHVE pro­
cedure, although the 'fixture or loading units* have been modified by 
several research workers. W e b s t e r d i s c u s s e s  the work of the 
various individuals who have proposed 'loading unit'scales for different 
types of appliances, and he compares their results in detail.
In the field of waste and soil drainage the expected flow is also
governed by the intermittent use of sanitary appliances. Hunter's
'discharge unit' approach has been rationalised by several people,
(85)
notably Griffiths and Burberry , and has formed the basis for drainage
/ Q / * \
design for several years. Britch and Wilson have recently used com­
puterised methods based on a statistical approach to improve the estim­
ates of expected drainage loads in a complex waste discharge system.
The current loading unit recommendations are contained in CP 310 
and are reproduced here in Table 8.3. Figure 8.2 is the design chart 
taken from the same code, which converts any number of loading units to a 
design flow rate. Referring to equation 8.4 and 8.3 it is seen that the exact 
function linking the loading units and design flow rate is dependent on
TYPE OF BUILDING TYPE OF APPLIANCE LOADING UNITS
Dwelling & Flats WC Flushing Cistern 2
Wash basin 1J
Bath 10
Sink 3-5
Offices WC Flushing Cistern 1
Wash basin n
Wash basin (use in
rapid succession) 3
Schools and WC Flushing Cistern 2
Industrial Wash basin (use in
Buildings rapid succession) 3
Shower (with nozzle) 3
Public bath 22
Table 8. 3 Loading Units (Taken from CP. 310)
150
Design Flow Rate100
gallons per minute
50
30 40 50 80 W O  150
Loading Units
200 300 400 600 000
Figure 8.2 Loading Units and Design Flow Rates (Taken from CP. 310)
P^, the acceptable failure rating. The failure rating associated with 
Figure 8.2 is not stated, However past and present design procedures 
have arbitrarily chosen failure ratings for water supply and drainage 
pipes generally in the range 0.01 - 0.005. In a later section of this 
chapter a method will be proposed to rationally assess the acceptable 
failure rating for any pipe. Current pipe sizing methods using Table 8.3 and 
Figure 8.2 could then be used to convert this failure rating to a design 
flow rate, which would allow an acceptable pipe diameter to be calculated. 
However first a method for storage tank sizing based upon the failure 
cost consistency criterion will be described.
8.2 Cistern Sizing based upon Failure Cost Consistency
In section 8.1.3 two possible events were stated which would result 
in an inadequate storage capacity, i.e. subsystem failure. The failure 
cost consistency criterion can be used to define the acceptable failure 
ratings, and hence a tank size, for both these possible adverse events.
It is proposed that the larger of these two tank sizes should then be used 
as the design tank size.
8.2.1 Storage tank design as a provision against mains failure.
Figure 8.3 is a flow chart of the failure cost consistency design 
procedure for determining the required water storage capacity when the 
storage is needed as a reserve supply should mains failure occur. The 
satisfaction provided by a particular size of tank is quantified by 
the failure rating, P^, which is given by,
P. = p x p - 8.5
f r m
where p^ is the daily probability of mains failure
and p is the daily probability of the actual water consumption 
exceeding the tank capacity.
To simplify the problem it is assumed that the average duration of 
mains failure is twenty four hours (this assumption is used in the CP 310 
recommendations). p can then be redefined as the probability of the 
twenty-four hour consumption exceeding the tank capacity. The consequences
Figure. 8 .
Use the cost of failure 
equation to determine *1*
Use the Failure Cost Consistency 
Equation to determine the DESIGN 
FAILURE RATE, Pf
Expected daily 
probability of 
mains failure
m
Determine the ACCEPTABLE DAILY PROBABILITY 
of the water consumption exceeding the tank 
capacity using
pf
P \ 5 w
/Probability distri- 
bution of daily 
water consumption
Use ’p ’ and daily consumption distribution
to determine the DESIGN DAILY WATER 
CONSUMPTION
The design daily water consumption is 
equivalent to the DESIRED CAPACITY OF 
THE STORAGE CISTERN
3 A Flow Chart illustrating the Failure Cost Consistency
Procedure for Sizing Storage Tanks when the Cause of Failure 
is an Interruption to the Mains Supply
of an insufficient water reserve is dependent upon the amount by which 
the twenty-four hour demand exceeds the tank capacity on the particular 
day when mains failure occurs. The proposed general expression for'l', 
the consequences of an inadequate reserve, is as follows;
I = E X F X ( l ------1—  ) y. , - 8.6
1 + 130 >
where X is the average percent by which the twenty-four hour water 
consumption exceeds the tank capacity on a day when this 
adverse event occurs 
E measures the financial consequences of zero water per day for 
the type of building being designed.
F is the inefficiency factor and measures the degree of dis­
ruption to the proper functioning of the building caused by 
insufficient water (the value of ’F* depends upon the type of 
building and the use of the building).
For a hotel or hostel it is proposed that E should be equal to the 
hotel charges or residence fees multiplied by the number of guests or 
occupants, and 'F* might be assumed to be approximately 0.5. For 
schools and hospitals E should be based upon the daily running costs 
per occupant and an estimate of the building population. For offices 
E should be based upon the average wage rate per employee, making a 
suitable correction for overheads and profit margins, and an estimate 
of the building population.
As an example of the use of equation 8.6 consider an office 
building with five hundred employees. Let it be assumed that on average 
each employee is worth thirty pounds per day to the employer, and that 
when the mains supply is interrupted on a day when the twenty-four hour
consumption is greater than the tank capacity then the average degree of
failure, X, is ten percent. It is also presumed that in an office 
building the lack of water only reduces the work output by one tenth, 
i.e. F = 0.1. Using equation 8.6
I = 500 x 30.0 x 0.1 x (1 - — 1- - )
1+U *1
= 150 pounds.
Using the failure cost consistency design criterion, the return 
period of this event, N, is given by
N = 16 *. 'I. * c * years
Assuming the conservation coefficient is equal to unity then 
150* 16 . q
N = — 500—  = years
The acceptable daily probability of this event, P^, is given by
Pf N x 365 = °*00057
Now if it is expected that an interruption in mains supply occurs 
once every m years then the acceptable probability, p, of the 24 hour 
consumption exceeding the tank capacity can be found using equation 8.5, 
i.e.
P£
P =
= 0.00057 x m x 365
If fm f is assumed to>be one year then,
P = 0.208
Consequently for storage tank design purposes the acceptable failure 
rating for the daily water consumption exceeding the cistern capacity .is
0.21. Unfortunately an estimate of the cumulative distribution of water 
consumption in an office building containing five hundred personnel is 
not available. Had it been known then it would have been used to 
determine the consumption associated with a 0.21 probability of being 
exceeded on any day. This would be equivalent to the required tank 
capacity for this hypothetical building.
Once the design twenty-four hour consumption has been determined 
it is possible to use the distribution of consumption to determine the 
actual average failure consumption, X. If the actual value of X is greatly 
different from the assumed value (ten percent in this case) then the
procedure should be repeated with revised *Xf values until the 
actual and assumed average failure percentages are approximately equal. 
This iterative procedure will be illustrated in the next example where 
a suitable twenty-four hour consumption distribution has been estimated. 
In a previous chapter it was shown that this type of iterative procedure 
can be approximated by a deterministic procedure if the cumulative 
distribution of the probabilistic factor is normal in character and the 
acceptable failure rate is expected to be small. In this particular 
problem the first assumption is permissible, however the acceptable 
failure rating will not be small and hence the iterative solution is 
necessary.
As a second example the failure cost consistency approach will be 
used to determine the water storage capacity needed as a provision 
against mains failure in two bedroomed dwellings.
The inconvenience cost of having zero water in a private dwelling 
is estimated at a rate of three pounds per person per day. Using 
census data it is known that there are on average 2.5 occupants per small 
dwelling. Assuming that when failure occurs the actual consumption 
exceeds the tank capacity by,on average,twenty percent, the cost of 
failure*I*is given by
I = 2.5 x 3 x (1 - y+q" 2') pounds - 8.7
= 1.25 pounds
Once again the acceptable return period of this event is given by
N = 16 x I x c x - 4.10Pop
As in the previous example c is assumed to be unity, hence
N = 16 x 1.25 x ~jr » 8 years
The acceptable daily probability of the cold water tank being 
inadequate is given by;
Pf * 81T365 ' °-00034
As in the previous example
Assume that there is an interruption to mains supply once a year,
i.e. pm = 0.00274, the acceptable daily probability that the total 
daily consumption exceeds the tank capacity is given by
0.00034 
P 0.00274
. = 0.124
Figure 8.1 illustrates the cumulative distribution of water 
consumption in small dwellings. This distribution was determined from 
data provided by the Building Research Station and reported by 
Websters^^. Unfortunately the data available only allowed the 
variation in consumption between flats to be illustrated. Strictly 
speaking it is necessary to include the daily variation within each 
flat when deriving the consumption distribution. However for the 
purposes of this example the consequences of this simplification 
have been ignored, although it is stressed that a more thorough 
analysis of water consumption in dwellings is required to improve the 
accuracy of this consumption distribution. If an interruption to supply 
is not to affect the occupants then the capacity of the storage cistern 
should be capable of meeting the cold water, hot water and drinking 
water requirements of the dwelling. For this reason the distribution 
of Figure 8.1 is the sum of the hot, cold and drinking water consumption 
in dwellings.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov quantitative techniques were used to 
verify that this water consumption probability distribution could be 
legitimately represented by a normal distribution function. This 
technique is described in greater detail in Appendix IV. The dotted 
curve of Figure 8.1 indicates the equivalent theoretical normal 
distribution. As can be seen the experimental consumption curve com­
pares favourably with this theoretical normal curve and hence the 
consumption of water in dwellings can be assumed to be normal in 
character. Consequently the mean and standard deviation of this cumulative
distribution function completely characterises water consumption and the 
consumption associated with any failure rating can be determined using 
normal probability tables.
Returning to the example, a failure rating of 0.125 is equivalent 
to a cumulative probability>(1—P^)^of 0.875. According to Figure 8.1 
the associated consumption is 125 gallons. In this example it was 
initially assumed that x equalled 0.2. The design failure rating is 
0.125, hence the average failure consumption is that associated with 
a 0.0625 failure rating. According to Figure 8.1, 145 gallons is the 
daily consumption associated with this failure rating, consequently 
X is given by,
* . i^ - 2 5  . 0;I6
This fX* value is approximately equal to the assumed value of 0.2, 
consequently it is unnecessary to adopt the iterative procedure described 
previously. For this hypothetical example the tank size required as a 
provision against mains failure, based upon failure cost consistency, is 
125 gallons.
For a private dwelling CP 310 recommends a storage of twenty gallons 
per resident. Hence for a two bedroomed dwelling, assuming 2.5 occupants, 
a fifty gallon storage capacity would be required. This is con­
siderably smaller than the proposed size of tank based upon failure cost 
consistency. However the failure cost consistency storage capacity 
includes the storage capacity of the hot water cistern in addition to 
the cold water supply tank. In addition this example is only intended to 
serve as an illustration of the application of the failure cost consis­
tency design technique, the cost consequences of the inconvenience of 
zero water in a private dwelling has only been approximately assessed.
It is interesting to note that the storage requirement of twenty 
gallons per occupant stated in CP 310 is supposedly the average daily 
consumption per person. According to Figure 8.1, such a consumption 
is equivalent to a cumulative probability value of 0.22, not 0.5. Thus 
according to the limited data available to the author CP 310 under-
estimates the average consumption in flats. Figure 8.1 suggests that the 
average daily consumption per person is nearer thirty gallons per day.
8.2.2 Storage tank design as a buffer1 against peak demands. An 
additional reason for providing water storage in a building is to 
reduce the maximum rate of demand on the mains. For any building the 
larger the supply flow rate, i.e. diameter of the mains pipe, the smaller 
need be the storage capacity. Consequently an adequate system can be 
designed with an infinite number of combinations of mains pipe diameters 
and storage capacity. The demand for water will vary .during any. twenty- 
four hour period. Assume that the demand over a critical period is as 
shown in Figure 8.4.
Accumulative Consumption
of Water
t , t ,t, bX y
\rrrA
TIME
FULL EMPTY
\zzzA
FULL
Figure 8.4 Reservoir Sizing Technique for Sizing Storage Cisterns
(24)
(Taken from Maver )
The constant rate of supply of water to the tank from the local authority 
mains is represented by the line AB. From time t ■onwards the rate of 
demand is in excess of the rate of supply, and hence the tank capacity 
is emptying. This continues until time t after which the supply rate
is greater than the demand rate and hence the tank is filling. The 
quantity 'Sf represents the required storage capacity of the storage 
tank. If the rate of supply increases to AC then the required storage re­
duces to S', This technique was originally adopted for reservoir 
sizing, and was developed for water cistern sizing in buildings by 
Maver<87>.
Unfortunately the water demand will vary from day to day, conse­
quently if the storage requirement, fS* for a particular mains supply 
rate is found for a number of days then the statistical distribution of 
S can be derived. Theoretically this distribution should be normal, 
hence using statistical tables (AppendixI), it would be'possible to determine 
the storage capacity associated with any failure rating, P^. It is 
proposed that the failure cost consistency technique might be used to 
determine the acceptable P^ value, and hence using the above procedure 
enable the required storage tank size to be determined.
Storage
Capacity Constant
Diminishing P
values
Supply Flow Rate
Figure 8.5 An Illustration of the Relation between Supply Rate and 
Storage Capacity for Various Pf Values
As already described the distribution of fST will be dependent upon the 
mains supply rate. By varying the supply rate is it possible to plot 
the relation between supply rate and storage for various P^ values,as
illustrated in Fig. 8.5. Lines of constant cost can then be super­
imposed and the most economic combination of supply rate and storage 
capacity found for the desired value.
The consequences should the water demand on any day be sufficient 
to exhaust the storage capacity of the tank will not be equal to the 
consequences of an inadequate storage capacity caused by an interruption 
in the mains supply. If the storage tank is exhausted then the system 
will remain in a state of failure for as long as the demand flow rate 
continues to exceed the mains supply. The symptoms of failure to the
user will be an insufficient flow rate at outlets. The cost consequences
of this event depend upon the following factors;
E, the average value of the outlet users time. Depending on the
type of building, this will be based upon the wage rate of the
employees, running costs of the building, or profit rates.
y, a factor which quantifies the effects of failure which are 
other than economic e.g. inconvenience, discomfort etc.
m, the duration of failure
d, the proportional flow deficiency at each outlet during a
period of average failure
n, the number of occupants affected by failure.
The proportional flow deficiency is found using the expression
d = desired flow rate - average failure flow rate g g 
average failure flow rate
It is proposed that algebraically the cost consequence of failure is 
given by s
I = E x y x m x d x n  pence - 8.9
To illustrate the use of equation 8.9, consider the small dwellings 
used as an example in the previous section. There are no actual 
economic losses involved, however the inconvenience and discomfort 
effects are presumed quantified by 2.5 pence per minute per person.
Assuming 2.5 occupants per dwelling, an average failure proportional flow 
deficiency, d, of 0.2, and a duration of failure of four minutes then 
the consequences of failure are given by,
I = 2 . 5 x 0 . 2 x 4 x 2 . 5  = 5 pence.
Using the failure cost consistency equation the acceptable return 
period for this event, assuming a conservation coefficient value of 
unity, is given by,
N = 58.5 x 5 x = 117 days
The acceptable daily failure rating is ^  or 0.0085. Unfortunately
the actual tank size associated with this P., value cannot be determinedr
because the probability distribution of S for dwellings is not available 
to the author. However had this distribution been known then the design 
tank size would have been the ,SI value associated with a 0.0085 proba­
bility of being exceeded on any day. This design procedure is illustra­
ted as a flow chart in Figure 8.6.
The storage capacity required as a safeguard against an interruption 
to the mains supply should be compared with the capacity required as a 
buffer against an excessive instantaneous demand, and the larger of the 
two tank sizes should be used for design purposes.
8.3 Hot Water Cylinder Sizing based upon Failure Cost Consistency
The demand for hot water is variable, hence a finite probability of
failure must be accepted with any cylinder size. However the probability
of failure does not simply depend on the size of the cistern, it also 
depends upon the recovery time, i.e. the capacity of the heating system. 
The cause of failure is a hot water demand rate in excess of the avail­
able supply rate, and the limit state of failure may be simply defined 
as insufficient hot water. This cause of failure is identical to the 
second cause of cold water tank inadequacy as described in section 8.2.2. 
Referring to Figure 8.4 the supply rate AB for hot water cylinder design 
will depend upon the heating capacity of the calorifier. There will be 
a number of combinations of storage capacity and supply rate which will
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Figure 8.6 A Flow Chart illustrating the Failure Cost Consistency 
Procedure for sizing the Hot or Cold Storage Cistern 
when the Cause of Failure is an Excessive Demand
be associated with a specific failure rating, P^. A cost effective
method, as described in the previous section is the most rational way
of finding the economic optimum combination of cistern size and heating 
(87)
capacity. Maver illustrated this cost effective design approach with 
hot water consumption data collected from hospital wards.
The failure cost consistency technique can be used to determine the
acceptable failure rating for the hot water system, however before this
is illustrated with an example it is appropriate to mention briefly the
(88)
survey of hot water consumption carried out by Harris . Harris 
monitored the hot water consumption over a 25 day period in an apartment 
block housing 214 persons. The flow meter installed in the building 
allowed the consumption during each five minute period to be logged.
From this consumption data Harris obtained the maximum quantities of 
water used during each day for various time periods ranging from five 
minutes to twenty-four hours. He normalised these maximum hot water 
consumptions by expressing them as a percentage of the total daily 
consumption. For each time period these maximum normalised consumptions 
were then used to derive the extreme value distributions of consumption. 
Harris used this probability distribution of consumption to determine a 
hot water cistern design equation. This equation gives the storage 
capacity as a function of the heat recovery rate of the calorifiers, and 
the normalised extreme value consumption. Because the consumption values 
are associated with a definite probability of exceedence, P^, the proba­
bility of failure associated with any cistern designed can be defined. 
Alternatively if a failure rating is specified,then the cistern 
design satisfying this level of performance can be determined. This 
represents an alternative probabilistic design method to that proposed 
by Maver, The basic difference is that Harris uses an extreme value 
method of illustrating the variation in daily consumption while Maver*s 
method requires that the actual distribution of required storage is 
determined from the analysis of each dayfs consumption histogram. Harris 
only illustrated his method for apartments but obviously if data were 
available it could be used for any class of building. The values 
assumed by Harris for illustrative purposes were 0.001 and 0.00254, and 
there was no evidence to suggest that these values were anything but 
subjectively chosen.
The failure cost consistency approach will now be used to determine 
an acceptable failure rating for such an apartment building. When the 
storage of hot water has been exhausted an adequate supply of hot water 
will not be available until the demand rate has fallen below the recovery 
rate of the calorifier. For private dwellings the cost consequences of 
an inadequate hot water system can be represented by/
I = q  x y x y - 8.10
is the average quantity of hot water desired while the failure 
state exists
is the heating cost per unit quantity of water 
is the ’nature of failure* factor representing the lost profits, 
discomfort, inconvenience or health hazard caused by not 
having adequate hot water available. For private dwellings the 
’nature of failure* will be inconvenience and *y* is given the 
value two.
Let it be assumed that for a tank supplying an apartment block that, 
on average, when failure occurs it will take one hour for the demand 
flowrate to drop below the heat recovery rate. According to Harris’s 
survey Q might be approximated as 4 gallons per person per hour. At 
present prices it costs approximately 0.6 pence to heat one gallon of 
water from 40°F to 110°F, hence assuming 110°F to be the desired hot 
water temperature, y equals 0.6 pence per gallon. *y* has been assumed 
to be two for private dwellings, consequently for an apartment block of 
similar size to that mentioned by Harris the cost of failure is estimated 
to be given by
I = 4.0 * 214 x 0.6x 2
= 1078 pence.
Using the failure cost consistency equation, (equation 4.9), the 
acceptable return period of failure is given by
N = 58.5 x 1078 x c x ~
Assuming a standard building in which case *c* equals unity, then
where Q 
Y
y
N = 294 days.
The acceptable daily failure rate is the reciprocal of N, that is 0.0034. 
This compares favourably with the failure rating value subjectively 
chosen by Harris.
The design procedure for hot water tank sizing is represented as 
a flow chart in Figure 8.6.
8.4 Pipe Sizing based upon the Failure Cost Consistency Criterion
In an earlier section of this chapter the probabilistic method was 
described which is the basis of the current design procedure for supply 
and drainage pipe sizing (section 8.1.4). However a rational method for 
assessing the acceptable failure rating for pipe sizing would prove 
beneficial. The criterion of failure cost consistency is just such a 
method. The proposed application of failure cost consistency as an aid 
in pipe sizing is illustrated as a flow chart in Figure 8.7.
8.4.1 The consequence of failure. As usual the first step is to 
quantify the expected consequences of failure. The symptom of failure 
is a reduction in the flow rate of any outlet caused by an excessive 
number of outlets being used simultaneously. Consequently'I*is defined 
to quantify the consequences of failure of an outlet, not of a particular 
pipe. It is the behaviour of the outlet not the pipe that is important 
to the users, thus the failure ratings resulting from the failure cost 
consistency analysis must relate to the individual outlets, rather than to 
the pipe . A method proposed by C a r s o n c a n  then be used to convert 
acceptable outlet failure ratings to pipe failure ratings. Pipes can 
then be sized using the present design procedure, which has been des­
cribed previously.
The consequences of failure of a single outlet will depend upon 
the following factors;
E - The value of the outlet user*s time, based on the average wage 
rate of the employees, the profits, or the running costs of the 
building.
y - A *nature of failure* factor which quantifies other uncostable
VDetermine the AVERAGE COST 
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Figure 8.7 A Flow Chart illustrating the Failure Cost Consistency 
Procedure for sizing Supply and Drainage Pipes
effects, such as inconvenience, health hazard, safety etc., 
which are not covered by E.
m - The duration of failure.
d - The proportional flow deficiency at the outlet. (This 
factor has been defined in section 8.2.2).
Algebraically the cost of one minutes failure for any outlet is 
given by
I = E x y x d - 8.11
Table 8.4 illustrates the variation of11*with the type of building 
and type of outlet. Since1I*quantifies the consequences of an insuff­
icient flow rate of one minutes duration, N, resulting from the use of 
the failure cost consistency equation, is the acceptable return period 
of one minutes insufficient discharge at the outlet. Alternatively N 
can be described as the period during which one minutes accumulated 
failure is permissible.
C o u r t n e y q u a n t i f i e d  the consequences of altering the pipe sizes 
in a system by formulating a dissatisfaction index. His dissatisfaction 
index is given by
S = K. x c. x dm - 8.12
J i
As in equation 8.11, 'd1 is the propprtional flow deficiency. 
Courtney concluded that a twenty percent flow deficiency is more than 
twice as annoying as a ten percent flow deficiency hence the power 
factor, ’m 1, is needed when quantifying dissatisfaction. The power 
factor is not needed in equation 8.11 because'I*quantifies the importance 
for a single, average deficiency value. *c^f is the outlet importance 
coefficient, this is equivalent to the product of fy* and fE* in 
equation 8.11. TK.1 is termed the repeat factor and quantifies the 
length of time each outlet is deficient, 'i*, (equation 8.11) quantifies 
the effect of one minutes failure hence the factor K is not required in 
equation 8.11. The similarity between equation 8.11 and Courtney's 
dissatisfaction index adds justification to the use of equation 8.11 for 
quantifying the consequences of an insufficient flow rate at any outlet.
TYPE OF SANITARY APPLIANCE 
OUTLETS
PRODUCTION OUTLETS 
i.e.Kitchen & Workshops
BUILDING
I
pf I P f
DWELLINGS
E=2.5p/min 
y=l .0 
d~0.5
0.0028
AS
SANITARY i
FOR
lPPLIANCES
OFFICES
E=8.33p/min 
y=l .0 
d=0.5
0.005
E=8.33p/min 
y=2.0 
d=0.5
0.0025
0.0025
SCHOOLS
E=2.78p/min 
y=2.0 
d=0.5
0.0055 AS FOR OF]'ICES
HOSPITALS
E=8.33p/min
y=2.0
d=0.5
0.0025
E=8.33p/min 
y=4.0 
d=0.5
0.00125
HIGHER EDUCATION : AS FOR OFI ICES AS FOR OF]‘ICES
HOSTELS AS FOR OFI ICES AS FOR OF] ICES
HOTELS AS FOR HOSPITALS AS FOR 
SANITARY AI
_____ 1
PLIANCES
_____ ,
RESTAURANTS AS FOR OFFICES
E=Profits/min
y = y  ( y  depends on the 
effect of outlet 
failure)
d=0.5
FACTORIES AS FOR OFF][CES
E=2.5p/person
y=2.0xX (X depends on the
, n c effect of outlet 
Q = U  . 5  ,  .  _
failure on pro-
duction)
Table 8.4 Nominal *1* Values and Failure Ratings for Two Classes 
of Appliances in various Types of Buildings
8.4.2 A numerical example. To illustrate the use of the failure 
cost consistency criterion as an aid in pipe sizing consider one of four 
washbasin outlets in an office cloakroom serving one hundred persons. 
According to CP 310, (Table 8.1), the average desired flow rate for such 
a basin is 0.15 litres per second. The flow rate deficiency, fd*, 
associated with average failure should be determined using the distribu­
tion of available flow rate when failure occurs, i.e. when the available 
flow rate is less than 0.15 litres per second. Unfortunately this 
distribution is not available for office appliance outlets, however for 
the purposes of this example it is assumed that the average failure* 
supply flow rate is 0.1 litres per second. Consequently *d* is given 
by
, 1 5  - 10 _■ '
d ------ —  - °-5
According to Table 8.4 for such a building 'y* is assumed to be unity 
and /E* is assumed as 8.33 pence per minute. Hence using equation 8.11
I - 1.0 x 8.33 x 0.5
= 4.16 pence per minute.
Using the failure cost consistency equation, and assuming the con­
servatism coefficient to be unity, the acceptable return period of one 
minutes accumulated failure is given by
N = 58.5 x 4.165 x ^
= 2.436 days
If one minutes accumulated failure is permissible every 2.436 days, 
then 24,6 seconds failure is permissible, on average, every day. Now 
if it is assumed that three quarters of all failures occur during the 
peak one hour usage period of each day, then the allowable probability 
of failure for the outlet during the daily peak one hour period is 
given by
In a similar manner it is feasible to determine the acceptable 
failure ratings for all the various types of outlets drawing on the pipe
network. The failure rating values shown in Table 8.4 are based on the
assumption that the outlet serves one hundred personnel. Although the 
desirable failure rating will be a function of the population served, 
small changes in the design failure rating will have an insignificant 
effect on pipe sizes.
The fE f, fy* and fd* values for the various types of outlets given 
in Table 8.4 are essentially illustrative, and are not based upon a 
rigorous analysis. They are relative values intuitively derived, and 
should be modified in the light of more thorough analysis of the cost 
consequences of an inadequate flow rate. In Table 8.4 the suggested
failure ratings for all types of outlets are based upon a 'd1 value of
0.5. There is no real justification for this assumption, in practice 
the true *d'* value will depend upon the actual pipe network, however for 
illustrative purposes a constant fd* value has been assumed. The con­
clusion which can be drawn from Table 8.4 is that the outlet failure 
rating should be approximately 0.005 when outlet inadequacy gives rise 
to inconvenience,and approximately 0.0025, i.e. twice as satisfactory 
when the functioning of the building is likely to be affected. However 
in factories where water is an implicit requirement for the manufactur­
ing process then the acceptable failure rating must be defined from 
first principles and will invariably be smaller than 0.0025.
This example has illustrated a method for deducing the design 
failure rating of each outlet of a network, however for pipe sizing pur­
poses the acceptable failure ratings of the pipes rather than the outlets 
are required. C a r s o n a r g u e d  the importance of knowing outlet rather 
than pipe failure ratings, and furthermore he described a method using 
Poisson*s trials, for determining the failure rating of the various 
pipes in a network associated with predefined outlet failure ratings.
To summarise, when the outlet failure ratings are less than 0.1, which 
is usually the case, then the failure ratings of the pipes serving any 
particular outlet should vary linearly with the number of series 
connections feeding that outlet. As an example consider outlet 'X* 
in Figure 8.8. The number of series connections is five, if the accept­
able outlet failure rate is 0.0068, (derived in example), then 0, the
design failure rating of each pipe, is given by
e . I f  -04068 = o aoo]4(
n 5
The failure rating of pipe be, (Figure 8.8), can be determined using 
the linearity assumption. If the acceptable failure rate of outlet fc* 
is 0.0068 then the failure rate of pipe be is equal to 0.0068 minus the 
sum of the failure ratings of all series connections feeding be. That 
is;
0. = 0.0068 - 2 x 0.0014
be
= 0.004
In a similar manner the failure rates for all the pipes in the 
network illustrated in Figure 8.8 can be determined, provided acceptable 
outlet failure rates are known. These can be found using the failure 
cost consistency criterion. The * loading unit* method, which forms the
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.0014
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Figure 8.8 Design Probabilities of Failure for a Pipe System
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basis of the current pipe sizing recommendations can then be used 
to model the effects of simultaneous usage of outlets, and hence size 
each pipe according to the prescribed failure rating. This part of 
the pipe sizing design procedure has not been illustrated with an 
example since the method is well documented e l s e w h e r e .
8.4.3 Discussion. It is particularly relevant to use this subsystem 
as an exercise in the application of the failure Cost Consistency design 
technique because quantifiable failure ratings are associated with current 
design tables and charts. In addition the concept of a probability of 
failure being associated with any pipe diameter has been recognised;for 
the past twenty years.
Table 8.4 suggests that water outlet failure ratings in the 
range 0.001 - 0.005 are realistic according to the failure cost con­
sistency criterion. Research workers who have tackled the problem of 
pipe sizing based on the load unit technique have attempted to estimate 
suitable failure ratings. In the majority of cases failure ratings have 
been estimated for pipes rather than the outlets. However making the 
necessary adjustment for this inconsistency, the failure ratings result­
ing from the application of the failure cost consistency criterion are 
of the same order of magnitude as the failure ratings used in the deriva­
tion of current design tables and charts.
There has never been absolute con sistency between the individuals 
who have worked in this field. Webster^^Vsuggested a 0.001 failure
Z O O \  / O C \
rating whereas Hunter used a 0.01 value. Burberry and Griffith 
suggested the use of a 0.005 failure rating and this is the basis of the 
current design charts of the I.H.V.E. Guide . However it is not 
possible to assume that larger pipes will result from using Webster’s 
criterion rather than Hunter’s or Burberry’s criteria because 
each of these design methods is based on differing frequencies of out­
let usage and desired outlet flow rates.
The only drawback of the pipe sizing procedure proposed in this 
section is the degree of complexity when compared with the present method
of design. The current method does not consider that the position of a 
pipe in a network should have any effect on the desirable level of 
performance. In addition all water outlets are currently assumed to be 
of equal importance. These two simplifications combine to make it 
possible to use a single failure rating for all pipes in a network, 
consequently only a single chart illustrating the relation between 
’demand or loading units*and flow rate is required.
In comparison the failure cost consistency criterion allows each 
type of outlet to be allocated a different importance rating, *l’, and 
hence a different failure rating. As a consequence for a series 
connected network system each pipe will have an individual failure ‘ 
rating, necessitating that each pipe be sized from first principles 
using equation 8.4. Alternatively the charts or tables relating the 
loading units to the design flow rate must be derived for various failure 
ratings. Although this might prove an unnecessary complication for the 
majority of small conventional buildings, this design method could prove 
economically beneficial for the design of extensive pipe networks as 
found in large building complexes, such as tall buildings, schools or 
hospitals.
8.5 Storage Tank Sizing based upon a Cost Benefit Analysis
In this section the framework for a cost benefit approach to sizing 
water storage tanks will be described.
8.5.1 The cost of failure function. The consequences of water 
storage tank failure has been described and quantified in section 8.2.1. 
Restricting our interest to tank failure caused by an interruption to
mains supply then the expected daily losses due to storage system failure
is given by
L = Pop x E x F x ( 1 ----- !---- ) x p - 8.13
1 + -X- f  
100
(_ jiJ&L O  W  A < y \ s X \ O V \ .
Now if the daily probability of mains failure is presumed to be
0.00274 and the acceptable daily probability of a twenty-four hour
demand in excess of the tank capacity is p, then equation 8.13 can 
be rewritten as
L = Pop x E x F x ( 1 ---------- ) x p x 0.00274 - 8.14
1 +
100
Assuming a thirty year design life and a net discount value of four 
percent then the total losses over the life of the cistern will be given 
by
L = W x 17.2 x Pop x E x F x ( 1 ----- L _ )  x p x 0.00274 t
. X '
+ Too
- 8.15
where W is the annual number of working days for the building being 
designed and 17.2 is the relevant discount factor taken from Table A.8.
8.5.2 The capital cost function. It can be assumed that the size 
of the storage tank is linearly related to its cost, and at 1974 prices 
the relation for mild steel cisterns is illustrated in Figure 8.9. 
Algebraically
E = a x <j) + b
= 0.2 x <j> + 2.0 pounds -8.16
where <j> is the tank capacity in gallons.
The relation between tank capacity and performance (the probability 
of the daily consumption exceeding the tank capacity) approximates to a 
normal distribution function. Unfortunately the normal distribution 
function is a complex expression not condusive to the mathematical 
manipulations required in the cost benefit optimising procedure. However 
as an approximation the distribution function illustrated in Figure 8.1 
can be assumed to be a parabolic function. Using a second order poly­
nomial regression programme the equation of the best fitting curve to 
the observed frequency curve, as shown in Figure 8.1,is given by
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p = 0.0000474 x > 2 - 0.0169 x <l> + 1.485 - 8.17
where p is the daily probability of the daily consumption exceeding 
the tank capacity, <J>.
Solving this quadratic function;
<{> = 178.27 ± (451 + 21097 * p)^ gallons - 8.18
The capital cost function for small dwellings is found by combining 
equation 8.16 and equation 8.18, i.e.
E = 0.2 x [178.27 ± (451 + 21097 x p)^J + 2.0 pounds
“ 8.19
The use of a parabolic function to approximate to the normal 
distribution function of Figure 8.1 is permissible because the expected 
design failure rating is comparatively large. This parabolic approx­
imation will produce significant errors when the expected design 
failure rating for the adverse event is small, and, as illustrated in 
the next chapter, under these conditions a more accurate approximation 
to the normal function is required.
8.5.3 Total cost function. A consumption distribution for small 
dwellings has been used to illustrate the derivation of the capital 
cost function, consequently it is convenient to use the private dwellings 
class of building to illustrate the cost benefit optimising procedure.
The total expected losses are given by equation 8.15. In a previous 
section(e .vc. f)for small dwellings was assumed to be three pounds, the 
average population per dwelling to be 2.5, and *X ' to be twenty percent. 
Under these circumstances,
L = 21.54 x p - 8.20
Combining equation 8. 19 and equation 8.20
C = 21.54 x p + 0.2 x [178.27 ± (451 +21097 x p)* ] + 2
-  8.21
The optimal p value is found by equating the first differential 
of equation 8*21 to zero, i.e.
*= 21.54 ± 0.1 x (451 + 21097 * * 21097 = 0
Solving this equation,
2.109 x p = 0.95 or - 1.05
o p t
Thus
p = 0.452 or - 0.5t opt
A negative failure rating is not acceptable hence,
p . = 0.452 
opt
Using Figure 8.1 the optimal tank size is eighty gallons. The 
actual 'X1 value associated with this solution is 0.18 which is similar 
to the assumed value, Consequently it is not necessary to repeat the 
design procedure with a modified X value.
The desirable storage capacity based on total cost implications 
is considerably smaller than the capacity based on the failure cost 
consistency criterion. The cost benefit optimal failure rating is 
approximately equal to the recommended failure rating used in the 
current design code^^. However the actual storage capacity associated 
with this optimal failure rating is higher than the recommended capacity 
in the current code because the average 24 hour water consumption 
according to Figure 8.1 is higher than the average consumption stated 
in CP 310.
The optimal failure rating is sensitive to changes in the expected 
losses L, if L doubles then the optimal failure rating will decrease by 
a factor of four. Consequently the application in practice of cost 
benefit techniques to this particular building design problem is dependent 
upon the consequences of failure being accurately quantified.
8.6 Pipe Sizing based upon a Cost Benefit Analysis
8.6.1 The capital cost function. The unit cost of pipes depends 
upon the construction material, which in turn depends upon whether the 
pipe is part of the hot water supply system, cold water supply system,
identical for the drainage or hot water supply systems. Figure 8.10 
illustrates the linear function linking the cost, E (which includes 
fitting charges), and diameter for copper and polythene pipes at 1974
/Q£\
prices, (taken from Spons Price Lists ).
Algebraically, for copper pipes
where d is the pipe diameter and 
. E is the pipe cost in pounds
The frequency with which a particular pipe will prove to be inad­
equate can only be found by determing the probability distribution of 
the expected water demand at outlets fed by that pipe. It seems 
reasonable to assume that for pipes serving many outlets this distribu­
tion will be normal in character. As a consequence the probability of 
the pipe being inadequate if the maximum discharge it can carry is X 
is given by
or drainage system. For this design exercise let it be assumed that 
the cold water supply network is being designed in which case either 
copper or polythene pipes can be used'. The design procedure will be
E >  0.1 + 0.045 x d -  8.21
and for polythene pipes
E = 0.42 +0.01925 x d -  8.22
OO
P^ - P(demand > X) = (z-y)2/2a2
i /2irxcr X
Unfortunately this normal distribution function cannot easily be 
inverted, which is a requirement of the cost benefit analysis, consequently
m e  xogic runction must be used to approximate to this normal 
function.
Pf
- In y-r- = a + 8 X d - 8.24
f
This equation will plot as a straight line on normal probability 
paper, illustrating its use as an approximation to the normal function, 
Equation 8.24 can be written as
1 Pf
d = - j  (In -pp- - a) - 8.25
Combining equations 8.21 and 8.25, the capital cost function 
for copper pipes is given by
E =  0.01 + 0.045 j  (In -pj- - a) J  -8.26
a and 8 are best evaluated by plotting d as a function of logit p 
on normal probability paper and then graphically determining the best 
estimates, a and b, of a and 8.
8.6.2 The failure cost function. When illustrating the use of
the failure cost consistency criterion for pipe sizing in section 8.4.2
the resulting failure rating referred to a particular outlet. In this
cost benefit approach the failure rating, P^, must relate to an actual 
pipe. If is the failure rating for the pipe during the peak daily one
hour usage period then the expected duration of failure on any day will
be given by
P *='■ '1.33 x p x 60 minutes per day - 8.27
The factor 1.33 accounts for the assumption that only three quarters of 
the daily failures1 occur during the peak hourly usage period.
. Now consider the consequences of one minutes failure. The criterion 
for costing the consequences of a pipe being undersized is similar to 
the criterion used to cost outlet failure in section 8.4.1. The average 
cost of failure is represented by the following,
I = E x y x d x m - 8.28
The application of the logit function as an approximation to the 
normal distribution function is described in more detail in section 
9.6.3.
where E is the average value of an outlet users time.
y is the nature of failure factor measuring uncostable effects
not covered by E. 
d is the average flow deficiency of each outlet, as described in 
section 8.2.2.
m is the number of outlets affected by undersizing of the pipe.
The expected daily losses is found by combining equation 8.2? 
and equation 8.28, i.e.
Lp = E x y x d x m x Pf x 60 x 1.33 - 8.29
The total losses during the design life of the pipe are given by
L - W x D x E x y x d x m x p x 60 x 1.33 
nr J f
- 80 x W x D x E x y x d x m x p - 8.30
nr J f
where 'W* is the annual number of days the building is occupied
and D is the relevant discount factor taken from Table A.8. 
nr
8.6.3 The total cost function. The total life cycle cost equation 
for a copper pipe is found by the addition of equation 8.26 and equation 
8.30, i.e.
C « 0.1 + 0.045 - I n  P f v8 1-Pf “ •
+ 80 x W x D
nr
x E x y x d x m x p f -8.31
The optimum P^ value is determined by equating the first differential 
of equation 8.31 to zero i.e.
p J ___________0.045_________________ 1 — 8 32
f opt L 8  x 80 x W x Dnr x E x y x d x m j
Now factors E and y depend upon the type of building. Table 8.4 
attempts to estimate relative values for these two factors for a variety 
of types of buildings. Factors, d, m and K depend on the position of 
the pipe under design. Once the design failure rating has been established 
then the loading unit method can be used to size the pipe, alternatively
design charts or tables might "be available enabling the required pipe 
size to be directly found.
8.7 Conclusions
In this chapter a method, based upon the reservoir sizing technique 
used in hydrology, has been described for determining the probability dis­
tribution of the required water storage capacity. This distribution function 
was shown to depend upon the supply rate from the local authority mains, 
in the case of the cold water system, or upon the heat calorifier 
recovery rate in the case of the hot water system. Both the failure 
cost consistency criterion and the cost benefit technique were shown 
to be rational methods for choosing the design failure ratings for the 
hot and cold water cisterns.
The cold water tank sizing problem was also considered from the 
view point of providing a supply of water when there is an interruption 
in the mains supply. Using the failure cost consistency criterion, and 
the water consumption data for small private dwellings, It was concluded 
that the present recommendation for a fifty gallon tank in such dwellings 
is only adequate if the hot water cylinder storage is considered as a 
part of the reserve.
Supply and drainage pipe sizing charts and tables were indicated to have 
been probabilistically orientated for many years. However these design 
charts are based upon a single failure rating, consequently no provision 
is made for the designer to increase or decrease the desired failure 
rating. Once again the failure cost consistency and cost benefit 
techniques were shown to offer a possible solution to the problem of 
determining acceptable failure ratings for each individual pipe in a 
network. Unfortunately such design procedures necessitate an extension 
of current design tables and charts to include the variability of 
acceptable failure ratings.
Because the pipe sizing problem has been investigated probabilistic­
ally by a number of research workers, each of whom have suggested an 
acceptable failure rating, it was possible in this chapter to consider
the validity of using the failure cost consistency criterion as an aid 
in making subsystem failure decisions. In fact using a simple example 
the failure rating based upon the failure cost consistency criterion 
was shown to be of the same order of magnitude as the subjective values 
currently used, and found to be adequate in practice.
CHAPTER NINE 
THE THERMAL ENVIRONMENT
9.1 Introduction
9.1.1 The importance of the thermal environment. One of the 
fundamental purposes of a building is to protect the occupants from 
adverse climatic conditions, in effect the building must act as a 
climatic modifier. For this reason the provision of an acceptable 
thermal environment is, and always has been, an important priority 
in building design. As our expectations of living and working con­
ditions have increased, especially in the last thirty years, there 
has been a general rise in the desired internal temperature in 
winter, and even more recently a marked growth in the use of air 
conditioning to control internal temperatures in summer. This has 
resulted in a greater proportion of the total cost of the building 
being used for the thermal hardware, consequently it is important
to ensure that there is no over provision of plant. It is feasible to 
use the failure cost consistency criterion as an aid in making thermal 
plant failure rating decisions, and this will be considered in greater 
detail in a subsequent section.
An artificial internal environment needs to be provided because 
of adverse climatic conditions. The elements of the climate which can 
influence the thermal load on a building will now be considered.
9.1.2 Site climate. Every city, town or even district of a town 
will have its own climate which is slightly different from the 
macroclimate of the region. The factors which may cause local deviations 
from the climate of the region are as follows;
a) Topography, i.e. slope, orientatiop, exposure, elevation, 
hills etc.
b) Ground surface - whether natural or man made, its reflectance, 
permeability and soil temperature. All these factors will 
affect vegetation and thus in turn affect the climate.
c) Three dimensional objects; such as trees, fencqs, walls and 
buildings. These may influence air movement, or may cast shadows.
Man made environments can create major modifications in the regional 
climate. The factors which cause the urban climate are as follows,
a) Changed surface qualities, increased absorbance of solar , 
radiation, reduced evaporation etc.
b) Buildings which can cast shadows, and/or act as barriers to 
wind. A number of tall buildings can act as wind channels.
c) Energy seepage through walls of heated buildings, or as output 
of electrical appliances, industrial processes or internal 
combustion engines.
d) Atmospheric pollution - waste products which tend to reduce 
solar radiation but increase diffuse radiation.
9.1.3 Elements of the climate affecting a building. In this 
section the elements of the climate which affect the design of 
buildings will be discussed.
Temperature. The external temperature can be monitored at any 
particular time of the day and a continuous plot can be used to record 
graphically the daily temperature variations. Alternatively the 
maximum and minimum daily temperatures can be recorded and a mean daily 
temperature found as the average of these two extreme daily temperatures. 
The mean daily temperatures are usually averaged over monthly periods 
to give the monthly mean temperature. Toxindicate diurnal variations 
monthly mean maxima and mifyima temperatures are calculated and these 
are used to establish the monthly mean daily range of temperature.
It is common practice in meteorological records to also indicate the 
highest and lowest temperatures ever recorded for each month.
Humidity.The humidity of air can be described as "absolute humidity" 
(AM), i.e. the amount of moisture actually present in unit mass or unit 
volume of air, or alternatively as "relative humidity" (RM), which is a 
much more useful index of evaporational potential. Relative humidity 
is the ratio of the actual amount of moisture present to the amount of 
moisture the air could hold at that temperature, expressed as a percent­
age. (The saturation-point humidity depends upon the temperature). 
Humidity is usually measured with a wet and dry bulb hygrometer.
Sunshine. The duration of sunshine is very important to the 
designer because this will allow average amounts of solar radiation to 
be determined for each month of the year. However solar intensities 
will change significantly with the time of day and the designer must be 
aware of the diurnal variations in solar radiation. Unfortunately hourly 
solar intensities for a variety of orientations are rarely published by 
meteorological observatories.
Wind. The wind velocity will affect the surface temperature of the 
building, consequently it is important to correct anticipated temperat­
ures using an exposure factor.
Other climatic elements which are relevant to the building designer 
are the "driving rain index" for the location of the building, and the 
sky condition characteristics for the site. The latter factor will 
indicate any significant daily variation in the expected chance of sun­
shine, which might affect the design of roofs and shading devices.
In conclusion it may be said that the designer is interested in 
those aspects of the climate which will affect human comfort or the 
requirements needed to provide human comfort in a building. They include 
average temperatures, diurnal variations in temperature, extreme temp­
eratures, humidity, sky conditions, radiation intensity, rainfall, air 
movements, and any special features such as trade winds, thunderstorms 
or hurricanes.
Climatic records are not primarily published for building designers 
and therefore frequently omit certain aspects of interest to the designer.
In this chapter it is intended to outline the thermal meteorological 
information which is required for the rational design of the heating 
and cooling plant in buildings.
9.1.4 Factors affecting thermal comfort. The occupants of a
building judge the quality of the design from a personal point of view.
The thermal environment can affect both a person's physical and emotional
state of well-being, and thus it is important to attempt to provide a
satisfactory internal climate at all times. The interest in establishing
thermal comfort criteria dates back more than a century in Europe, and
during this time many scales have been derived to measure human comfort.
Unfortunately human response to the thermal environment does not depend
upon air temperature alone. It has been established beyond doubt that
air temperature, humidity, radiation and air movement all produce
thermal comfort effects, and must be considered simultaneously if human
responses are to be accurately predicted. The first attempt at a thermal
(91)comfort scale was due to Houghton and Yaglou who produced psychrometnc 
charts onto which they superimposed equal comfort lines based on an 
Effective Temperature Scale. This scale combines the comfort effects 
of air temperature, humidity and air movement. Subsequent research showed 
that this comfort scale had limitations since it did not consider radi­
ation. However using a simple modification the psychrometric charts 
were corrected to take account of the thermal effect of radiation, and 
the new comfort scale was called the Corrected Effective Temperature 
(C.E.T). This scale is currently the most widely used thermal comfort
index. However many other scales have since been developed such as Bedfords
. (92) .
Equivalent Warmth Scale , the Operative Temperature Scale developed
(93)by Winslow et al. m  the U.S.A. , the Equatorial Comfort Index 
(94)developed by Webb , and the Resultant Temperature developed by
. . (95)
Missenard m  France . For a comprehensive discussion of these various
comfort scales, and the use of the C.E.T. charts the reader is referred
to Koenigsberger et a l . ^ \
* -
The IHVE Design Manual, which is most commonly used by service 
engineers, employs the Environmental Temperature scale to model thermal 
comfort. The environmental temperature is approximately given by ;
where
t is the mean radiant temperature of all the surfaces.
’' t is the air temperature.
This is a very simple comfort scale since it only considers the 
effects of the air temperature and radiation, ignoring humidity and air 
movement. However relative humidity has very little effect on the 
subjective feeling of comfort of sedentary persons providing it lies 
within the range 40% - 70%. For the climate prevailing in the U.K. 
it is not a difficult task to meet this comfort criterion. A discussion 
of the use of the environmental temperature to model thermal comfort 
is found in Humphreys .
Each individual will have a different opinion of what constitutes 
a satisfactory thermal environment. The conditions resulting in a 
comfortable thermal environment will depend upon the following factors;
a) The activity of the occupants.
b) The amount of clothing worn, (although it is feasible to 
adjust clothing according to the climatic conditions).
c) The age of the individual.
d) The sex of the individual.
The subjective and personal nature of thermal comfort in addition
to the many factors which can affect the comfort standards of individuals
means that comfort zones, rather than single temperature values are more 
useful for design purposes. The range of conditions within which at least 
eighty percent of the occupants feel comfortable is termed the "comfort 
zone", and is superimposed on C.E.T. nomograms or design charts enabling 
any thermal design to be checked. In recent years Humphreys has attemp­
ted to derive simple methods for predicting thermal comfort zones for 
offices and schools .
9.2 Heat Exchange in Buildings
9.2.1 Introduction. Before discussing probabilistically orienta­
ted thermal design methods it is necessary to consider current methods 
of thermally analysing a building.
A building can be considered as a single body, and its heat 
exchange processes with the external environment can be examined (see 
Figure 9.1). The heat transfer analysis of a building cannot simply 
be based upon the internal and external air temperatures, because the 
rate of heat flow is affected by the radiant temperature as well as the 
air temperature. For example in summer the outside surface temperature 
can rise many degrees above the air temperature because of solar radia­
tion. Similarly the inside surface temperature of a wall may be at a 
different temperature to the internal air temperature. To take account 
of this radiation effect it is necessary to use the sol-air temperature, 
t^ , to represent the external conditions, and the environmental temper­
ature, t^ , to represent internal conditions in the thermal analysis.
As already discussed the environmental temperature is also better than 
air temperature as an index of thermal comfort.
9.2.2 Thermal conduction. Conduction of heat may occur through 
the walls either inwards or outwards, the rate of conduction will be 
denoted by Q^. The conduction heat flow rate through a wall of a given 
area can be described by the following equation;
Qf = A x u x At - 9.2
where Qf is the conduction heat flow rate W
. 2A is the surface area m
2
u is the transmittance value W/m deg.C
At is the temperature difference across
the external wall deg.C
For an area enclosed by various elements, and possibly having 
temperature variations on each side, equation 9.2 should be solved for 
each element and the results summed. In winter when heat losses will
Figure 9.1 Heat Exchange in Buildings
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occur
At = t - t 
ej e,
and in summer when the building gains heat
At = t - t
eo ®1
where, t is the design external sol-air temperature
o
9.2.3 Thermal convection. Convection heat flows depend upon 
the rate of ventilation, i.e. air exchange rate. This may be unintentional 
air infiltration or deliberate ventilation. The rate of ventilation heat 
flow is given by
only necessary to multiply this by the area of the surface to determine 
the heat flow rate. This would be the heat flow rate through an 
unglazed surface, however for glazed surfaces this value must be reduced 
by a vsolar gain factor1, which depends upon the type of glass. The 
solar heat flow equation is therefore given by
= 1300 x V x At -9.3
where is the ventilation heat flow rate W
1300 is the volumetric specific heat of air J/m^ deg.C
. . 3V is the natural ventilation rate m /s
At is the temperature difference,
t - t 
1 ej e,
deg.C
9.2.4 Radiation through windows. If the intensity of solar 
radiation, I, incident on the plane of the window is known then it is
Q,s
- 9.4
I is the radiation heat flow density W/ni
S is the solar gain factor of window 
glass
2
9.2.5 Internal heat: gain. Table 9.1 indicates the average heat 
output rate of the human body while undertaking certain tasks. This 
will be a heat gain for the building.
Qh “ Pop x W - 9. 5
where Pop is the estimated population of the building
W is the average heat output per person for the relevant 
activity, (taken from Table 9.1).
Activity Watts
Sleeping min 70
Sitting, moderate movement 130 -  170
Standing, light work 160 - 190
Sitting, heavy arm and leg movements 190 - 230
Standing moderate work, some walking 220 - 290
Walking, moderate lifting 290 - 410
Intermittent heavy lifting 440 - 580
Hardest sustained work 580 - 700
Maximum heavy work for 30 min. duration max 1100
Table 9.1 Rates of excess heat output of the body for various 
activities (Taken from Koenigsberger et al.^*^)
Electric lights also emit a significant amount of heat arid this must 
be taken into consideration. The proportion of the input energy to the 
lights which gives a useful heat output to the room will depend on the 
type of light fitting (Tungsten or fluorescent) and also the type of 
mounting (recessed or surface lighting). Tables provided in the IHVE 
M a n u a l a l l o w  the heat imput from lights to be determined. In 
general the heat imput to the room, is given by the following;
Ql = Z x w' - 9.6
where w'is the total wattage of all the lights
Z is a proportional factor, the value of which depends upon 
the type of light and fitting.
If electric motors and machines are being used in the space being 
thermally analysed then it is necessary to take into consideration the 
heat emitted when these machines are in use.
9.2.6 Artificial heating and cooling. The heat flow provided by 
mechanical means is deliberately controlled to preserve a comfortable 
environment within the building at all times, this aspect of heat flow 
is denoted by Q^.
9*2.7 Thermal balance. The total heat balance equation can be 
written as follows;
± Q. ± Q ± Q + Q. + Qt ± Q = S - 9.7r v s h L m
If-,’S' is positive the temperature in the building will be rising. 
The artificial heating or/and cooling plant is designed so that can 
be adjusted to balance equation 9.7 at a comfortable internal temperature
9.2.8 Heat loss calculations. For winter conditions equation 9.7 
can be rewritten as follows;
Qh + QL - Qf - Qv + Q* = s - 9-8
When sizing the heating plant for a building the value of is 
found which will balance equation 9.8, with S equal to zero, for a 
predefined comfortable internal temperature and a specific design 
external temperature. Current design manuals suggest the use of the 
external temperature which is exceeded for ninety percent of the time 
during the winter period. If this criterion for design is adopted then 
the heating capacity, Q^, will be insufficient for ten percent of the 
time. However in current design guides it is presumed that the thermal 
capacity of the building will cope with short cold spells.
9.2.9 Heat gain calculations. In summer it is often necessary 
to provide artificial cooling in buildings when natural ventilation is 
unable to cope with the internal heat gains. For design purposes a spec­
ific external temperature and solar radiation intensity must be defined. 
These are frequently the values which are not exceeded for ninety percent 
of the time. For air conditioning design equation 9.7 is rewritten as 
follows; ■'»
QT + Q* + Q ± Qf 1 Q,7 = Q_ - 9.9L n s £ v m i •cooling
The direction of heat flow due to conduction and convection will 
depend on whether the external sol-air temperature is higher or lower 
than the internal environmental temperature.
9.2.10 Periodic heat flow. The heating and cooling load procedures 
described above are based on the thermal balance equation (equation 9.7). 
This analysis is only valid if, and only if, both external and internal 
temperatures are constant, that is ’steady state* conditions prevail. 
However building structures are normally subjected to intermittent heat 
gains from the artificial lighting, occupancy, and electrical equipment, 
and to cyclic heat gains due to diurnal solar radiation variations and 
due to the diurnal external temperature variations.
In winter solar heat gains are usually presumed to be negligible 
and in general daily swings in temperature are also assumed negligible. 
For this reason steady state calculations are normally used for calcu­
lating heat requirements for continuously heated buildings. However an 
empirical allowance is usually included to account for intermittent 
heating. '
In summer the daily variations in solar heat gain, artificial 
lighting load etc. can cause excessive internal temperature swings.
To ensure these temperature swings do not occur inside the building the 
mean to peak heat gains, Qfc, must be calculated and taken into consider­
ation when sizing air-conditioning plant.
The admittance procedure for calculating internal temperature 
swings from the variation in heat imput was derived by Lcudon^^^, and
was incorporated in the last revision of the IHVE Design Manual .
The daily swing in heat imput is related to the mean to peak temperature 
swing as follows;
6 = (I A x Y + 1300 XV) x t. -9.10
t l *
where is the total swing in heat imput W
^ A x Y is equal to A-j x Y^ + A^ x etc. W/deg.C
Y. is the admittance value of surface i
i
A. is the area of surface i 
1
t^ is the mean to peak swing in internal
temperature deg.C
The admittance of a surface is a measure of its ability to smooth 
out temperature variations. Admittance values for various structural 
elements have been tabulated by Loudon^^^ . The variation in heat 
imput Qt is the sum of variations due to solar radiation, outside air
temperature and casual gains. The solar heat gains are usually pre­
dominant, and thus in order to determine the mean-to-peak temperature 
swing it is usual to presume that the peak internal temperature occurs 
when the solar radiation is at its peak value. The time of peak solar 
intensity will depend upon the orientation of the room or building.
Because of the thermal storage capacity of the cladding and other structural
elements a time lag <{> exists between the time of peak solar radiation and
the time of peak internal temperatures. For lightweight cladding no
allowance for a time lag is required, however for heavyweight construc­
tions <j> is approximately two hours. The swing in effective heat gain
due to solar radiation is given by the following expression;
Q = S x A x (I - V )  - 9.11
s a g p
where S is the alternating solar gain factor
a . . 2
I is the peak intensity of solar radiation W/m
P # 2
I* is the mean intensity of solar radiation W/m
2A is the glazed surface area m
8
Swings in structural heat flow are also dictated by a time lag,^' 
for the structure. The contribution made by Q to the total peak cooling
S ' -
load will depend upon the time of the peak external air temperature 
compared with the time of the peak daily solar radiation, and the time 
lag,<J>f, for the particular type of construction being considered. The 
diurnal swing in effective heat gain through the structure is given 
by the following expression;
Qf = f x A x u x (t - tf ) - 9.12
eo eo
where f is the decrement factor dependent on the thickness of the wall
t is the sol-air temperature at the assumed time of peak heat
eo
gains, less the time lag 4>f 
t^ is the mean sol-air temperature.
The amount by which the casual gains at the time of peak cooling 
loads exceeds the mean casual gains can only be found by examining 
the proposed use of the building
Qc = % - %  -9.13
where is equal to the total casual heat gains at the assumed
time of peak heat gains
is equal to the mean daily casual heat gains.
There will also be a convective heat gain in excess of the daily 
mean value at the time of peak loading because of the swing in external 
air temperature above the mean daily value. This heat gain is described 
by the following,
Q* = (I V  V  cv) X ;ao -9.14
where £ A x u is the sum of the product of the exposed 
8 S
glazed areas and the appropriate 'u* values W/deg.C
t is the swing in external temperature deg.C
The total swing in head gains is given by
The magnitude of the mean to peak temperature swing is determined 
using equation 9.10 and equation 9.15. The peak internal environmental 
temperature is then determined by adding the mean to peak temperature 
swing to the mean temperature determined using the fsteady state1 , 
analysis.
In this section the theoretical analysis of the thermal response 
of buildings which is currently in common use in the U.K. has been 
described. This analysis is the basis of the procedure currently used 
to determine the heating and cooling plant requirements for buildings.
In later sections of this chapter the probabilistic factors inherent in 
this thermal analysis will be examined in greater detail, and methods 
proposed to incorporate these probabilistic factors in a rational manner,
9.3 Thermal Inadequacy
9.3.1 Symptoms. In an earlier section it was stated that thermal 
comfort depends upon four factors; these are the air temperature, the 
humidity, the air movement and the radiation effects. Although the 
environmental temperature is independent of humidity and air velocity 
this is the scale currently adopted in the IHVE thermal design procedure. 
(Neglecting humidity and air velocity does not prove serious in the U.K.) 
Consequently the symptom of thermal inadequacy considered here is the 
occurrence of an environmental temperature outside the comfort range.
For sedentary occupations, as is usual in offices, the minimum acceptable 
environmental temperature in winter is taken to be twenty degrees C., 
and the maximum acceptable environmental temperature in summer is assumed 
to be twenty-two degrees C. These values are taken from the IHVE design 
manual(100).
9.3.2 The causes of thermal inadequacy. During either the summer 
or the winter, inadequate thermal conditions, i.e. an uncomfortable
internal environmental temperature, occurs because the total heat gain
\
(loss) exceeds the value presumed for design purposes. According to the 
thermal balance equation (equation 9.7) heat flow is caused by the
following factors;
* ’ '
a) Conductance - this heat flow is steady state in nature during 
the winter, however the daily mean to peak heat flow must be 
considered for air-conditioning design
b) Convection - this heat flow can be assumed steady state in
nature for heating and air-conditioning design
c) Radiation - heat flow caused by solar radiation need only.be 
considered for air-conditioning design
d) Casual heat gains - these heat gains must be considered for the 
design of both heating and air-conditioning plant.
The probabilistic aspect of each one of these heat flow factors will 
be considered in turn. Furthermore it is convenient to deal separately 
with the problem of winter heating and summer cooling.
9.4 Winter. Heating - The Probabilistic Implications
9.4.1 Conductive heating losses. Referring to equation 9.2 it is
seen that the steady state flow through the building fabric depends upon
the design external air temperature (it is not necessary to use the
sol-air temperature because zero solar radiation is assumed for heating
plant design). If the design external temperature is exceeded then the
actual heat losses, Q_ , will exceed the heat losses assumed for design
a .
purposes. If the plant is designed for zero overload then the IHVE Guide 
suggests that in the U.K. -4°C be used as the design external temperature. 
However no indication is given of the probability of a lower temperature 
occurring, which, in fact, depends upon the geographical location and the 
site conditions. Unless the building is of a particularly low thermal 
capacity a heating unit having an output equal to the mean twenty-four 
hour net heat loss rate is suitable providing the plant is designed to 
be in continuous use. As a consequence the heat plant design can be 
based upon steady state losses using the mean daily external air tempera­
ture. Figure 9. 2 illustrates the cumulative distribution of daily 
mean temperatures in London during a ten year period. The data for this 
distribution has been taken from Shellard^*^^. This cumulative dis­
tribution function approximates to a normal distribution function. 
Consequently the variation of daily mean air temperature is totally
characterised by the mean, y , and standard deviation, a. , of
cao # o
the distribution function. The probabilistic design procedure proposed
requires that y and a be known for the site of the building being 
ao ao
designed. This information is most accurately obtained by consulting
the nearest weather station. However various site factors such as the
ground topology, and the proximity of other buildings must be taken into
consideration when estimating the site climate. As an alternative to
using the nearest weather station the variation of y and a around
tac ta0
the U.K. could be illustrated using maps. Figure 9.3 illustrates the
variation of y around the U.K. Unfortunately the current temperature 
0
analyses performed by the meteorological office do not allow the dis­
tribution of a around the U.K. to be readily mapped. However the 
0
daily mean temperature distribution illustrated in Figure 9.2 shows
that for London a is 6.4°C.
a0
The mean and standard deviation of the daily heat losses due to con­
duction for a specific external temperature can be determined using 
equation 9.2. That is;
yn = A x u x (t - y ) - 9.16
Qf ei ^
o
% ■ \ - [* - -.j > ]
= A x u x a
9.4.2 Convection heat losses. The required size of the heating 
plant will depend upon the convection heat losses in addition to the
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Figure 9.3 Annual Means of Daily Mean Temperature, y. , (Taken 
from Booth(103)) 30
conduction losses. Equation 9.3 shows that convection losses depend 
upon the external air temperature, hence the losses on any day, (for a 
constant internal temperature) will be probabilistic. The mean and 
standard deviation of daily convection heat losses are given by
V U  = 1300 x  V x  (t - u ) - 9.17
Qv el ao .
a = 1300 x v x a - 9.18 r
7'. ao
where y and a are the mean and standard deviation of t'hfe 
ao tao  ^ ^
daily mean air temperature respectively. Again y and a values
ao tao i
must be determined after consultation with the nearest weather station 
or from the U.K. maps which it is suggested should be provided in thermal 
design guides.
During conditions of extreme heat losses in winter it is logical to
assume small gains from solar radiation. The IHVE design manual
2
recommends that 25 W/m should be assumed as the solar radiation gains 
for glazed areas when designing the heating system. It is not necessary 
to apply probabilistic methods to the analysis of these small winter solar 
heat gains.
9.4.3 Incidental heat gains. In winter it might be assumed that 
the lights will be switched on permanently, thus, providing a deterministic 
heat gain. However the heat gain from the occupants will not be deter­
ministic. This will depend upon both the population present, and the 
metabolic rate of each person. Both these factors are probabilistic.
The metabolic rate of each individual will depend upon a variety of 
factors; clothing, state of health, colour of skin, age and sex. It is 
assumed in the IHVE m a n u a l t h a t  emissions for women and children are, 
eighty-five and seventy-five percent respectively of the male heat 
emission rates. Consequently it is proposed that metabolic rate proba­
bility distributions for various activities be determined for males , 
and a correction table used to modify the metabolic rate distribution 
for other proportions of men, women and children. Although metabolic
rate data is not available to the author, it is acceptable to assume 
that this distribution will be normal in character. The number of 
occupants is also assumed to be a normal distribution function, the 
spread of the distribution depending upon the individual building.
The designer can determine the characteristics of the distribution of
VkXM'l*VUt'IN
the total /. -rate of the building, office or room by combining 
the mean and standard deviation of the metabolic rate and population 
distributions.s
VU = y x y - 9.19
Qh m Pop
ion «? (a2 x y2 + a2 x y 2 + a2 x aT)2 )
Pop m m Pop m Pop
- 9.20
where y^ and are the mean and standard deviation of the total 
k k metabolic heat gains
V
y. and a. are the mean and standard deviation of the 
m m
' expected metabolic rate per occupant.
yp an^ apop a?e mean and standard deviation of the expected 
number of occupants.
For the derivation of equations 9.19 and 9.20 the reader is 
referred to H a u g e n ^ .
9.4.4 The total heat load distribution. The heat, Q , which must------ - --- -—  --  , -----  m
be provided to ensure the internal temperature does not fall below tfi
is given by the following;
Qm ■ <>f + “ QL - \
It has been shown that Q^, ■ Q^ - and are probabilistic variables, 
and hence the daily heat load will also be probabilistic. If Q^, 
and are normally distributed then it is a simple task to determine the 
mean and standard deviation of Q ;
Normal statistical tables, (Appendix I) can be used to determine 
the heat load associated with any prescribed failure rating, P^. This 
failure rating is the probability of the plant capacity being inadequate 
on any day. The use of the failure cost consistency technique and cost 
benefit method for determining the acceptable daily probability of the 
heating plant being insufficient will be illustrated in subsequent 
sections.
9.4.5 Comment. The annual distribution of daily mean air temper­
atures has been used in this probabilistic analysis of the heating 
problem. It is desirable that the heating system should only rarely be 
inadequate, consequently the design failure rating will be small. The 
assumption of normality can produce erroneous results in the ftailf 
section of the distribution function and thus it would be more accurate 
to use an extreme value distribution of the ten lowest annual daily mean 
temperatures as the air temperature probability distribution function.
In these circumstances it would be necessary to determine the extreme 
value function for each probabilistic element of the total heat load 
and then combine them. Acceptable failure ratings based upon either 
the failure cost consistency criterion or a cost benefit analysis would 
need to be converted to extreme value failure ratings to enable the 
desired heating plant capacity to be determined. Unfortunately the 
meteorological office does not publish the relevant data to allow the 
extreme value distributions of daily mean air temperatures to be 
readily derived. However should the designer consult the nearest weather 
station then it should be possible to obtain data relating to the extreme 
value distribution of winter daily mean air temperatures. It is sugges­
ted that the analysis of raw data to produce the relevant extreme value 
distributions of lowest annual daily mean temperatures would prove an 
extremely worthwhile research project. It might be found possible to 
consolidate the extreme value distribution functions from various sites 
around the U.K. by using similar mapping techniques to those illustrated 
previously in this section. (Figure 9.3)
9.5 Summer Cooling -The  Probabilistic Implications
The problem of plant sizing for mechanical cooling is essentially 
different from the winter heating problem, since steady flow is of 
only minor significance in summer, while periodic heat loads, primarily 
due to solar radiation, are of major importance. However it is still 
necessary to consider the steady state heat gains.
9.5.1 The mean steady state heat gains. The total daily mean heat 
gains comprise of the following;
a) mean solar heat gains
b) mean casual heat gains
and if the external temperature is above the internal temperature then
c) mean gains by conduction through building fabric and window
d) mean gains by air-to-air convection (ventilation)
Each of these heat gain elements is probabilistic in nature, and 
it is necessary to analyse each element individually if the distribution 
of total daily mean heat gain is to be determined for any space.
9.5.2 The mean splar heat gains. Referring to equation 9.4 the
mean solar heat gain, Q1 , is a function of the mean incident radiations
intensity, I1, the solar gain factor for the appropriate type of glass,
S, and the sunlit area of glazing, A .
6
Q * « S x I*x A - 9.4
s g
Mean solar radiation intensity information is available for all 
latitudes. Figure 9.4, which is reproduced from the current IHVE Guide^®^ 
presents solar intensity information for the U.K. The solar radiation 
intensities depend upon the orientation of the glazed area, and the 
season of the year. Although the total cooling load is the sum of the 
heat gains from a number of sources, the solar heat gains are usually 
predominant, and thus the design cooling load is usually determined for 
the season of maximum solar heat gains. If the windows face north then
Date Oricn- Daily
Sun Timr
taekKi mean 04 00 05 00 06-00 07-00 08-00 09-00 1000 11-00 12-00 13-00 14-00 15 00 16-00 17-00 18-00 1900 20-00
N 90 45 180 190 115 95 110 125 135 135 135 125 110 95 115 190 180 45
NE 140 75 360 510 530 460 330 175 135 135 135 125 110 95 75 55 30 5
E 190 60 340 560 680 695 630 505 335 135 135 125 n o 95 75 55 30 5
SE 185 15 140 315 475 580 625 615 545 420 260 125 n o 95 75 55 30 5
June 21 S 155 5 30 55 75 180 320 435 510 540 510 435 320 180 75 55 30 5SW 185 5 30 55 75 95 110 125 260 420 545 615 625 580 475 315 140 15
W 190 5 30 55 75 95 110 125 135 135 335 505 630 695 680 560 340 60
NW 140 5 30 55 75 95 110 125 135 135 135 175 330 460 530 510 360 75
H 330 10 95 230 385 535 660 765 830 850 830 765 660 535 385 230 95 *10
. N 75 135 155 85 90 105 120 130 135 130 120 105 90 85 155 135
. NE 125 280 465 505 435 310 150 130 135 130 120 105 90 70 45 20
E ISO 275 525 665 695 630 505 330 135 130 120 105 90 70 45 20
July 23 SE 190 120 305 480 595 645 635 565 440 280 120 105 90 70 45 20S 165 20 45 70 200 345 465 540 570 540 465 345 200 70 45 20
May 21 SW 190 20 45 70 90 105 120 280 440 565 635 645 595 480 305 120w 180 20 45 70 90- 105 120 130 135 330 505 630 695 665 525 275
NW 125 20 45 70 90 105 120 130 135 130 150 310 435 505 465 280
H 305 65 195 350 500 630 730 795 820 795 730 630 500 350 195 65
N 50 5 75 55 75 95 110 115 120 115 110 95 75 55 75 5
NE 90 15 305 405 365 240 110 115 120 115 110 95 75 55 30 0
E 150 15 370 585 660 615 495 320 120 115 110 95 75 55 30 0
August 24 
and
SE 190 10 240 460 610 685 680 615 490 325 135 95 75 55 30 0
S 185 0 30 95 250 405 530 615 640 615 530 405 250 95 30 0
April 20 SW 190 0 30 55 75 95 135 325 490 615 680 685 610 460 240 10w 150 0 30 55 75 95 110 115 120 320 495 615 660 585 370 15
NW 90 0 30 55 75 95 110 115 120 •115 110 240 365 405 305 15
H 245 0 95 240 395 530 635 700 725 700 635 530 395 240 95 0
N 30 - 30 55 70 85 95 100 95 85 70 55 30
NE 50 215 240 145 85 95 100 95 85 70 55 30
E 110 365 535 545 450 290 100 95 85 70 55 30
September 22 
and
SE 170 315 545 670 695 640 525 360 180 70 55 30
S 200 100 270 445 580 670 700 670 580 445 270 100
March 22 SW 170 30 55 70 180 360 525 640 695 670 545 315w 110 30 55 70 85 95 100 290 450 545 535 365
NW 50 30 55 70 85 95 100 95 85 145 240 215
H 165 95 230 365 470 540 560 540 470 365 230 95
N 20 0 25 45 65 70 75 70 65 45 25 0
NE 25 10 110 60 65 70 75 70 65 50 25 0
E 70 25 315 410 370 240 75 70 65 50 25 0
October 23 SE 135 20 350 545 625 600 505 360 190 50 25 0
&nd S 180 10 195 390 550 650 680 650 550 390 195 10
February 20 SW 135 0 25 50 190 360 505 600 625 545 350 20W 70 0 25 50 65 70 75 240 370 410 315 25
NW 25 0 25 50 65 70 75 70 65 60 110 10
H 95 0 90 200 300 365 385 365 300 200 90 0
N 10 5 25 40 50 55 50 40 25 5
NE 10 10 25 40 50 55 50 40 25 5
E 35 50 235 255 ISO 55 50 40 25 5
November 21 SE 95 60 335 470 490 425 305 165 40 5
and S 130 35 255 430 545 580 545 430 255 35
January 21 SW 95 5 40 165 305 425 490 470 335 60
W 35 5 25 40 50 55 180 255 235 50
NW 10 5 25 40 50 55 50 40 25 10
H 50 5 80 155 215 235 215 155 80 5
N 10 15 30 40 45 40 30 15
NE 10 15 30 40 45 40 30’ 15
F. 25 150 205 150 45 40 30 15
SE 75 225 385 425 375 270 140 30
December 22 S 105 175 360 475 515 475 360 175SW 75 30 140 270 375 425 385 225
W 25 15 30 40 45 150 205 150
NW 10 15 30 40 45 40 30 15
H 35 40 110 160 175 160 110 40
Basis for tabulated values: 1. Direct Radiation factor (sky clarity), kt — 0-95
2. Cloudiness factor 0
3. Ground Rctlectancc factor. kr =  0-2
4. Altitude --- 0 to 300 m (see Fig. A6.4 for correction factors)
Figure 9.4 Total Solar Intensities on Vertical and Horizontal Surfaces 
(W/m2) (Taken from IHVE Guide(100))
maximum daily mean solar intensities will occur in the middle of 
summer, whereas windows facing south will produce maximum solar 
intensities in March and September. When glazed areas exist on more 
than one side it is often necessary to analyse the thermal behaviour 
for a number of trial times of the year to ensure the maximum cooling 
load is known.
For any season of the year the daily mean solar radiation intensity, 
as listed in Figure 9.4 is, in reality, a probabilistic variable. It is 
proposed that means and standard deviations of daily mean radiation 
intensities should replace the deterministic values currently used for 
design purposes. If the mean and standard deviation of the expected 
daily mean solar radiation intensity are and respectively, then 
the mean and standard deviation of the expected daily mean heat gain
due to solar radiation can be found using equation 9.4,
y , = s x y , x A
s g - 9.23
crQ , = S x oIt x Ag
When glazed areas exist on more than one side then the mean and standard 
deviation of the daily mean solar heat gains during the most onerous 
season is found by combining the probability distributions for each 
glazed surface. Unfortunately solar radiation intensity data is not 
as readily available as information concerning air temperature. As a 
consequence it has not been possible to illustrate the determination of 
the mean and standard deviation of daily mean solar radiation intensities 
for any location.
9.5.3 Mean casual gains. The proposed procedure for determining
the mean and standard deviation of the expected casual gains in any
building, room or office has been described in section 9.4.3. This
procedure is independent of whether summer or winter thermal design is
being considered. However there is less likelihood of artificial light­
ing being in use during periods of peak heat gains during the summer, 
consequently there are grounds for incorporating lighting loads as a 
probabilistic variable in air-conditioning design.
9.5.4 Mean heat gains due to conduction arid convection. The mean 
summer gains (losses) due to conduction and convection are given by the 
following;
Ql + Q* = (Y (&x u) + c ) x (t* - t1 ) - 9.24
f v u v aQ ej
In summer the steady state conduction heat flows, Q^, are only
significant for materials with minimal thermal capacity, consequently
in normal buildings conduction heat flows need only be considered for
glazed and cladded areas. These heat flows are probabilistic because
tT , the daily mean outside temperature is a probabilistic variable. 
ao
Now it has been assumed that for any particular space the maximum cooling 
load will occur when the solar gains are a maximum, hence the probability 
distribution of daily mean external air temperature is required for the 
season of maximum solar radiation. Studying Figure 9.4 it is seen that in 
the U. K. , with the exception of south-facing windows, the solar radia­
tion will be at a maximum during the mid-summer period. Hence daily mean 
heat flows due to conduction and convection should, in general, be 
determined for this season of the year.
Figure 9.5, which represents the distribution of daily mean temper­
atures during mid-summer in London was derived using London Weather 
Centre i n f o r m a t i o n ^ . This temperature variable approximates to a 
normal probability distribution function, thus the distribution function
is totally described by two parameters, the mean u , and the standard deviatio
ao
a , . For any design problem the relevant value of y , and a , must
taO tao ao
be known. The most convenient way of providing this information in a
design guide is to use maps showing the variation of y . and 0 » '
tao ao .
around the U.K., and incorporate a number of correction factors to account 
for site conditions. Figures 9.6 and 9.7 illustrate the distributions of 
u . and a . around the U.K.
ta tflao ao
The mean and standard deviation of daily mean heat gains due to 
conduction and convection during the mid-summer period are given by 
the following;
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9.5.5 The probability distribution of total daily mean heat gains. 
By combining the means and standard deviations of daily mean solar gains,
gains for a particular space it is possible to determine the mean and 
standard deviations of the total daily mean heat gains for the most 
onerous season of the year, i.e.;
It is not possible to illustrate the derivation of the mean and standard
casual heat gains.
It should be stressed that Q* is only a normally distributed variable 
if the various probabilistic heat gains are normal in character , and 
are also mutually independent. In reality this second criterion will 
not be true; there will be £ correlation between the daily mean tempera­
ture and the mean solar intensity. A more realistic method is required 
to combine the effects of the daily mean solar intensity and the daily 
mean air temperature. However the simplistic assumption of independence 
of the contributing heat gains is used for the purpose of illustrating 
a general probabilistic design approach for the cooling plant.
daily casual gains, daily mean conduction gains and daily mean convection
9.27
- 9.28
deviation of the total daily mean heat gain because of a lack of inform­
ation concerning the variability of solar intensities' and also
9.5.6 Mean to peak heat gains. During any day the peak cooling load 
will occur when the effect of the peak daily solar intensity is felt 
inside the building. The time that this occurs depends upon the time lag
of the structure. In addition to mean to peak heat gains caused by a 
diuraal swing in solar radiation there will be a mean to peak air to 
air heat gain caused by the difference between the outdoor air tempera­
ture at the peak hour and the daily mean outdoor air temperature. Other 
possible reasons for an increase in the peak cooling load above the 
daily mean value are swings in casual heat gains, and the swing in 
structural heat gains. In most instances in the U.K. the latter two 
aspects may be neglected.
The peak outside air temperature usually occurs in mid-afternoon, 
and although the peak solar intensity depends on the orientation of the 
window, the proposed procedure for determining the probability distribu­
tion function of the mean to peak heat gains, Qt, will be illustrated 
assuming 15.00 hours as the time of the peak cooling load. In a design 
situation the assumed time of the daily peak heat gain will depend upon 
such factors as the type of building construction, the orientation, and 
the location. If there is any doubt concerning the time of the peak 
cooling load then the heat gains should be calculated for a number of 
times of. day.
The probability distribution function of Q , the mean to peak swing
. . .  S ' '
in effective heat gain due to solar radiation, is based upon equation 
9.11.
Q = S x A x (I - I) - 9.11
Hs a g p
where S is the alternating solar gain factor
Si
Ip is the solar radiation intensity at time 15.00—<f> in mid summer
Now both 1^ and I 1 are probabilistic variables and thus assuming 
normality, the mean and standard deviation of the distribution function 
of (Ip-IT) is found by combining the means and standard deviations of 
Ip and I 1 relevant to the space being analysed. From the point of view 
of design guides this will mean that each of the hourly solar intensity 
values of Figure 9.4 must be replaced by a mean and standard deviation 
value. Again if more than one side of the space is glazed then the
statistical parameters of Qg for each side of the space must be 
combined.
The swing in air to air heat gains is given by equation 9.14
Q = (J A x vt + 1300 x V) x t - 9.14
a g g aQ
where U is the transmittance value of exposed glazing 
8
t is the difference between the mean and peak air temperature 
o
for the season of assumed peak heat gains.
Qa is a probabilistic variable because taQ is a probabilistic 
variable. Figure 9.8 illustrates the probability distribution of half 
the diurnal temperature swings for London during summer. This variable 
is equivalent to ta^ , when, for the space being analysed, peak cooling 
loads can be assumed to occur in summer. Should any other season produce
peak cooling loads then the appropriate distribution of ta can be based
(102) ° 
on the data present in Shellard' . The variation of the mean of taQ
around the U.K. is illustrated in Figure 9.9. This map can be used to
determine u~ at any location in the U.K. A similar distribution map 
. ao . .
showing the variation of a~ around the U.K. is also d e s i r a b l e , however
ao
unfortunately the necessary analysis of raw climatic data is not under­
taken by the meteorological office. As an alternative to the use of such 
general distribution maps the designer could determine the statistical
parameters of ta directly from data provided by the nearest weather 
o
station. Using equation 9.14, and the appropriate statistical parameters 
of ta^ , the mean and standard deviation of Qa for any particular space 
could then be'determined.
The expected mean and standard deviation of the total mean to peak
swing in daily heat gains, Qt is found by combining the mean and standard
deviations of Q and Q , i.e.s a
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Figure 9.9 Average Daily Mean to Maximum Temperature Swings,
y~ , in Mid-Summer. (Based on Booth 
ao
Once again these two expressions assume that the mean to peak 
external temperature swing is independent of the mean to peak solar 
intensity variation. In reality there is no straightforward justifica­
tion for this assumption. It is used here for the purposes of simplicity, 
however refinements of this probabilistic analysis of cooling loads 
will hopefully produce a more accurate solution to this problem.
9.5.7 The total cooling load distribution. By combining the 
means and standard deviations of the total steady state heat gains and
the total daily mean to peak heat gains for the most onerous season of
the year and time of day,the mean and standard deviation of the total 
design cooling load can be determined,
yQ V  y Q  + V  - 9.31
m xt xt
and a « (a~2 + a2,)^ - 9.32
tq \  ^t
Using standard normal tables (Appendix I), u , and oQ is it
mi Tn
possible to determine the daily peak cooling load associated with 
any predefined probability of exceedence. Either the failure cost 
consistency criterion or a cost benefit analysis could be used to 
determine the acceptable probability of exceedence.
9.5.8 Disoussion. In this section an attempt has been made to show 
in very general terms how variable factors may be probabilistically 
incorporated in the design of air-conditioning systems. There are 
several aspects of the present air-conditioning design procedure which 
have not been considered here, such as the effect of sky clarity, 
height and ground reflectance on solar intensities, the correction 
factor used to convert twenty-four hour loads to twelve hour loads, the 
allowable swing in controlled air temperature,and finally the use of 
diversity factors when the plant serves buildings or offices with non­
coincidence of peak load times. However it is hoped that the procedure proposed 
here might provide the framework for an air-conditioning design procedure
and associated climatic tables which will model the probabilistic 
variables more accurately.
9.6 Heatiiig Plant Sizing - a  Systematic Approach
9.6.1 The Cost of thermal inadequacy. Thermal inadequacy in winter 
has been defined to occur when the internal environmental temperature 
drops below the lowest acceptable temperature of the occupants. In an 
earlier section twenty degrees centigrade was assessed to be the limit 
state of comfort for offices. Minimum comfort temperatures for other 
types of buildings are reproduced from the IHVE design manual in Table 
9.2.
SPACE
ENVIRONMENTAL
TEMPERATURE
°C
DOMESTIC
Living rooms 21
Bedrooms 18
Kitchens 19
OFFICES 20
SHOPS 18
CLASSROOMS 18
FACTORIES
Sedentary 19
Light 16
Heavy 13
HOSPITAL WARDS 18
Table 9.2 Recommended standards of air temperature. (Taken from 
IHVE Guide(100))
The criterion for costing thermal inadequacy in winter is to 
assume that should the temperature drop below twenty degrees C, the 
efficiency of the occupants will be adversely affected, or in the case 
of a shop the turn over might be adversely affected. For every type of 
building the consequences of a lower than comfortable temperature can be 
monetarily assessed.
Considering an office building, the actual financial losses assoc­
iated with a lower than acceptable internal temperature depend on the 
following factors;
a) The number of occupants, m
b) The value of each individual to the employer, E
c) The duration of the failure state, L
d) The inefficiency caused by the fall in temperature, a
An inconvenience factor is not included because inconvenience is 
the reason for the reduced efficiency of the employees, which is 
quantified by a.
In general the cost of inadequacy of the heating system is presumed 
to be given by the following;
I = E x a x L x m -9.33
The inefficiency factor will increase as the temperature falls, 
however it is suggested that this relationshipis not linear, for example 
the effect of a one degree fall in temperature below the limit state will 
be less than 0.2 of a five degree fall. A subjective scale for a is 
proposed in Table 9.3.
Drop in temperature 
below comfort level
fit °C 
el
Inefficiency Factor 
" a
1 0.05
2 0.1
■ 3 ■' 0.2
4 0.3
5 0.5
6 0.75
7 1.0
Table 9.3 Proposed inefficiency scale.
It is proposed that Table 9.3 should be used to determine the 
inefficiency associated with the average reduction in internal temperature, 
6te , when inadequacy of the heating system occurs. Consider now how 
6 might be determined. Once the heating plant is working to full
e i
capacity then the total heat gams are constant. Should the external 
temperature drop below the design temperature then to bring about thermal 
equilibrium the internal temperature must eventually fall by approximately 
the same amount, although a time lag might be involved. Hence 6te  ^ is 
given by
6tei “ fita0 c *30 W esi8"> - ^  " 9-34
where ta” is the average failure external temperature
ta (design) is the design external temperature, 
o
In section 4.3.2 it was shown that if the failure rating is small then 
for a normal distribution function the average degree of failure is 
approximately constant. Both these criterion are satisfied in this 
instance, consequently St^, (and hence 6te ) can be determined directly
from the distribution of external air temperatures relevant.to the 
site being developed. Table 9.3 can then be used to determine the 
appropriate inefficiency factor. The remaining factors of equation 
9.33 must then be estimated for the proposed building. In winter the 
internal conditions are governed by steady state heat flows rather 
than periodic gains or losses, hence the duration of failure might be 
assumed to be two or three hours.
9.6.2 Plant sizing based upon failure cost consistency. As an 
example consider the office shown in Figure 9.10. It is assumed that 
the heat which must be supplied to this office on any day is normally 
distributed with mean 10,000 W and standard deviation 4,000 watts. (A 
method for determining the mean and standard deviation of the expected 
daily mean heat load was proposed in section 9.4). Assuming this office 
to be situated in London, then using Figure 9.2, 6te  ^ is found to be 
1.6°C, for small failure ratings. Interpolation of the inefficiency 
scale (Table 9.3) suggests that if 6tej equals 1.6°C then a equals 0.075. 
Now it might be reasonably assumed for this particular office that m is 
ten persons, L is two hours and E is*five pounds per hour.Thus using 
equation 9.33
I = 0.075 x 10 x 5 x 2 
= 7.5 pounds.
Using the failure cost consistency equation, and assuming a conser­
vatism coefficient equal to unity the acceptable failure rating is 
given by
P = - ____ — 19____
f 16 x 7.5 *365
>  0.000228
Using the normal statistical table, (Appendix I), the desired capacity 
of the heat plant for this office is
(^(design) = 10000 + 3.5 x 4000
= 24,000 watts.
c z t = Q = o = a
15 m
**1
t-n n
/
PQ==€ZI==Q==Ot==Q==^^
Figure 9.10 A Hypothetical Office Housing Ten Employees
A heating system which provides heat at the rate of 24 KW will 
be inadequate on one day in every 4380 days (12 years). This design 
procedure is illustrated as a flow chart in Figure 9.11.
The inaccuracy of assuming normality of the expected daily heating 
load distribution is most apparent for small failure rating values.
This example has shown that the financial consequences of underheating 
are sufficient to warrant a very small failure rating, consequently it 
would be beneficial to derive the extreme value distribution of the 
lowest annual temperatures and use that as a basis for the heating load 
distribution rather than the annual probability distribution of the 
daily mean temperatures.
9.6.3 Plant sizing based upon a cost benefit analysis. In this 
section a possible cost benefit approach to the design of the heating 
system will be outlined.
The total cost of a heating system is represented by the
following;
C = E + E_ + En + L - 9.35
C R D
where Ec is the capital cost
E is the total expected running costs (fuel)
Eg is the capital cost of the distribution system
L is the total expected losses due to an inadequate heating
capacity.
The optimal daily probability of inadequacy, P^  , is determined 
by equating the first differential of the total cost equation to 
zero, i.e.;
dE dE_ dE_ ,T
+ %■ = 0  - 9.36dP^  dP^  dPf dP^  dP_j-
The relationship between P^  and each component of the total cost 
equation will now be considered in more detail.
The capital cost of the heating system will be dependent upon the 
required capacity of the plant which, because of the daily variability
^  Value of 
tine for 
each occupant
Expected 
duration of 
failure, L
^Expected 
number of 
occupants 
affected by 
failure M
Normal
Statistical
Tables
Use Importance Equation (Eq. 
9.33) to find the cost 
consequence of failure,*!*
Use Distribution of daily 
mean external temperature 
to determine fit ,
Invert N to give Acceptable 
Daily Probability of Failure
Use Failure Cost Consistency 
Equation to determine Acceptable 
Return Period of Inadequacy, N
Use Distribution of Expected 
Daily Mean Heat Loss to determine 
the Design Rate of Heat Loss,
Design heat plant to supply 
heat at the rate of Q , watts
Figure 9.11 Flow Chart illustrating the Failure Cost Consistency 
Procedure for Sizing Heating Plant
of expected heat losses, will in turn be dependent upon the acceptable 
daily probability of inadequacy, P^. In addition the capital cost of 
the heating plant and the distribution system will also depend upon the 
heating method being adopted, i.e. warm air■, hot water radiation, heated 
ceiling or floors etc., and also on the fuel being used i.e. electricity, 
gas, or oil. However for simplicity these two factors will be ignored 
in this discussion. Figure 9.12 represents the relationship between
capital cost and boiler size based on the cost information provided in
(3.6) -
Spons Building Price List Algebraically the heating plant mstall-
i
ation cost, as illustrated in Figure 9.12 is given by the following 
expression; |
Ec >  0.00025 # Qjj - 1.4375 x + 13821 pounds - 9.37 
where is the heating plant capacity.
(Figure 9.12 and equation 9.37 are only legitimate for boiler capacities 
in the range 200 —  3000 KW hour. 'J
The daily heating load, C^, is a normally distributed variable (section 
9.4.4), however the normal distribution function cannot be algebraically 
differentiated, consequently the daily heating load must be represented 
by a function which approximates to the normal curve yet can be alge­
braically inverted. In chapter eight a parabolic function was used to 
represent a normally distributed variable. The logistic growth curve 
is a more accurate approximation to the normal distribution curve.
The integrated normal and logistic curves agree closely over the whole 
range, only . at the ends of the range where the probability of a 
response is either small or near to unity,, does the normal curve approach 
its limits slightly more rapidly than does the logistic curve. The general 
algebraic form of the logistic curve is as follows;
£  ■“ , . -(«+Px) -9.38
r 1 + e
or logit p ■ a + 8x
where logit p s= in (_IL.)
- 9.39
Boiler Capacity, Q , 
ma
KW/Hour2000
E -0.0025 x Q ' -1 .4375 :x 
c ma
+ 13821
1000
20,000 30,00010000
Installation Cost, E , £
c
Figure 9.12 Boiler Capacity.as a Function of Installation Cost, 
(pased on Spons Price List^^^^)
A plot of logit p against x gives a straight line on normal 
probability paper, consequently the easiest way of estimating a + 8 is 
by plotting the data and graphically finding a and b, the estimated 
values of a and 8. For a more thorough description of the logistic 
transformation function the reader is referred to Ashton^*^.
Using equation 9.39 the function relating the net heat loss, Q^, 
and the heating plant failure rating, P^, can be written as
V- ln T^- = « + e x Qm
Referring to equation 9.36 it is seen that to enable the optimum 
P^ value to be found it is necessary to determine dE^/dP^. Now
dE dE dQ
 JL = __— x - 9 41dpf dV dPf
Using equation 9.37 
dE
— = 0.005Q -1.4375 -9.42
dQ mm
and using equation 9.40
. _ I  L - 1— 1 - 9 43 '
dPf b lPf<'-pf>J
Combining equations 9.40, 9.41, 9.42 and 9.43
dE r i Pf -1
jp5- = { |o.005( - £  U n - a}) | - 1.4375} x
{ ' b [p (1-P ) ] 1 “ 9.44
If it can be assumed that the efficiency of a particular type of 
boiler is independent of its size then the fuel cost component can be
ignored. However if there is a relation between fuel use efficiency 
and the plant capacity failure rating then the optimising procedure 
requires that dE/dP. be determined. The size, and hence cost of the
R I
heat distribution system may also depend upon the boiler size, and once 
again for a strict consideration of total costs the effects Of the 
failure rating on the distribution costs must be considered.
The expected losses due to inadequacy of the heating plant are 
based upon the cost of failure (equation 9.33). If the plant can be 
assumed to have a design life of thirty years and a net discount rate 
of four percent then the total expected losses are given by
L = W x I x pf x 17.2 - 9.45
and
dL
dPf - W x I x 17.2 - 9.46
where W is the annual number of days the building is in use.
Once the first differential of each of the cost components has 
been found then the optimal failure rating can be found using equation 
9.36.
9.7 Air-Conditioning Plant Sizing ~ A Systematic Approach.
9.7.1 The cost consequences of inadequacy. The cost consequence 
of undersizing of the air-conditioning plant can be assumed to be 
represented by equation 9.33. However since excessive temperatures 
are likely to be caused by periodic thermal effects, rather than steady 
state effects, the expected duration of failure for any building or 
space will be less in the case of air-conditioning than in the case of 
heating.
The inefficiency scale for air-conditioning can only be accurately 
assessed from detailed studies inside buildings. It is debatable 
whether being too hot has a greater detrimental effect than being too 
cold. However for simplicity the inefficiency scale of Table 9.3 is
1assumed reasonable for air conditioning design in addition to heating 
design.
9.7.2 Plant sizing based upon failure cost dorisistericy. The
average increase in internal environmental temperature, 6t* , which
1
occurs when the cooling plant capacity is insufficient to handle 
the internal heat gains, must be found as a first step towards estimating 
the cost consequences of inadequacy.
In section 9.5 a method was presented for determining the mean and
standard deviation of the expected cooling load for any space. Now
consider the case when the design cooling load (cooling capacity of air-
conditioning equipment) is Qm(j* Since the acceptable daily probability
of inadequacy of the cooling plant will be small and the distribution of
Q is normal in character, it is permissible to assume that the average 
m
degree of failure 60^ will be independent of the actual value.
Consequently using standard normal tables, y ,and o the approximate
in in
60 value can be found. Now the artificial ventilation rate of the air 
m
conditioning unit will be given by
Q = 1300 x v x (t - t ) - 9.47
md a ej c
where V is the artificial ventilation rate 
a
t is the design internal temperature (22°C) 
el
and t is the supply air temperature to avoid chilly draughts (16 C).
Now once the cooling plant is working to full capacity the artificial
ventilation rate cannot be increased. Consequently any increase in
cooling load above Q , results in an increase in the internal temperature
m d
above the desired value. The average failure increase in internal 
temperature, 6t^ , is thus given by
SQ_
e l
6t . _  m
e. V xi300 
* a
where V is the maximum artificial ventilation rate found using 
a
equation 9.47.
[i.e. can only be determined by assuming an air-conditioning
capacity, .]
The next stage in the design procedure is to use equation 9.33 and 
Table 9.3 to estimate the cost consequences of inadequacy of the cooling 
plant. Then the failure cost consistency equation (equation 4.9) can be 
used to find the acceptable daily probability of inadequacy of the 
cooling plant, P^. The probability distribution of has been defined 
as the cooling load during the peak heat gain period of the year. Should 
this period be assumed as two months, (60 days), then determining the 
cooling plant capacity would require that the acceptable daily failure 
rating, P^, be converted to the associated failure rating assuming that 
failure can only occur on sixty days of the year.
P » = p x - o 49
f f 60 y -
where P£ is the failure rating which when used in conjunction with 
the probability distribution of produces the desired rate of cooling 
of the air-conditioning unit, Q ^ .  Should this capacity be substant­
ially different from the assumed value in equation 9.47 then the design 
procedure must be repeated with a revised assumed value. This 
design procedure is shown as a flow chart in Figure 9.13.
9.7.3 Cooling plant sizing based upon a cost benefit analysis.
A similar procedure to that described in section 9.6.3 is proposed for 
economically sizing air-conditioning plant. For brevity only the steps 
of this procedure will be given here.
1) Determine the mean and standard deviation of the expected 
daily cooiing load for the space being artificially cooled
2) Determine the capital cost of the air-conditioning plant as a
function of P^, the daily failure rating, (not as a
function of P^, the failure rating during the peak load season)
i r
/  Acceptable 
Internal temper­
ature t ,
Use Table 9.3 to find 
inefficiency factor a
r Value of 
time of each 
occupant, E
'Population
affected
/Duration 
of failure.
YES
NO Print
Assume ' 
cooling plant 
load is Qmd j
Use Importance Equation 
(Eq. 9.33) to find »I»
Use this distribution to 
determine 60^
Use equation 9.48 to 
determine 6t !
Use Eq. 9.49 to determine
Use Failure Cost Consistency 
Equation to determine P.
Determine the Probability 
Distribution of the Daily 
Cooling Load during Mid- 
Summer (section 9.6)
Use distribution found in 
operation 1 to determine the 
required Cooling Plant Capacity
Sating QL,
Figure 9.13 Flow Chart illustrating the Failure Cost Consistency 
Procedure for Sizing Air-Conditioning Plant
3) Similarly, if they exist, determine the distribution system 
cost, and fuel cost as a function of P^.
4) Determine the total expected life cycle cost consequences of 
inadequacy. Taking the relevant discount factor value from 
Table A.8.
5) Determine the first differential of the total cost function.
dC6) Equate t° zero and solve to find the optimal value;
7) Convert the optimal P^ value to the optimal P^ value assuming 
inadequacy of the air-conditioning plant can occur on only 
sixty days of any year.
8) Using the optimal P^, and the mean and standard deviation"of
the expected daily peak cooling load determine the optimal cool­
ing rate of the air-conditioning plant,
!
9.9 Conclusions
In this chapter methods have been presented for analysing the, 
probabilistic factors which affect the operational performance of heating 
and cooling plant. There are a number of probabilistic factors which 
affect the daily heating or cooling load, consequently it is a complex 
problem to determine probability distributions which are both realistic­
ally accurate, and of practical value to the design engineer. This 
proved to be particularly the case for air-conditioning design, since 
periodic heat flows must be considered in addition to steady state heat 
flows. However probabilistically orientatdd heating and cooling analyses 
were proposed, and it is thought that these could be used as a basis for 
more accurate probabilistic procedures for thermal design.
The probabilistic analyses of heating and cooling loads described 
in this chapter highlighted the climatic data which is required. It was 
not possible to illustrate the derivation of a heat load, distribution 
because much of the required probabilistic data, such as the variability 
of solar intensities, the standard deviations of daily mean air tempera­
tures and the variability of metabolic heat rates, is not readily avail­
able. However the variability of outside air temperature was illustrated 
using Meteorological Office information. Also a method was illustrated
for mapping over the U.K. the variability of air temperature information 
relevant to building design.
Although the problem of building climatology has received greater
. (108) (109) . . ,... . -
attention m  recent years it is suggested that far more use
could be made of weather station climatic data if the climatic variables 
requires for the probabilistic thermal analysis of buildings were pre­
cisely defined. Solar radiation is a particularly important thermal 
design parameter. Unfortunately it is also one of the least well 
documented, due in part to the considerable difficulty encountered when 
attempting to obtain accurate continuous measurements. It is important 
that comprehensive records of solar radiation, similar to those available 
for air temperature be collated if more quantitative predictions of 
internal thermal conditions in summer are to be made.
The increasing use of computer techniques to aid thermal design 
emphasises the need to model probabilistic factors more rigorously. If 
probability distributions, rather than single deterministic design values 
were used for air temperatures, solar radiation intensities, diurnal 
temperature swings etc. then computer simulation methods could be used 
to accurately investigate the operational performance of many possible 
heating and/or cooling plant systems.
In this chapter two methods were proposed for choosing the accept­
able failure rating of the thermal plant. The economic optimum failure 
rating can be found using a cost benefit analysis, alternatively the 
failure rating which is consistent with the design of all the other 
subsystems of the building can be found using the failure cost consis­
tency criterion.
In this chapter neither the failure cost consistency criterion nor a 
cost benefit analysis has been applied to the reliability design of 
thermal plant. However it would be feasible to adopt either of these 
two methods using a similar procedure to that described in greater detail 
in previous chapters. '
CHAPTER TEN
FIRE PROTECTION
10.1 Introduction
Fire is a major hazard in buildings. It threatens both life and 
property and its control costa a great deal of money. The likelihood 
of a fire can be reduced by a severe restriction in the use of energy 
and combustible materials, or by reducing the chance of human error 
and mechanical faults which cause the ignition of fires. However such 
fire prevention measures may cause inconvenience, discomfort or 
reduced productivity which in total will exceed the savings resulting 
from the reduced likelihood of a fire. As an alternative, action can 
be taken to control a fire once it has started and consequently reduce 
the likely damage; such actions are termed fire protection measures.
Fire protection measures take one of two forms;
a) Passive fire protection which consists of structural fire 
resistance protecting the frame of the building and thus 
preventing a fire from spreading. Passive fire resistance
is usually measured in minutes or hours of resistance for the 
structural components. The effect of introducing increased
fire resistance is to raise the threshold of fire severity
•/«t/.i?hieh. structural'damage-; or significant losses occur.
b) Active fire protection, such as sprinklers, extinguishers, 
hoses, dry or wet risers, reduce the frequency of fires above 
a particular threshold level which is usually smaller than 
the severity necessary to overcome the fire resistance.
To determine the most economical provision of fire precautions 
the sum of the cost of the fire protection and the resultant fire 
losses must be minimised. The expected fire losses will depend upon
a number of probabilistic factors; i.e. the annual chance of a fire 
Occurring; the chance of the fire growing sufficiently large to affect 
the structure (which in turn will depend upon the chance that the active 
protection system fails), and finally the chance that the passive 
resistance fails. The concept of fallible fire resistance is surpris­
ing at first, however a few moments of reflection will show that it 
is inevitable. Consider the protection of a structural frame. Suppose 
a fire resistance R is provided and that a fire has severity S; then 
the frame is adequately protected provided S, if R <  S then failure 
occurs.
Cost benefit design approaches for determining optimum levels of 
active and passive fire protection have been proposed by a number of 
authors^ ^  The application of cost benefit techniques
to the design of both passive and active fire protection is summarised 
in the following section.
10.2 Design Based upon a Cost Benefit Analysis
10.2.1 The cost benefit analysis. In the introduction it was 
stated that complete safety against fires is impossible to achieve.
In addition there is a limit to the amount the community should spend 
on fire safety, particularly when the risk is very small. A number 
of criteria can be used to assess the acceptable expenditure on fire 
safety. However the most serious hazard associated with fires is the 
risk to human life and this has been proposed as the most sensible 
basis for choosing the acceptable fire risk and hence defining the 
acceptable expenditure on fire safety. A thorough discussion of the 
various methods which have been proposed for evaluating life is found 
in section 4.3.2 or in Melinek^^. The cost benefit procedure described 
here proposes the use of socio-economic values of life and serious injury. 
The optimum economic design is that associated with the minimum total 
cost; the total cost being the sum of the capital expenditure on fire 
protection measures and the total expected fire losses over the design 
life of the building. Figure 4.5 illustrates a graphical method for 
determining the optimal level of design. The optimising procedure for 
passive and active fire protection described below is based upon the
285
work of Baldwin and Thomas
The probabilistic factors affecting fire safety are listed in Table 
10.1. Using these probabilities the annual likelihood of various rele­
vant events can be predicted. These are summaries in Table 10.2 in addition
to estimatesofthe expected financial consequences associated with these
events. Combining the annual probabilities with the associated 
expected losses an expression can be derived for the
expected annual losses due to fires, 1^ ,. Referring to Table 10.2 1^
is given by;
IT = P(1-P2)(1”P1P3)I1 + P (1"P2^P1P3I2
+ PP2(1-PoP3)I3 + ppoP2p3I4 " ,0-1
The total expected fire losses, L, depend upon the net discount rate 
and the design life of the building. In general L is given by
L = 'I** Dm  - 10.2
where D is the relevant discount factor taken from Table A.8. nr
The expected losses, L, can be reduced if the probabilities of 
failure of the active and/or passive protection, p2 and p^, are reduced 
by, for example, increasing the fire resistance, or improving the 
sprinkler system. However the expected annual losses can only be 
decreased at the expense of increased capital expenditure on active 
and passive fire controls, Figure 4.5 illustrates this point. Unfort- 
uhately little information is available concerning the way protection 
provision costs vary with the probability levels p0,p.-. However the 
results of Kawagoe and Saito and Maskell and Baldwin suggest
that a logarithmic relationship between passive resistance and cost 
is applicable. If a similar relationship is assumed for active controls 
then
Ej = - Kj.log p2 - 10.3
®2 “ " ^2. log p^ - 10.4
Probability Definition
P Probability of a fire occurring per building 
per year
V
Probability of a fire becoming sufficiently 
large to damage the structure when active 
protection is either not installed or fails
p l ; Probability of a fire becoming sufficiently 
large to damage the structure when active 
protection is installed and operates
p2 Probability of failure of active protection 
given that a fire has occurred
p3 Probability of failure of passive fire protection 
given a fire that is sufficiently large to 
damage the structure
Table 10.1 Definition of Probabilities
Active Passive Probabilities Expected Damage
Operate Operate p(l“P2) ^ “PjP3) xi
Fails p (i-p 2)p ,p 3 I2
Fails Operate p p 2(i-p0p 3) X3
Fail
pp2pop3 *4
Table 10.2 Probabilities and Damage for Combined Action of Active 
or Passive Fire Protection
where Ej and E2 are the sprinkler and fire resistance provision 
costs respectively.
The total cost of fires and fire protection, C, is the sum of 
the provision costs, Ej and and the total expected losses, L.
C = - Kj log p2 - K2 log p3 + Dnr[jp(l-p2)(l-p1p3)l] +
p d - p ^ p ^ I . ,  + p p . / l - p ^ ' l ^  + PP0P2P3I J
- 10.5
The optimum values of p2 and p3 are given by the solution of the 
simultaneous equations;
dC n ' dC n-—  = 0 and -z—  = 0
dp2 dPs
If the reasonable assumption is made that if the sprinklers 
operate, structural damage does not occur, then Pj can be assumed to 
be zero. This assumption simplifies the optimising procedure. 
Solving the above equations assuming p^ to be zero
K1 "  K2
p = ------7—   — r---- —--- “  10.6
2 _ p x (I0-I.) x Dopt 3 1 nr
K x (I -I )
and p~ ~ ------------—---------- - 10.7
opt pQ x (Kj-K^ x (I4-I3)
If only active protection exists then the total cost is given by; 
C, = - K, log p2 + D ^ & d - p ^ X ,  + pp2(l-po )I3
+ PPoP2I4 ^  -10.8
r » o
dp,
.  .  . d c l
and the optimum p2 value is given by equating to zero
K I
i.e. p* *= -------------  —  - 10.9
-opt D frdj-I,) + PP0d 4-I3)]
Similarly if only passive protection is installed then the optimum 
design is associated with the following failure rating
p' - --------- ------  -10.10
°pt D„ r & P o (I4"I3)J
Using these optimal failure rates it is theoretically possible to 
determine when passive and/or active protection is justified. However 
numerical interpretation of these optimal expressions depends on both 
the failure losses, Ij, I^9 and 1^, and provision cost parameters,
Kj and being known. In addition it is necessary to be able to 
interpret optimal failure ratings in terms of a degree of fire resist­
ance and/or an actual sprinkler system. C o w a r d h a s  shown that 
simulation techniques, using data relating to fire loads, ventilation, 
room shape etc. can be used to predict the severity of fires. From 
this information it is possible to assess the probability of a fire 
exceeding various levels of resistance (measured in minutes). For 
offices Coward deduced the following relationship
- 2. 4R in iip^ = e - 10.11
where R is the resistance in hours.
In general terms for any type of building
-KR in io
Pg = e ~ 10.12
Using such a relationship any passive resistance failure rating, p^,
can be interpreted as a level of fire resistance.
Similarly it should be feasible for manufacturers to predict the 
reliability of various sprinkler systems, and hence to be able to re­
commend the sprinkler system which will provide the desired level of
reliability, Pg * 
opt
Consider now in more detail the variables contained in expressions 
10.6 - 10.10.
.2.2 The probabilistic factors.
p is the probability of a fire occurring per building per 
year. The value of p will depend upon the type of building 
and, for commercial premises it will also depend upon the spec­
ific product being manufactured or service being provided.
To determine realistic p values it is necessary for organisa­
tions such as the Fire Research Station to statistically 
analyse fire data provided by Fire Services around the U.K.
Table 10.3 gives an indication of the likelihood of fires 
in various types of commerical buildings. In more accurate 
terms the probability of occurrence of a fire is proportional 
to the floor area of the building. That is;
P = Ap x p f
where is the floor area of the building and p* is the 
probability of occurrence of a fire per year per unit floor 
area of the building. p 1 is determined from a detailed 
analysis of previous fires.
Pq is the probability of a fire becoming sufficiently large 
to damage the structure when active protection is not installed 
or alternatively fails. Once again assessing p^ is dependent , 
upon the analysis of information provided by Fires Services. 
Table 10.4 illustrates pQ values for various types of commercial 
establishments.
pj is the probability of a fire becoming sufficiently large 
to damage the structure when active protection is installed 
and operative. For algebraic simplicity Pj was assumed as 
zero in the preceding analysis. However following an analysis 
of the performance of sprinklers in commercial premises 
Rawachandran^ deduced that on average there is a 2.3% 
chance or a 0.023 probability of the sprinklers operating but 
not controlling the fire. Consequently in practice the 
assumption that Pj is equal to zero must be treated with 
caution.
Hazard
Number of 
buildings*'
Number of 
fires 
annually+
P
Industry 183 377 8 075 4.4  x lO-2
Houses 14 202 359 38 142 2.7 x 10"3
Commercial -  shops 664 817 5 574 8.4 x lO-3
Commercial -  offices 152 430 866 5.7 x 10'3
Assembly -  entertainment 12 540 1 446 1.2 x 10_1
Assembly -  non-residential 143 019 2 810 2.0 x 10-2
Residential -  dubs, hotels
etc
36 609 1 352 3.7 x 1<T2
Residential -  institutions - 803
Storage 199 612 2 420 1.2 x 10-2
♦Source: 108th Report of the Commissioners of HM Inland Revenue 
+Fires during 1967
Table 10.3 The Annual Chance of a Fire Outbreak for various 
Occupancies (Taken from Baldwin*^)
Occupancy Probability of fire 
becoming large, pQ
Manufacturing Industries
Food, drink and tobacco 0.044
Chemical and allied industries 0.046
Metal manufacturing, engineering and 
electrical goods 0.028
Textiles 0.082
Clothing and footwear 0.133
Timber and furniture 0.051
Paper, printing and publishing 0.064
Distributable Trades
Wholesale 0.071
Retail 0.016
Table 10.4 Probability of Fire becoming Large (Taken from Ramachandran*
10.2.3 The expected fire losses. Losses caused by fires in 
buildings can include the loss of the whole or part of the building 
and its contents, indirect losses such as lost production, or in more 
general terms profits, and the cost of replacing or repairing the build­
ing. In addition the human injuries or fatalities resulting from the 
fire must be assessed in financial terms.
In general terms the expected fire losses may be expressed 
algebraically as follows;
I B . y [ h  + J + F + R ]  - 10.13
where
y is the proportion of the building affected by the fire.
Aj, is the floor area of the building.
H is the socio-economic 'cost1 of the expected human injuries 
and fatalities per unit floor area
J is the indirect losses^assessed from the rentable value or 
profitability per unit floor area
F is the content losses per unit area
R is the replacement or repair cost per unit area.
The method used to quantify the indirect losses depends upon the 
type of building. For a commercial building indirect losses are rela­
tively easy to assess, J can either be based on the net rentable income 
of the building (allowing for rates and other charges paid by the owner) 
or the net profitability per unit area of the building. For community 
or social establishments such as schools and hospitals the profitability 
of the building is much harder to assess. For schools it is proposes 
that the indirect losses be based on the education cost per pupil.
This can be transformed to a cost per unit area by using floor area to 
pupil ratios determined from a statistical analysis of existing pupil 
density data. For hospitals it is logical to base the indirect losses 
on the running cost per patient. At the present time it is estimated 
that each bed in a hospital costs the state sixty to a hundred pounds 
per week. It can therefore be concluded that this is the value that 
the community places on health and hence quantifies the indirect worth 
of a hospital bed. For other commercial establishments such as hotels,
restaurants, shops or hostals it is feasible to base indirect losses 
on the expected net worth per unit area.
When assessing the value of a building and its contents, R and F resp­
ectively, it is important to take into consideration depreciation.
The actual depreciated value of the building will depend on the age of 
the building at the time of the fire. When assessing average losses 
it is reasonable to assume that the building and contents have both 
served half their useful life at the time of the fire and hence a 0^5 
depreciation factor is proposed when assessing F and R. IJ, J, F, and R
are all assessed at present day prices and hence I , the expected
annual losses, must also be a base year figure.
Obviously the fire losses will depend upon the severity of the 
fire. Ij represents the consequences of a fire when both passive and 
active protection operates satisfactorily and hence only a minor fire 
occurs. In general minor fires can be assumed to be restricted to one 
compartment or floor of the building, hence *y * will be small, say 
0.1 - 0.25. It is also reasonable to expect that for minor fires 
human losses will be negligible and repair costs will be very low.
The indirect losses, J, will be equivalent to the production or rental
value of that part of the building affected by the fire for the period 
it is out of service.
1^ represents the consequences should the passive resistance 
restrict the fire to one area and prevent structural damage when the 
active protection system has either failed or is not installed. In 
this case a more serious fire will result even though the fire will 
again be restricted to a small area. y will again be in the range 
0.1 - 0.25, the human losses will again be negligible although sub­
stantial repair and replacement costs might be expected. The time 
required for repair will be larger than for a fire represented by Ij 
and hence indirect losses will be larger. The average value of the 
content losses will be equal to half the renewal cost because of the 
effects of depreciation. general will be greater than Ij.
/
I2 and 1^ represent the consequences should a severe fire occur.
In this case it can be presumed that the fire will spread through the
building and partial or total structural collapse will Occur. As a 
consequence y will probably be in the range 0.7 - 1.0. Human fatali­
ties and injuries will occur, and it is necessary to analyse previous 
severe fires for the appropriate class of building to enable the death 
and injury rates to be assessed. The socio-economic value of a human 
life was discussed at length in chapter four, and fifty thousand pounds 
was estimated to be a realistic figure. Injury compensation rates were 
also estimated in chapter four. Combining these compensation rates 
with the expected injury and death rates it is theoretically possible 
to assess the expected human losses associated with a severe fire. 
Unfortunately no accurate information regarding injury and death rates 
due to severe fires has been found by the author. However to illustrate 
the calculation of the total human losses, H, associated with a severe 
fire the assumed rates shown in Table 10.5 will be used.
TYPE SOCIO-ECONOMIC COST RATE PER METRE2 OF
Pounds FLOOR SPACE
Deaths 50,000 0.01
Residual Injury 10,000 0.015
Non-Res i dual Inj ury 500 0.025
Table 10.5 The estimated cost and likelihood of various human
losses caused by a severe fire in office accommodation.
The injury and death rates shown in Table 10.5 are estimated 
values for office premises with less than eight floors. It is 
proposed that the rates should be increased by 0.0001 for each 
additional storey. Only detailed analyses of fire data will provide 
more accurate assessments of the human losses associated with a 
severe fire in various types of buildings.
For a severe fire it is reasonable to assume that the building 
or factory will be completely shut down while rebuilding takes place. 
Hence J will be the total net production losses or net rental losses 
over the rebuilding period. That is
J = Y x H - 10.14
where Y is an estimate of the expected rebuilding time following the fire 
(years), and & is an estimate of the net rental or production losses 
per year at present day prices.
The average content losses, F, will again be equal to half the 
renewal cost per unit area. Similarly the depreciated value of the 
building at the time of the fire will be taken to be half the replace­
ment cost at present day prices.
10.2.A The cost of fire protection. For the cost benefit 
analysis to be developed a log-normal function was assumed to relate 
both the reliability of sprinkler systems, and the probability of 
passive fire resistance failure with their respective capital costs.
Only a careful analysis of sprinkler failures or a comprehensive 
analysis of sprinkler reliability by manufacturers could produce a 
more numerically accurate active fire protection function. However 
the passive capital cost function can be considered in greater detail. 
Haskell and B a l d w i n ^ s t u d i e d  the additional cost of fire protection 
for both steel and concrete columns. For steel it was estimated that 
fire protection increases the structural cost by ten percent per hour 
of resistance. At today's prices this might mean a passive resistance 
cost of 0.5 pounds per square metre of gross floor area per hour of 
resistance. That is
2
E = 0.5 x R pounds per m - 10.15
where R is the passive resistance in hours.
Now Coward^ proposed that for offices
Combining 10.15 and 10.16
2.31 * 0.5 , , 2
 --- :--2"4~“—  g p3 Pounds Per m •
= - 0.48 x log p3 - 10.17
Equation 10.17 is a realistic expression for the passive resist­
ance capital cost as a function of p3 for office accommodation. It 
is feasible that similar expressions might be derived for all types 
of buildings.
10.2.5 An example. Problem:- Design the passive resistance for
a steel framed ten storey office building. Assume that the annual
-3
chance of a fire, p, is 5.7 x 10 and that the chance of a fire 
becoming large, pQ, is 0.1. The optimum p^ value is given by
K2P =     -10 .  VO.
opt p x pQ x (I4-I3) x Dnr
According to equation 10.17 ^  is equal to -0.48 pounds. The fire 
losses, I3 are calculated assuming the following;
Y = 0.125 (one floor affected by the fire)
H = zero
2
L = 6.5 pounds per m . [Based on a net rentable value of
2 T
£20 per m and 4 months repair time J 
2
F = one pound per m . [Based on a content value of two
2 -i
pounds per m and complete renewal of all the contentsj
and R = 60 pounds per m^. [Based on repair costs being half
of total rebuilding costs which are assumed to be 
2 t
120 pounds per m .J 
Thus using equation 10.13
I3 = 0.125 x 76.6
2= 9.575 pounds sterling per m .
Similarly for the calculation of 1^ the following assumptions are 
made;
Y » 0.8
H *. 0.012 x 50,000 + 0.017 X 10,000 +0.027 x 500 
= 783.5 pounds per m" [[Based upon Table 10.5 ]
F = Ten pounds per nr [[ As for ]
R = 120 pounds per f Estimated replacement cost [).
Using equation 10.13
I, = 0.8(783.5 + 120 + 10)
2= 730.8 pounds per m .
2
Thus (I^-Ig) = 721 pounds per m .
Assuming a sixty year design life and a real rate of interest of four
percent D is nr
equation 10.vo
equal to 22.6. (Taken from Table A.8). Hence using
0.48 x 104 
P3 „ 5.7 x 721 x 22.624opt
= 0.0516
Using equation 10.16.
RoPt = logp3 _ hours
opt
= 1.23 hours or 75 minutes.
For this hypothetical example the optimal passive fire resistance 
is 75 minutes.
10.2.6 Discussion. A procedure has been described to determine
the optimal provision of fire resistance and sprinkler systems. Figure 
10.1 summarises this procedure as a flow chart. The main drawback 
preventing the use of these optimising procedures is the derivation 
of numerical values for each factor of the optimal expressions. A 
procedure has been proposed for estimating the various failure cost 
expressions, (Ij and an example has been used to illustrate
the calculation of these failure costs. However the capital cost 
parameters Kj and are more difficult factors to numerically estimate,
Assess the Cost Consequences of 
various Fire Events, I
Assess Probabilities
building under consideration
Assess
the Capital Cost 
Functions
TOTAL COST FUNCTION
Derive the
Determine the Total Expected 
Fire Loss Function
Determine the OPTIMUM P2 and p^
VALUES by equating to zero the first 
differential of the Total Cost Function
Figure 10.1 Flow Chart illustrating the Cost Benefit Procedure 
for Fire Protection Design
in the following section a procedure based upon the failure cost 
consistency criterion will be described for determining passive and/or 
active fire protection failure ratings. It is important to note that 
such a procedure does not require capital cost functions and hence 
Kj and need not be estimated. Consequently in practice this might 
prove a more feasible aid than the cost benefit analysis for fire pro­
tection design.
10.3 Fire Protection Design based upon the Failure Cost Consistency 
Criterion
Both passive and active fire protection can be designed using the 
failure cost consistency technique. First the design of the passive 
resistance will be considered. The expected average annual losses 
resulting from the failure of the passive resistance is represented 
by 1^. A method for assessing 1^, was described and illustrated with 
an example in the previous section. Using the failure cost consistency 
equation (equation 4.9) the acceptable average return period of losses 
equal to 1^ is given by
N = 16 x I x c 'x -
4 Pop
and hence the acceptable annual probability of these losses occurring 
is given by
P ’ = 16 X T x c ' ,0-18
4 Pop
Now using the probability definition of Table 10.2, p* is also 
given by
P ! = P x PG x P3 -10.19
Hence the acceptable probability of failure of the passive resist­
ance should a severe fire occur is given by
The actual degree of fire resistance required can then be calculated 
using Cowards function (equation 10.12) i.e.
P3
or R
For the office building example considered in the previous
2
section, I, is equal to 730pounds per m . If the building has a floor
2 . .
area of say 2000 m then I, is equal to 1.462 million pounds. Using
2 .
a population density figure of one person per m the population of
the building will be 200. The acceptable probability of the fire
resistance being exceeded is found using equation 10.20 i.e.
200
P 3  - 4
■ 16 x c x 1,461,000 x 5.7 x 10
= 0.015
Using equation 10.21 with K equal to 2.4
R = - x In 0.015
2.4
= 1.7 hours or 105 minutes.
The structural fire resistance should be equivalent to 105 minutes
Consider now the design of the active fire protection system. 
The consequences should the active devices fail to operate depend on 
whether the passive fire resistance prevents structural collapse.
The average losses resulting from failure of the active protection is 
given by
Xa -  ( 1 - P D X P3> x I3 + po X p3 x I4 - 10.22
Using the failure cost consistency criterion, the acceptable 
average probability of I losses occurring in any year is given by
3
-KR
K * ln P3
K
x In ________ Pop16 x c x 1 x p 10.21
p
It Pop
16 x c x I
a
Now using Table 10.2, p" is also given by;
P
tt P  *  P2
Hence
Pop
10.23P2 16 x c x I x p
a
As a numerical example assume that an active fire resistance 
system is also required in the office building previously described 
in this chapter. The design p^ value has already been determined and 
found to equal 0.015. Thus using equation 10.22
I = (1 - 0.1 x 0.015) x 9.575 + 0.0015 x 73.1
a
= (9.562 + 0.1095) pounds per m 2
2
= 9.67 pounds per m .
Since the building has a gross floor area of two thousand square
This desired reliability level for the active protection system 
is equivalent to the sprinklers failing to operate on eleven percent 
of occasions. Although this level of performance might seem unsatis­
factory it is consistent with present performance standards of sprinkler
The desired performance standards of both the active and passive 
fire protection for this hypothetical building are of a reasonable 
order of magnitude when compared with the present fire resistance 
recommendations and present sprinkler reliability. This example 
again illustrates the benefit of the failure cost consistency technique
metres
200
16 x 19340 x 5.7 x 10~3
0.1134
systems according to Ramachandran (116)
as a simple design decision aid for building design.
10.4 Conclusions
Two methods have been described for choosing the level of 
active and passive fire protection in buildings. Both methods rely 
on various probabilistic factors and the assessment of failure costs 
associated with fires of differing severity. However the failure cost 
consistency approach does not require scarce provision cost information 
which limits the use of the cost benefit optimising approach. A 
numerical example of the cost benefit procedure for sprinklers has 
not been possible due to the lack of reliable cost information.
However the design of both the active and passive fire protection has 
been satisfactorily illustrated using the failure cost consistency 
technique. The derived failure ratings for both the active and passive 
protection systems were acceptable when considered in the light of the 
present fire safety precautions provided in buildings.
The use of both the cost benefit approach and the failure cost 
consistency criterion relies on information which can only be assessed 
through the statistical analysis of actual fires. This emphasises that 
organisations such as the Fire Research Station and Local Authority 
fire services' should continue collating and reporting fire severity, 
injury and fatality information for the various types and sizes of 
buildings.
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
OTHER P R O B A B IL IS T IC  SUBSYSTEMS
'11*1 Introduction
The application of probabilistic methods to a number of building 
subsystems has been considered in detail in the previous six chapters.
It is not feasible to undertake a detailed analysis for all the prob­
abilistic subsystems which exist within a building. However in this 
chapter various additional probabilistic subsystems will be briefly 
considered.
11*2 The Oscillatory Motion of Buildings
Modern highly elastic tall structures undergo significant lateral 
oscillatory deflections and hence one criterion for structural design 
should be the prevention of perceptable building motion. Such motion 
will often irritate the occupants, or possibly cause a feeling of 
nausea.
. Building motion is caused by lateral wind forces. Wind velocity 
is a probabilistic variable and hence a criterion for structural design 
should be that the perceptional threshold of building motion should only 
occur every X days. X is determined using the failure cost consistency 
technique in conjunction with an assessment of the consequences of 
unacceptable oscillatory motion. The wind velocity associated with an 
X day return period can be determined from meteorological data. It is 
then a matter of using structural analysis techniques to design the 
structure such that the design wind velocity does not cause perceptable 
sway. Two aspects of this proposed design procedure need to be consid­
ered in greater detail. First the definition of the"perceptable threshold 
of motion'.’ The criterion used for recent tall buildings in this respect
has been an acceletation of 0.4 m/s . This is the ninety percentile 
threshold of perceptable motion according to Vickery and Davenport^ .
It has been found that .the perception of building motion is more crit­
ical for a stationary rather than a mobile person. The most critical 
activity affected by motion sickness is dining and hence the dynamic 
structural design is a prime consideration when rooftop restaurants 
are being considered. In general the limiting state of perceptable 
building motion can only really be assessed by user surveys and obser­
vations carried out by environmental psychologists.
The second difficulty concerns the assessment of the average
consequences of perceptable motion. In general terms
I = E x G x M x L -11.1
where E is the average worth of each individual to the employer
G is the inefficiency coefficient, which will be in the range
0 - 1.
M is the number of individuals affected by motion
and L is the length of time excessive motion lasts per occurrence.
11.3 Building Acoustics
The acceptable level of noise in a building must again be based 
on the subjective opinions of the users. Keighley^ carried out 
an extensive survey of the response of occupants to noise. He con­
cluded that two physical parameters affect the users opinion concern­
ing the acoustic environment in offices. The first parameter is the 
average noise level, as measured on the dBA scale, and the second 
parameter is the number of impact sounds per minute rising substantially 
above the background level.
When designing the acoustic environment it is necessary to consider 
noise generated both internally and externally, the latter being 
particularly relevant in large industrial cities. For design purposes 
a noise scale should be used which correlates well with human responses, 
unfortunately there is no simple scale which has this property. However 
a number of noise comfort scales have been developed using regression
and correlation techniques. The basic measure of noise is the dBA 
scale, which is a decibel scale weighted to correspond to the response 
of the human ear to loudness at different frequencies. From a decibel 
trace of the fluctuating noise level it is possible to determine noise 
levels exceeded for ten percent, (Ljq), fifty percent, (L^) or 
for ninety percent, (L^q ) of the time. A composite unit, termed the 
Traffic Noise Index, correlates human response with the noise generated 
by free flowing traffic. Other composite scales have been proposed to 
model human response, for example the mean energy level, the ten
percentile noise l e v e l , ' a n d  the noise pollution/Scale, l^p- The 
latter scale being defined by j
■ < ■ V .
V  = Leq + 2-56 X 0 - "  •2
where a is the standard deviation of the noise level.
To take account of all the various noises generated in an office
i.e. people balking, office machinery, air conditioning noise and noise 
. . . (13)
intrusion from the outside, the IHVE Guide recommends that the 
designer should assess the total noise in terms of noise rating curves 
rather than single dBA values. The acceptable noise rating curve for 
office plant will depend on the background noise rating curve of the . 
office.
The Office Noise Rating Index derived by Hay and Kemp attempts
to combine in a single dBA value the effects of both background noise 
and extreme noises which both affect acoustic comfort according to 
Keighley^ Correlating the subjective and objective results from
ten buildings Hay and Kemp proposed the following Office Noise Index.
Office Noise Index = + 2 . 4(Ljq-L^q ) - 14 - 11.3
Although the noise level is a probabilistic variable the above 
expression indicates that this noise comfort scale is a function of 
just two noise levels,Ljq and If the design noise index is
specified then equation 11.3 can be used to determine the acceptable 
dBA values for L^q and L jq» which in turn specifies the acceptable 
noise rating curve. This is then used as the acoustic design standard 
for the building. The failure cost consistency procedure could be used
to determine the acceptable Office Noise Index value in the following 
manner. The failure cost consistency equation is used to determine the 
acceptable daily losses, I, for an event which occurs every day. By 
estimating the cost consequences of acoustic inadequacy the number of 
employees, M, might be determined who if irritated by the noise level 
will result in the daily losses I. M is calculated as a percentage 
of the total work force,and this percent of dissatisfied occupants can 
then be used to determine the design Office Noise Index value.
11.4 Electrical Supply
If it is necessary for a building to generate its own electricity 
or provide generators for use in the event of an emergency, then the 
size of the generating plant depends upon the expected demand for 
electricity. The consumption of electricity is probabilistic and 
hence the problem of sizing electrical generating plant is amenable to 
the failure cost consistency technique or a cost benefit analysis.
When predicting the likely distribution of electricity consumption, 
data must be available from existing buildings. . In addition an allow­
ance must be made for both increases in consumption over the design 
life and seasonal variations in consumption.
The consequences of the electricity demand being in excess of the 
capacity of the plant should be assessed using similar criteria to 
those described for other subsystems in previous chapters. The cost 
consistency criterion can then be used to determine the acceptable risk 
of generator inadequacy. The expected consumption distribution can then 
be used to define the design consumption.
11.5 The Allocation of Power Sockets or Gas Outlets
In this particular case failure means a shortage of outlets which 
is caused when two electrical appliances simultaneously require the 
use of a single power socket. The probability of a socket being simult­
aneously needed for two*or more appliances should be consistent with 
the consequences of this event occurring. The consequences will range 
from mild inconvenience in a domestic home through to a definite risk 
to human life in certain hospital wards. Once the consequences of
failure have been costed then the failure cost consistency criterion 
can be used to determine the acceptable failure rating. Information 
concerning the frequency and duration of use for various electrical 
appliances will enable the binomial approach,described in detail in 
chapter six,to be used to determine the number of sockets associated 
with this acceptable failure rating. C a r s o n ^ ^ V  first proposed this 
binomial approach for assessing the probability of inadequacy assoc­
iated with various allocations of power and gas outlets in hospital 
wards.
A similar probabilistic model can be used to assess the expected 
failure rating whenever the design problem entails choosing the number 
of facilities to be provided when there is the possibility of simultan­
eous demand, for example, gas outlets in hospitals, telephone extensions 
in offices or shower units in sports halls.
11.6 Circulation within a Building
In theory the losses resulting from undersizing of corridors or 
stairs can be assessed using a similar criterion to that used for 
lifts, i.e. the time lost and inconvenience caused when travelling from 
A to B. As a consequence it is theoretically feasible to use the failure 
cost consistency technique to determine the acceptable frequency of a 
blocked stairway or corridor. Information regarding the probable use
of the corridor or stairs could then be used to determine the desired 
width. \
CHAPTER TWELVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
Only general conclusions will be discussed here since more 
detailed comments concerning individual subsystems have been included 
at the end of the relevant preceding chapters.
This thesis has attempted to show the relevance of probability 
theory and statistical methods to the operational performance of 
building subsystems. Rational analytical methods have been proposed 
to allow the probabilistic implications to be incorporated in the design 
of a number of building subsystems. Using such methods it is
possible to determine the failure rating associated with any design 
solution. For a number of the subsystems studied insufficient 
information existed to allow realistic probabilistic functions to 
be derived. However, in such cases the statistical information needed 
to develop the proposed probabilistic design method was described.
A classic example of the lack of relevant information concerns 
the design of the thermal environment. Although weather stations 
collect all the necessary climatic information, it is not analysed 
by the meteorological office with the needs of the building industry 
in mind. Clearly it is essential that organisations which are in a 
position to collect statistical information from buildings should 
know the precise purpose of the information and thus ensure that it 
can be of beneficial use in the design of future buildings.
The 1 failure cost consistency criterion* has been developed as a 
systematic method for deciding acceptable failure rating values. This 
criterion is based upon the concept that from the users view point a 
balanced building is desirable; that is the failure rating of each 
subsystem or adverse type of event should be inversely proportional 
to the seriousness of the consequences of failure. The actual 
performance of every subsystem can be raised or lowered by proportion*-
ally equal amounts to ensure that the total capital expenditure 
available for the building is not exceeded. The aim of failure cost 
consistency is to ensure that the design failure rating for probab­
ilistic types of events is of the right order of magnitude. For the 
majority of such adverse types of events the acceptable failure rating 
will be small, in which case subsystem designs will only be sensitive 
to order of magnitude changes in the failure rate value. Consequently 
extremely accurate failure cost estimates are not an absolutely 
essential prerequisite of failure cost consistency. However this 
design decision technique could be improved by collating consequence 
of failure information,and thus improving cost of failure or' 
inadequacy estimates for each subsystem. The average cost of failure 
for each subsystem has been assumed for simplicity to be associated with 
an average degree of failure. There would be merit in considering in 
greater detail the functions relating the consequence and degree of 
failure for each subsystem.
The use of the failure cost consistency criterion has been illus­
trated using at times less important subsystems. There are two reasons 
for this; the first is in the cause of completeness, and the second 
is because such aspects of a building provided relatively simple 
examples illustrating the use of this design criterion.
The failure cost consistency design criterion is indirectly an 
economic optimising criterion since the satisfactory performance of a 
building means that the money has been wisely spent, and in general the 
owner will be refunded in an optimum rentable value.
As an alternative to failure cost consistency, desirable failure 
rating values can be determined using a classical cost benefit 
technique. The use of a cost benefit method to determine 
economic optimum failure ratings relies on the following information;
a) The derivation of realistically accurate capital cost 
functions.
b) The accurate probabilistic analysis of subsystem performance.
c) A realistically accurate consequence of failure function.
Each of the above requirements has been considered for various 
building subsystems. However, relevant information either to 
produce the probabilistic model or to derive the capital cost 
function was not always readily available. For many of the subsystems con­
sidered it will remain impossible to implement cost benefit methods in 
practice until more extensive cost and/or probabilistic information 
becomes available. Here there is definite scope for more research work 
in the various subsystem fields. Before totally blaming the lack of
information for the apparent resistance in applying cost benefit
(122)
techniques to building problems it is worth quoting Rosenbleuth 
He wrote
nif we recognize the urgency of adopting explicit optimization 
codes we may ask what prevents us from adopting them now.
Lack of sufficient statistical information is not a convincing 
reason, since present codes and those having an optimization 
format would aim at the same goals and a change of format 
will not reduce the amount of information available. The 
main obstacles can be overcome through education of the 
professions and the development of design aids including simple 
approximate methods3 design tables and charts3 and reliability 
and optimization oriented computer programs and computer 
language. It is indeed urgent for present and future engineers 
that such aids should be developed. "
The cost benefit technique and the failure cost consistency crit­
erion are both systematic approaches to building design since the 
building is considered as a single system and a consistent and rational 
method is used to make design decisions for the various subsystems.
Systems methodology, as illustrated by these two design methods can produce 
decision making aids which can prove valuable to the designer. These 
design aids cannot however consider every aspect of a problem and 
consequently they cannot replace the designer but only assist him in 
making design decisions.
In practical terms the significant difference concerning the imple­
mentation of the failure cost consistency and cost benefit design 
methods is that the latter method requires knowledge of the capital 
expenditure of each system as a function of its failure rating.
Invariably this proves an extremely difficult function to establish.
In addition, should a total capital constraint exist for the building, 
then a cost effective, rather than a cost benefit analysis must be 
used to balance the capital expenditure allocated to each subsystem 
such that the most economically efficient building results. This 
balancing process would be extremely complicated for a building. Although 
a number of possible ways of approaching this problem have been out­
lined only the use of computer facilities offers a realistic method of 
solving this problem.
The primary objective of this thesis has been to propose concepts 
and general frameworks for systematic building subsystem design, the 
actual numerics could be vastly improved if each subsystem were to 
be considered in more detail.
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STATISTICAL TABLES
Table A.1 Areas under the standardised normal curve
K a .00 .01 .02 .03 .04 .05 .06 .07 .08 .09
0.0 .5000 .4960 .4920 .4880 .4840 .4801 .4761 .4721 .4681 .4641
0.1 .4602 .4562 .4522 .4483 .4443 .4404 .4364 .4325 .4286 .4247
0.2 .4207 .4168 .4129 .4090 .4052 .4013 .3974 .3936 .3897 .3859
0.3 .3821 .3783 .3745 .3707 .3669 .3632 .3594 .3557 .3520 .3483
0.4 .3446 .3409 .3372 .3336 .3300 .3264 .3228 .3192 .3156 .3121
0.5 .3085 .3050 .3015 .2981 .2946 .2912 .2877 .2843 .2810 .2776
0.6 .2743 .2709 .2876 .2613 .2611 .2578 .2546 .2514 .2483 .2451
0.7 .2420 .2389 .2358 .2327 .2296 .2266 .2236 .2208 .2177 .2148
0.8 .2119 .2090 .2061 .2033 .2005 .1977 .1949 .1922 .1894 .1867
0.9 .1841 .1814 .1788 .1762 .1736 .1711 .1685 .1660 .1635 .1611
1.0 .1587 .1562 .1539 .1515 .1492 .1469 .1446 .1423 .1401 .1379
1.1 .1357 .1335 .1314 .1292 .1271, .1251 .1230 .1210 .1190 .1170
1.2 .1151 .1131 .1112 .1093 .1075 .1056 .1038 .1020 .1003 .09S5
1.3 .0968 .0951 .0934 .0918 .0901 .0885 .0869 .0S53 .0838 .0823
1 4 .0.808 .0793 .0778 .0764 .0749 .0735 .0721 .0708 .0694 .0681
1.5 .0668 .0655 .0643 .0630 .0618 .0606 .0594 .05S2 .0571 .0559
1.6 .0548 .0537 .0526 .0516 .0505 .0495 .0485 .0175 .0465 .0455
1.7 .0446 .0436 .0427 .0418 .0409 .0401 .0392 .0384 .0375 .0367
1.8 .0359 .0351 .0344 .0336 .0329 .0322 .0314 .0307 .0301 .0294
1.9 .0287 .0281 .0274 .0268 .0262 .0256 .0250 .0244 .0239 .0233
2.0 .0228 .0222 .0217 .0212 .0207 .0202 .0197 .0192 .0188 .0183
2.1 .0179 .0174 .0170 .0166 .0162 .0158 .0154 .0150 .0146 .0143
2.2 .0139 .0136 .0132 .0129 .0125 .0122 .0119 .0116 .0113 .0110
2.3 .0107 .0104 .0102 .00990 .00964 .00939 .00914 .00889 .00866 .00842
2.4 .00829 .00798 .00776 .00755 .00734 .00714 .00695 .00676 .00657 .00039
2.5 .00621 .00604 .00587 .00570 .00554 .00539 .00523 .00508 .00494 .00480
2.6 .00466 .00453 .00440 .00427 .00415 .00402 .00391 .00379 .00363 .00357
2.7 .00347 .00336 .00326 .00317 .00307 .0029S .00289 .00280 .00272 .00264
2.8 .00256 .00248 .00240 .00233 .00226 .00219 .00212 .00205 .00199 .00193
2.9 .00187 .00181 .00175 .00169 .00164 .00159 .00154 .00149 .00144 .00139
Ka .0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
3 .00135 .0*968 .0*687 .0*483 .0*337 .0*233 .0*159 .0*108 .0*723 .0*481
4 .043 1 7 .0*207 .0*133 .0*854 ,0*541 .0*340 .0*211 .0*130 .0*793 .0*479
5 .0*287 .0*170 .07996 .0*579 .0*333 .07190 .0*107 .0*599 .0*332 .0*182
6 .0*987 .0*530 .0*282 .0*149 .0“777 .0**402 .0,0206 .0l5104 .0J1523 .0,1250
For a design problem for which the parameters y and o of the normal 
demand density are known an exact design value which provides performance 
is given by y + cr.
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* Extracted from Bowker & Lieberman
Table A.2 Percentage Points of the t Distribution *.
Table of t - the 100CC percentage point of the t distribution 
CL t v
for v degrees of freedom.
a
V 0.40 0.25 0.10 0.05 0.025 0.01 0.005 0.0025 0.001 0.0005
1 0.325 1.000 3.078 6.314 12.706 31.821 63.657 127.32 318.31 636.62
2 .2S9 0.816 1.886 2.920 4.303 6.965 9.925 14.089 23.326 31.598
3 .277 .765 1.638 2.353 3.1S2 4.541 5.841 7.453 10.213 12.924
4 .271 .741 1.533 2.132 2.776 3.747 4.604 5.598 7.173 8.610
5 0.267 0.727 1.476 2.015 2.571 3.365 4.032 4.773 5.893 6.869
6 .265 .718 1.440 1.943 2.447 3.143 3.707 4.317 5.208 5.959
7 .263 .711 1.415 1.895 2.365 2.998 3.499 4.029 4.785 5.40S
8 .262 .706 1.397 1.860 2.306 2.896 3.355 3.833 4.501 5.041
9 .261 .703 1.383 1.833 2.262 2.821 3.250 3.690 4.297 4.781
10 0.260 0.700 1.372 1.812 2.228 2.764 3.169 3.581 4.144 4.587
11 .260 .697 1.363 1.796 2.201 2.718 3.106 3.497 4.025 4.437
12 .259 .695 1.356 1.782 2.179 2.681 3.055 3.428 3.930 4.318
13 .259 .694 1.350 1.771 2.160 2.650 3.012 3.372 3.852 4.221
14 .258 .692 1.345 1.761 2.145 2.624 2.977 3.326 3.787 4.140
15 0.258 0.691 1.341 1.753 2.131 2.602 2.947 3.286 3.733 4.073
16 .258 .690 1.337 1.746 2.120 2.583 2.921 3.252 3.686 4.015
17 .257 .689 1.333 1.740 2.110 2.567 2.’898 3.222 3.646 3.965
18 .257 .688 1.330 1.734 2.101 2.552 2.878 3.197 3.610 3.922
19 .257 .688 1.328 1.729 2.093 2.539 2.861 3.174 3.579 3.883
20 0.257 •0.687 1.325 1.725 2.086 2.528 2.845 3.153 3.552 3.850
21 .257 .686 1.323 1.721 2.0S0 2.518 2.831 3.135 3.527. 3.819
22 .256 .686 1.321 1.717 2.074 2.508 2.819 3.119 3.505 3.792
23 .256 .685 1.319 1.714 2.069 2.500 2.807 3.104 3.485 3.767
24 .256 .685 1.318 1.711 2.064 2.492 2.797 3.091 3.467 3.745
25 0.256 0.684 1.316 1.708 2.060 2.485 2.787 3.078 3.450 3.725
26 .256 .684 1.315 1.706 2.056 2.479 2.779 3.067 3.435 3.707
27 .256 .684 1.314 1.703 2.052 2.473 2.771 3.057 3.421 3.690
28 .256 .683 1.313 1.701 2.048 2.467 2.763 3.047 3.408 3.674
29 .256 .683 1.311 1.699 2.045 2.462 2.756 3.038 3.396 3.659
30 0.256 0.683 1.310 1.697 2.042 2.457 2.750 3.030 3.385 3.646
40 .255 .681 1.303 1.684 2.021 2.423 2.704 2.971 3.307 3.551
60 .254 .679 1.296 J. 671 2.000 2.390 2.660 2.915 . 3.232 3.460
120 .254 .677 1.289 1.658 1.980 2.358 2.617 2.860 3.160 3.373
CO .253 .674 1.282 1.645 1.960 2.326 2.576 2.807 3.090 3.291
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Table extracted from Bowker & Lieberman
Table A.3. Percentage Points of the Distribution.
Table of “ the 100Q£percentage points of the X
distribution for v degrees of freedom.
a
V
.995 .99 .975 .95 .90 .75 .50
1 .0*393 .03157 .03982 .00393 .0158 .102 .455
2 .0100 .0201 .0506 .103 .211 . .575 1.386
3 .0717 .115 .216 .352 .584 1.213 2.366
4 .207 .297 .484 .711 1.064 1.923 3.357
5 .412 .554 .831 1.145 1.610 2.675 4.351
6 .676 .872 1.237 1.635 2.204 3.455 5.348
7 .989 1.239 1.690 2.167 2.833 4.255 6.346
6 1.344 1.646 2.180 2.733 3.490 5.071 7.344
9 1.735 2.088 2.700 3.325 4.168 5,899 8.343
10 2.156 2.558 3.247 3.940 4.865 6.737 9.342
11 2.603 3.053 3.816 4.575 5.578 7.584 10.341
12 3.074 3.571 4.404 5.226 6.304 8.438 11.340
13 3.565 4.107 5.009 5.892 '7.042 9.299 12.340
14 4.075 4.660 5.629 6.571 7.790 10.165 13.339
15 4.601 5.229 6.262 7.261 8.547 11.036 14.339
16 5.142 5.812 6.908 7.962 9.312 11.912 15.338
17 5.697 6.408 7.564 8.672 10.085 12.792 16.338
18 6.265 7.015 8.231 9.390 10.865 13.675 17.338
19 6.844 7.633 8.907 10.117 11.651 14.562 18.338
20 7.434 8.260 9.591 10.851 •12.443 15.452 19.337
21 8.03.4 8.897 10.283 11.591 13.240 16.344 20.337
22 8.643 9.542 10.982 12.338 14.041 17.240 21.337
23 9.260 10.196 1 1 .6 8 8 13.091 14.848 18.137 22.337
24 9.886 10.856 12.401 13.848 15.659 19.037 22.337
25 10.520 11.524 13.120 14.611 16.473 19.939 24.337
26 11.160 12.198 13.844 15.379 17.292 20.843 25.336
27 11.808 12.879 .14.573 16.151 18.114 21.749 26.336
28 12.461 13.565 15.308 16.928 18.939 22.657 27.336
29 13.121 14.256 16.047 17.708 19.768 23.567 28.336
30 13.787 14.953 16.791 18.493 20.599 24.478 29.336
40 20.707 22.164 24.433 26.509 29.051 33.660 39.335
50 27.991 29.707 32.357 34.764 37.689 42.942 49.335
60 35.535 37.485 40.482 43.188 46.459 52.294 59.335
70 43.275 45.442 48.758 51.739 55.329 61.698 69.334
80 51.172 53.540 57.153 60.391 64.278 71.145 79.334
90 59.196 61.754 65.647 69.126 73.291 80.625 89.334
100 67.328 70.065 74.222 77.929 82.358 90.133 99.334
K a -  2.576 -2 .3 2 6 -1 .9 6 0 -1 .6 4 5 -1 .2 8 2 -0 .6 7 4 5 0 .0 0 0•
123 Extracted from Bowker and Lieberman.
Table A.3 (continued).
.25 ,c .10 .05 .025 .01 .005 .001 cc V
1.323 2.706 3.841 .5.024 6.635 7.879 10.828 1
2.773 4.605 5.991 7.378 9.210 10.597 13.816 2
4.108 6.251 7.815 9.348 11.345 12.838 16.266 3
5.385 7.779 9.488 11.143 13.277 14.860 18.467 4
6.626 9.236 11.070 12.832 15.086 16.750 20.515 5
7.841 10.645 12.592 14.449 16.812 18.548 22.458 6
9.037 12.017 14.067 16.013 18.475 20.278 24.322 7
10.219 13.362 15.507 17.535 20.090 21.955 26.125 8
11.389 14.684 16.919 19.023 21.666 23.589 27.877 9
12.549 • 15.987 18.307 20.483 23.209 25.188 29.588 1.0
13.701 17.275 19.675 21.920 24.725 26.757 31.264 11
14.845 18.549 21.026 23.337 26.217 28.300 32.909 12
15.984 19.812 22.362 24.736 27.688 29.819 34.528 13
17.117 21.064 23.685 26.119 29.141 31.319 36.123 . 14
18.245 22.307 24.996 27.488 30.578 32.801 37.697 15
19.369 23.542 26.296 28.845 32.000 34.267 39.252 16
20.489 24.769 27.587 30.191 33.409 35.718 40.790 17
21.605 25.989 28.869 31.526 34.805 37.156 43.332 18
22.718 27.204 30.144 32.852 36.191 38.582 43.820 19
23.828 28.412 31.410 34.170 37.566 39.997 45.315 20
24.935 29.615 32.671 35.479 38.932 41.401 46.797 21
26.039 30.813 33.924 36.781 40.289 42.796 48.268 22
27.141 32.007 35.172 38.076 41.638 44.181 49.728 23
28.241 33.196 36.415 39.364 42.980 45.558 51.179 24
29.339 34.382 37.652 40.646 44.314 46.928 52.620 25
30.434 35.563 38.885 41.923 45.642 48.290 54.052 26
31.528 36.741 40.113 43.194 46.963 49.645 55.476 27
32.620 37.916 41.337 44.461 48.278 50.993 56.892 28
33.711 39.087 42.557 45.722 49.588 52.336 58.302 2?
34.800 40.256 43.773 46.979 50.892 53.672 59.703 30
45.616 51.805 55.758 59.342 63.691 66.766 73.402 40
56.334 63.167 67.505 71.420 76.154 79.490 86.661 50
66.981 74.397 79.082 83.298 88.379 91.952 99.607 60
77.577 85.527 90.531 95.023 100.425 104.215 112.317 70
88.130 96.578 101.879 106.629 112.329 116.321 124.839 SO
98.650 107.565 113.145 118.136 124.116 128.299 137.208 90
109.141 118.498 124.342 129.561 135.807 140.169 149.449 100
+0.6745 +1.282 +  1.645 +  1.960 +  2.326 + 2 .576 + 3 .0 9 0 K*
Table A.4 Expected Means and Standard Deviations of Reduced Extremes
N- ' -y.v
I!
cr.v j! Arj! . S .V___ __________
•
«.v
__ ■. ____
20
21 'O }
23 
*) *
0. 5230  
• ^
! 5202 
. 5230
1 .0 6 2 8  
1. 0095  
1. 0755  
1. 0812  
1. 0565
1
50
51
i 52 
51
0. 54 85 
. 5489 
. 5193 
.5 1 9 7  
. 5501
1. 1007 
1. 1023 
1. 1 035 
1. 1053 
1 .1007
25 
' 20
27
28  
29
. 5309  
. 5320  
. 5332  
. 5343  
. 5*153
1 .0 9 1 5  
1. 0901 
1. 1004 
1. 1017 
1. 10S6
55
50
57
58
59
. 5504  
. 5508  
. 5511 
. 5515 
. 5518
1. 1081 
1. 1090 
1. 1708 
1. 1721 
1. 1731
30
31
32
33
34
■ .5 3 6 2  
. 5371
. 5380  
. 5388  
.5 3 9 6
1. 1124 i 
1. 1159 ! 
1. 1193 I 
1. 1226 
1. 1255
60
62
64 
GO
65
. 5521 
. 5527 
. 5533 
. 5538  
. 5513
1. 1747 
1. 1770 
1. 1793 
1. 1814 
1. 1834
35
36
37
38
39
. 5403  
. 5410  
. 5418  
. 5424 
.5 4 3 0
1. 1285 
1. 1313 
1. 1339 
1. 1363 
1. 1388
• 70  
72 
74 
76 
78
. 55 IS  
. 5552 
. 5557 
. 5561 
. 5565
1. 1854 
1. 1S73 
1. 1890 
1. 1906 
1. 1923
•40
41
42
43
44
. 5436  
. 5442  
. 5448  
. 5453  
. 545S
1. 1413 
1. 1436 
1. 1458 
1. 1480 
1. 1499
80
82
84
86
88
. 5569  
. 5572 
. 5576  
. 5580  
.5 5 8 3
1. 1938  
1. 1953 
1. 1907 
1. 10S0 
1. 1991
45
46
47
48
49
. 5463  
. 54GS 
. 5473  
. 5477  
. 5481
1. 1519 
1. 1538 
1. 1557 
1. 1574 
1 .1 5 9 0
j  90  
! 92 
94 
96 
93 
100
. 5580  
. 5589 
. 5592 
. 5505  
. 5598  
. 5600
1. 2007  
1. 2020  
1. 2032  
1. 2044  
1. 2055  
1. 2005
Extracted from Gumbel^”^
Table A.5 Cumulative Probability Function and Density 
Function of Extremes
y
Cum ulative probability 
function of extremes
Density function of 
extremes
y
Cum uietive probability 
function of extremes
Denstty function of 
extremes
cxp( — err) c x p ( - y - c V ) P* exp( — e-yi 4‘* e x p ( - j - e - r )
- 3. o . 00000 00 0. 0 . 30787 94 3 .30787 94 - 3 0 8  63
- 2. 9 , 00000 00 . 00000 02 + 5 . 1 . 40100 77 35 20 .30010 42 328 39
- 2. S . 00000 01 .00000 12 21 . 2 .41099 10 65 90 .36105 29 283 92
2. 7 . ooooo 03 0 . 00000 51 78 ! 3 . 47072 37 91 99 .35316 56 237 87
• 2. (i . ooooo 14 21 .00001 91 2 41 . 4 . 51154 48 113 49 . 34289 68 192 38
- 2. r, . ooooo 51 + 03 . OOOOO 21 -i o 55 0 .5 . 54523 92 - 1 3 0 54 .33070 43 - 1 4 9  06
- 2- 'I . .00001 03 1 07 .00017 99 15 32 .0 . 57703 58 143 45 . 31701 33 109 05
7 . 00800 53 152 4S . 30222 45 73 00
-  2. -10 . 00001 03 + 44 .00017 99 +  3 98 ! 8 . 03805 62 158 17 .28009 71 41 44
-  2. 25 . 00002 70 08 .00029 29 5 70 . 9 . 66593 07 160 92 .27074 72 -  14 30
• 2. 20 . 0000-1 00 1 03 .00010 17 8 13
1.0 . 69220 00 -1 6 1 18 . 25464 64 +  8 48- 2. 25 . 00007 58 +  I 51 .00071 89 -I 11 17 I. 1 . 71080 20 159 30 . 23802 28 27 15
2. 20 . 00012 01 2 10 .00108 03 14 90 1. 2 . 73993 41 155 87 .22280 39 42 04
-  2. 15 . 00018 00 3 02 . 00100 40 19 55 1.3 .70141 92 151 07 .20751 91 53 56
2. 10 . . 00028 11 4 13 . 00232 00 24 97 1. -1 . 78145 56 145 26 .19270 46 62 12
2. 05 . 00012 31 5 53 .00328 00 31 18
r. 5 . 80001 07 -  138 73 .17850 65 +  68 12
2. 00 . 00001 80 I- 7 20 .00150 03 •I 38 11 1. 0 .81717 95 131 71 . 1 649S 57 71 96
• 1. 05 . 00< 88 01 0 35 .00022 81 45 01 1. 7 . 83303 17 124 39 . 15218 12 74 01
1. 00 .00121 84 1 1 82 .00834 07 53 50 1. 8 . 84764 03 110 95 . 14011 40 74 58
-1. X5 . 00172 07 11 70 .01100 04 01 53 1. 9 . 8G107 93 109 52 . 12879 04 73 98
1. K0 .00235 87 17 08 .01120 93 09 43
2 .0 . 87342 30 - 1 0 2 19 .11820 50 +  72 45
. -  1. 75 . 00310 82 •1 21 01 .01823 15 •I 70 88 2. J . 88474 45 95 05 .10834 26 70 22
-1. 70 . 00110 10 25 0.5 .02290 12 83 58 2 .2 .89511 49 88 10 .09918 16 67 40
• 1. 05 .00517 82 20 08 .02852 48 89 22 2 .3 . 90400 32 81 57 . 09009 45 64 35
- -1. 00 . 00700 20 34 55 .03497 81 93 49 2. 4 .91327 53 75 30 . 08285 05 61 00
- I. 55 . 00800 15 30 30 .04230 34 90 17
2. 5 . 92119 37 -  69 37 . 07501 62 +  57 51
-  1. 50 . 01131 43 -I I I 14 .05070 71 •I 97 05 2. 0 . 9284 1 77 63 80 . 00895 69 53 97
■ -  1. 45 . 01107 84 18 07 .00001 78 90 00 2. 7 . 93500 30 58 58 .06283 74 50 45
- I. 10 . 01733 20 53 70 i .07028 48 92 90 2. 8 . 94100 20 53 71 . 05722 24 46 98
• • 1. 35 .02112 23 58 23 .08147 77 87 93 2. 9 . 94046 32 49 18 .05207 75 43 63
1. 30 . 0251(1 14 02 17 .09351 05 81 00
3. 0 . 95143 20 -  44 OS . 04736 90 +  40 40
I. 25 .03010 04 •I 00 30 .10012 20 -I- 72 30 3. 1 . 95595 04 41 09 . 04306 48 37 32
- 1. 20 . 03014 80 00 07 1 . 12001 70 02 03 3. 2 . 90005 74 37 51 . 03913 41 34 40
• 1. 15 . 01250 25 72 18 ! .13123 10 50 43 3 .3 . 90378 87 34 21 . 03554 76 31 65
- I .  10 .01058 01 71 09 . 1 1894 08 37 78 3. 1 . 90717 75 31 18 .03227 79 29 07
1. 05 . 057 10 31 70 25 . 10103 90 21 37
3. 5 . 97025 40 -  28 39 . 02929 91 + 20 65
1. 00 . 00508 80 1 77 12 . 17937 41 I 10 52 3. 0 .97301 02 25 84 . 02058 72 24 41
- 0. 05 .0 7 5 3 1 20 77 30 .19181 41 -  3 48 3. 7 . 97557 90 23 50 . 02411 98 22 33
■ - . 00 . 085 If. 80 70 78 .21021 95 17 34 3. 8 . 97787 70 21 37 .02187 59 20 40
-  . 85 . 00030 17 75 57 . 22515 23 30 78 3. 9 . 97990 10 19 42 . 01983 03 18 63
- . 80 . 10800 90 73 71 . 21037 81 13 57
1. 0 .98185 11 -  17 64 .01708 32 -I 16 99
- 0 .  75 . 12030 23 1 71 23 . 25187 04 -  55 49
-  . 70 . 13348 08 08 18 . 208X0 94 00 38
-  .05 . 14720 22 04 01 . 28208 07 70 10 4. 0 . 98185 1! - • 7 0  36 . 01798 32 +  07 79
-  . 00 . 10108 28 00 50 . 29400 53 84 50 4. 2 .98511 03 57 99 . 01477 24 56 20
-  . 55 . 17070 80 50 18 . 30028 08 91 08 4. 4 . 98779 77 47 73 .01212 75 46 57
4. 0 . ‘18999 85 39 25 . 00995 13 38 47
-  n. 50 . 10220 50 -1 51 44 .31701 19 -  97 40 4. 8 . 991S0 40 32 20 . 00S16 23 31 73
- . 15 . 20830 00 40 45 .32083 10 101 89
-  . 40 . 22100 18 41 28 .33500 30 105 00 5. 0 . 99328 47 - 20 49 . 00009 27 -j- 20 13
• . 35 .21103 05 35 08 .34332 85 100 85 5. 2 . 99449 80 21 74 . 00548 62 21 50
- . 30 . 25027 09 30 01 .*31998 72 107 51 5. 4 .99549 30 17 83 . 00449 62 17 67
5. 0 . 99030 90 14 02 . 00308 42 14 52
• 0. 25 . 27002 03 +  25 24 .35557 27 - 1 0 7 07 . 5. 8 .99697 70 11 99 . 00301 84 11 92
-  . 20 . 20481 03 10 02 . 30008 95 105 03
. 15 . 31201 17 14 70 .30355 15 103 30 0. 0 .99752 43 -  9 83 . 00247 26 + 9 78
- . 10 . 33115 13 0 01 .30598 21 100 17 0. 2 . 99797 20 8 05 . 00202 53 8 02
-  .0 5 , 31040 32 -I- 4 09 .30741 21 90 38 0. 4 .99833 98 0 60 . 00105 88 6 58
0. 0 . 99S64 00 5 40 .00135 85 5 39
0. 00 . 30787 04 2 .30787 91 -  92 02 0. 8 . 99888 OS 4 43 . 00111 25 4 42
(124)
* Taken from National Bureau of Standards
APPENDIX I I
S T A T IS T IC A L  ANALYSIS OF EXTREME VALUE DATA -  
EXAMPLE OF PROCEDURE
a) Plotting Extreme Value Data
Extremes
X
Cumulative Frequency 
m
Plotting Position 
m/N+1 
total number of 
extremes
0.75 1 0.0417
0.75 2 0.0833
0.75 3 0.1250
0.80 4 0.1667
0.81 5 0.2083
0.88 6 0.2500
0.90 7 0.2916
0.90 8 0.3333
0.93 9 0.3750
0.98 10 0.4167
1.00 11 0.4583
1.01 12 0.5000
1.02 13 0.5416
1.08 14 0.5833
1.08 15 0.6250
1 .15 16 0.6667
1.15 17 0.7083
1.16 18 0.7500
1.20 19 0.7917
1.20 20 0.8333
1.31 21 0.8750
1.38 22 0.9167
1.43 23 0.9583
Table A.6 Determining the Plotting Position of Extreme Observations.
This data is shown plotted on extreme value probability paper 
in Figure A.I.
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b) Fitting the best straight line to extreme observations.
After plotting the N extreme observations on extreme value 
probability paper (Figure A.l) the question arises of how to determine 
the equation of the best fitting straight line. Let this line be of 
the general form
X  e  u  +  J. X y  -  a . l
where x is the extreme observations and y is the double logarithm 
r m • "
N+l ;
Finding the equation of the best fitting straight line now reduces
to a special case of the classical technique of minimising the sum of
', 1 * 
the squares of the errors. Algebraically u and — are given by
:v: y . :
u “ x    - a.2a
5- = IT ~ a -3° N
where
x is the sample mean determined from observed data
Sx is the sample standard deviation again determined from observed
data
y^ is the expected mean of the population
and Ojj is the expected standard deviation of the population.
yN and are theoretical quantities depending only upon sample
size. In principle the numerical calculation of y^ and cr^ is simple
enough but very tedious. Table A.4 gives yM and a as functions of N 
(15) . W(Taken from Gumbel ). Using this table it is possible to determine
u and — for any set of extreme observations.
To illustrate this line fitting procedure the extremal distribu­
tion shown in Figure A.l will be used;-
* The theoretical derivation of equations a.2 and a.3 is given in 
Gumbel .
Stage 1. Determine the mean of the extreme observations
x = 1.027
Stage 2. Determine the standard deviation of the extreme observations
S = 0.1950
x
Stage 3. Use Table A.4 to determine the expected mean, y^, and 
expected standard deviation, a^.
For N equal to 23
y23 = 0.5283 and g 23 = 1..0811
Stage 4. Determine the gradient of the line;
1 = S
-  ~  = 0.1804
°N , ■
Stage 5. Determine the intercept of the line
- y23
u = x - = 0.9317
a
Stage 6. The best fitting line is given by;
x = —  x y + u a J
= 0.1804y + 0.9317 
where y = - log[ - log(l-Pf)] .
c) Control Curves
The previous section described how the algebraic form of the best 
fitting straight line can be found for a set of extreme observations. 
Control curves should be used to indicate how well this best fitting 
line fits the observations. Control curves are constructed by adding 
to and subtracting from the theoretical values of x the standard 
error of each point. If a single standard error is used to construct 
the control curves then there is a 0.6827 probability that future 
extremes predicted using this distribution function will be contained 
within the control interval. If instead of one standard error, twice 
this amount is used the probability rises to 0.95 and the interval
spreads accordingly. Table A.7.gives the reduced standard errors,
b x as a function of y, the reduced variate. This table is used
to set up the control curves of an extremal distribution. For a more
detailed discussion of extreme value control curves the reader is
(15}
referred to Gumbel
As an example consider the extremal distribution illustrated in 
Figure A.l. The equation of the theoretical straight line is;
x = 0.1804y + 0.9317
The first step in constructing control curves is to determine the
value of — 7*-, For this example 
°^N
—  « 0.1804 x 0.2085 = 0.0376
oo'fc
Table A.7 illustrates the determination of the control curves for 
this particular set of data.
y xb =  o  x ■
y
ip x —  = e 
av^ N
X
m
x + e  m x -e m
-0.5 1.2431 0.0467 0.8415 0.888 0.7948
0 1.3108 0.049 0.9317 0^9807 0.8827
0.5 1.5057 0.0566 1.0219 1.0786 0.9654
1.0 1.8126 0.068 1.1121 1.1801 1.0441
1.5 2.2408 0.0842 1.2023 1.2865 1.118
2.0 2.8129 0.105 1.2925 1.395 1.1875
Table A.7.
The second column of Table A.7 is the reduced standard errors which
when multiplied by — —  gives the actual standard errors of the m values
ou/n
of N (column 3). These errors are added and subtracted from x to
m
give the control curves (columns 5 and 6). The control interval is 
illustrated on Figure A.l.
d) Extrapolation
The extreme probabilities of the largest and the penultimate
values may be used to extend the control curves. For the largest
extreme value the points on the 0.68 control curve are given by the
observed Txf variate value ± . For the numerical example useda
in this appendix
A d i QZ. = 0.205
For the penultimate value, the relevant points on the 0.68 control 
i ai 
example
0 7594
curve re given by the observed x variate value ± — ----  . For this
= 0.137
For extrapolation of the control curves beyond the largest extreme 
observation straight lines are drawn parallel to the best fitting 
straight line at distances 0.32T and 3.13T from the theoretical line. 
The extrapolated control curves are illustrated in Figure A.l.
APPENDIX III 
DISCOUNT RATINGS*
N o. o f years
R ate o f  interest
4 % J /O 0 /  0 /a 7%
I 0-962 0-952 0-943 0-935
' 2 1-886 1-859 1-833 1-808
3 2-775 2-723 2-673 2-624
4 3-630 3-546 3-465 3387
5 4-452 4-330 4-212 4-100
io 8- m 7-722 7-360 7-024
*5 i i - i i 8 10-380 9-712 9-108
20 13-590 12-462 11-470 10-594
25 15-622 14-094 12-783 11-654
30 17-292 15-373 I3-765 12-409
35 18-665 16-374 14-498 12-948
40 19-793 17-159 15-046 13-332
45 20-720 * 17-774 15-456 13-605
50 21-482 18-256 15-762 13-801
55 22-109 18-633 15-991 13-940
6o 22-624 18-929 16161 14-039
70 23-395 19-343 16-385 14-160
8o 23-915 19-597 16-509 14-222
90 24-267 19-752 16-579 14-253
100 24-505 19-848 16-618 14-269
Table A .8 The Present Worth of Regular Annual Payments of £1 for 
n years (in £'s)
* Extracted from Stone
APPENDIX IV
THE KOL.MOGOROV-SMIRNOV TEST
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a quantitative test for measuring 
the goodness of fit of a hypothesized distribution function. To 
illustrate the test procedure consider the tensile strength data 
plotted as a CDF,'(jp (x)') in Figure A.2.
1.00
0.90
0.80
.0 .70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.10
2750 2800 2850 2900 2950 3000 3050 3100  3150 3200
Tensile strength o f  rubber compound (psi)
Figure A.2. Comparison between the sample CDF, F^Cx), and the
Normal CDF, FQ (x) with mean equal to 3000p.s.i. and Standard 
Deviation equal to lOOp.s.i.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test will be used to test the hypothesis that 
the underlying distribution is normal with a mean equal to 3000 p.s.i. 
and a standard deviation equal to 100 p.s.i. The hypothesized dis­
tribution F q ( x )  is shown in Figure A.2. At each njump point11 the
differences I F (x) - F (x) I and I F (x.) - F (x. ) I are obtained.
1 o n ' o l n m
The maximum absolute difference occurs at the jump point corresponding 
to the.tensile strength of 3,053.02, and the maximum absolute difference 
is 0.880 - 0.702 = 0.178. The table of percentage points for the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic is reproduced as Table A.9. For a
5% level of significance when the sample size is 25, the critical
value d„ is 0.264 (Taken from Table A.9). Since the maximum
0.05;25
absolute difference between F (x) and F (x) is 0.178 which is lesso n
than 0.264, the hypothesis is accepted that Fq (x ) is normal with 
mean equal to 3000 and standard deviation equal to 100.
|C Significance Level
Sample Size (//) 10% 5% 1 %
1 0.950 0.975 0.995
2 0.776 0.842 0.929
3 0.642 0.708 0.829
4 0.564 0.624 0.734
5 0.510 0.563 0.669
6 0.470 0.521 0.618
7 0.438 0.486 0.577
8 0.411 0.457 0.543
9 0.388 0.432 0.514
10 0.368 0.409 0.486
11 0.352 0.391 0.468
12 0.338 0.375 0.450
13 0.325 0.361 0.433
14 0.314 0.349 0.418
15 0.304 0.338 0.404
16 0.295 0.328 0 .392,
17 0.286 0.318 0.381"
18 0.278 0.309 0.371
19 0.272 0.301 0.363
20 0.264 0.294 0.352
25 0.24 0.264 0.317
30 0.22 0.242 0.290
35 0.21 0.23 0.27
40 0.210 0.252
50 0.188 0.226
60 0.172 0.207
70 0.160 0.192
80 0.150 0.180
90 0.141
100 0.134
Approximate formula: 1.22
• *fn
1.36
T Z
1.63
7 7
Table A.9. Percentage Points for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
*
Statistic.
123Taken from Bowker & Lieberman.
COMPUTER PROGRAM L IS T IN G S
1) Program to determine the probability of failure, CS1, associated 
with N appliances when the probability of any one appliance being 
in use is PI.
v »  I r  •
' 00.16. MASTER U I ^ n r i l A l
yoiy j HE AD < 5 f.Mlu) NO
00<JO 600 FUHilA T < I Z)
\)M(n  I F C 'U K  HR , U )  GO T 1’ I
PHI Tf; (•'>, 700) HO 
O U d . 5  7 0 0  F U H ’ I A i O H T  f 1 ’ H K O D L E M  N O
0 * ^ 4  C A U L  U Ml  i n  A T  I  O i l
oud> . r,o in 1
O odO Z S TOP
w i t  ri.'o
E N D  OF S ' E b h E M T #  U N O T H  AT i N A M E  U I N U M I A t .
u a ^ a  . SUBRfiu*r;i|fc SUMMATION
uo**v d i m e n s i o n  s i m n o o ?
0 0 5 U  RE AO < b 11 00) pi ,f]
0U4T 100 T 0 K H A T < E 1 0 fa # 14)
VQ$t WRI TE <6 f 200) pi ,1)
005.5 200 p O R M A T ( / /  T O X i  ' P T  >*» '• N «» # I A / / )
0*154 . WRlTE(tW8U0)
0 0 5 b  800 F O H M A T ( / / n X # ,vlf r d 0 X r ,S U ( l ' , 2 O X r « C S J , 2 0 X r ,CS'i^#
UU50 CS = 0 g U
\iosr nn*n+t.
0(156 D° .500 I al t NN
oo.5y j-i-i
0040 K = U M t|
;00 4T S U - H P  = FAC<N)/<EAC'(J)-*FAC<X))*P1**J*(1-P,I)*&
004<; C S s s C S ^ S U H U )
,0045 CS'I a 1 , o - C S  ■
0044 300 WRITE<6*4UG) . J # S«iM( I) , CS , CSV
0045 400 FORMAT < 11 bf1U'Xi5E<!0,8/)
0 0 4 6  'RETURN
004 7 END
END UF SEONEMT# IFNOTri 134, NAME SUMMATION
00 45 
004V 
00 PO 
oo bi 
oo bd 
00>i 
00 >4
END UF SEGMENT, LENGTH 4«# NAME FAC
FUNCTION FAC(fi) 
S = T
DO T 000 I«1 ,fi 
1000 $=S*I 
FAC«S 
RETURN 
END
rli
2) Program to determine the probability 01 w*
when there are K floors and N passengers in the lift.
0015 MASTER LIFT
001© . 10 READ (1/101) H/K
0017 DIMENSION L;25)
0U18 C N IS THE HUMBER Of PERSONS AND K IS THE NlHAER OF FLOORS
001^ WRITE (2,501) N ,VC .
QOCV 501 FORMAT(3't Na, I3/4H Kb,13//)'
0021 WRITE (2,106)
0022 101 FORMAT{213)
0023 . FUaFACT(N)
0024 FK*K
0025 FT0T«FK**W 1
0026 IF (N) 102,102,103 ' ,
0027 103 DO 200 Nal,t
0025 106 F0RNAT(37H ST->PS POSSIBILITIES PROBABILITY)
002Y FS*»0
0030 IF (N-N> 1^0,27,27
0031 27 IF(W*1) 100,25,26
0032 25 1(1)=N
0033 call jc/»l (l,fn,m,fss
0034 GOTJ 100
0035 26 MM1s?H~1
0056 DU 21 1=1 ,*mv
0037 21 L(I)b 1
0035 l (H)bH»-N+1
003V CALL JCm LU,FN,H,FS)
0040 IF (L(M)-1> 1"0,100,4
0041 4 L(MM1)k L(MMD+1
0042 L(H)o L(M)-1
0043 CALL JCAL (L,FM,M,PS)
0044 IF (l(M)"1) 100,6,4
0045 6 JbH»2
0046 IF (JJ100,100,17
Q047 17 L (J)s L (J) *1 '
0048 J1«J*1
.. 0049 DO 16 I»J1, Mil
0050 16 L(I)»1
0051 lOMrO
0052 DO ? I si,WM1
0053 7 LUMoLOil+Ld)
0054 l (-1>sH«-L!JM
0055 CALL JCAL (L,F:J,H,FS)
0056 IF (L(II)■•1) 100,5,4
0057 3
0058 IF (J-^ 1) 100,17,17 -
005V 100 KM»K«M ...........
0060 FD«FACT(<)/FACT(r1)/FACT(KM>*FS
0061 FIDcsFD/FTHT
0062 WHITE U,V!i> -l,F0,F!DE
0063 105 FUR.1AT(I3/E15.6,E12.A)
0064 200 CU.IT1NUL
0065 GOTO 10
^  0060.. 102 STJP
00©? END
0068
0069
0070
0071
0072
0073
0074
0075 
OO/o
0077 V :  REAL FUNCTION FAGT(N)
0078 IF (N) 34,31,32
0079 32 A® 1,
.0080 DO 33 1=1 iN
0051 b«i
0052 33 A a A * H
0083 F A C T ® A
0084 ' OUT.) 34
0065 31 FACT»1,
0080 .H «CTJ p !
0087 ... END
SUUrtOJTIME JCAL (L,FN,M,FS) 
DIMENSION L (25)
fI»*1.
DO 401 1=1,M
401 FPaFP*FACT<L(D)
FR»FN/fP .
F'Se-FS + FH 
« E T J R 
END
